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ABSTRACT
The Storytelling Cure
Medicine and Narrative from Galen to Shahrazad and Rousseau
By
Ryan A. Milov-Córdoba
Advisor: Anna Ayşe Akasoy
Are stories healing? This dissertation introduces and explores an idea that I call “the storytelling
cure.” With this term I capture a set of related notions about the healing power of stories that span
literary studies, intellectual history, philosophy, and medical practice. Through a comparative
study I make the case for “the storytelling cure” as a cross-cultural, multiconfessional, and
multilingual phenomenon of great age, complexity, and power, worthy of the most sustained
attention by the contemporary field of Comparative Literature. Concretely, this dissertation
presents three extended case studies of “storytelling cures” from three different kinds of texts (case
history, frame tale, thought experiment), three different cultures (Greco-Roman, Islamicate, early
modern European), and three different languages (ancient Greek, classical Arabic, French). The
key texts are Galen’s On Prognosis, the “Frame Tale” of the collection of stories known today as
1001 Nights, and The Second Discourse of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In drawing up these texts for
comparative analysis, my goal was to balance a sense of the cultural and historical differences that
make comparisons illuminating with the rendering power of a synthetic study. Galen, Shahrazad,
and Rousseau’s storytelling cures are each quite different, and they occur in different social
contexts as well, but they are unified by a shared historical and conceptual backdrop––the
reception history of the Galenic medical tradition, as it makes its way from Galen’s own day into
the ʿAbbāsid translation movement and on to the medical schools of Montpellier.
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There is this good word in our language: CURE.
If this word be allowed to talk,
it can be expected to tell a story.
Donald Winnicott
Home is Where We Start From
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Introduction
The Storytelling Cure
Freud tuvo la osadía de querer curar, cualquiera que
fuese la castidad lógica de los procedimientos…Pensó
que, en verdad, la psique, como tal, podía hallarse
valetudinaria, sufrir heridas psíquicas, padecer como
hernias espirituales, a que solo podía applicarse una
cirugía psicológica.
Freud had the audacity to want to cure people,
regardless of the logical purity of the procedure
involved…He believed that the mind, as such, could
get sick, and suffer emotional wounds and spiritual
hernias, to which the only response was a kind of
surgery of the mind.
—José Ortega y Gasset, 19221

This dissertation presents three studies that focus on the idea of a “storytelling cure.” Each
individual study looks in detail at a text with a storytelling cure in it from a different culture, time
period, and language, against the unifying backdrop of the reception history of the Galenic medical
tradition. These texts are Galen’s On Prognosis, the “Frame Tale” of the collection of stories
known today as 1001 Nights, and The Second Discourse of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Methodologically speaking, I have allowed each study to take on its own shape in the context of
historically and culturally specific questions, as well as disciplinary questions that scholars both
inside and outside of Comparative Literature are currently asking about these texts. In this regard
neither a comprehensive survey of storytelling cures, nor a genealogical account of their
emergence were ever the goals I set for myself in this project. To the contrary, I assumed, given
the wider cultural scope (Greco-Roman, Islamicate, early Modern European) and linguistic span

1
Ortega y Gasset, José, Obras Completas, vol. 6 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983), 302. The passage is from Ortega
y Gasset’s introduction to the translation of Freud’s complete works into Spanish by Luis López-Ballesteros y de
Torres for La Biblioteca Nueva.
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(ancient Greek, classical Arabic, French) that I wanted to pursue as a comparatist, it would be
better to focus on the local details at the dissertation stage, and allow a general theory of
storytelling cures to develop gradually in my subsequent work.
In this light, I see these three studies, on the one hand, as variations on a theme, and on the
other hand, as the first threads of a larger fabric of inquiry, which revolves around questions like
these: Are stories a kind of medicine? If so, how? Is the healing power of narrative culturally and
historically determined or is it an aspect of human nature, such that alongside John Niles’s idea of
homo narrans (humankind, the storyteller) we could also postulate a homo narrans sanans
(humankind, the storyteller-healer)?2 These are larger questions that I do not seek to answer in the
chapters of this dissertation, but I believe these chapters provide an original way to “lay hold” of
them as questions.3 At the same time this dissertation contributes to contemporary Comparative
Literature in three concrete ways: first, by offering three original interpretations of widely read
texts from three different cultures and putting them into conversation with one another; second, by
providing an example of how to engage the reception history of the Galenic medical body as a site
for the cross-cultural study of literature; third by extending the historical and cultural perspective
available to fields like narrative medicine, cultural psychiatry, and trauma studies in which the
healing aspects of storytelling are currently being actively explored.4

2

See Niles, John D., Homo Narrans: The Poetics and Anthropology of Oral Literature (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1999); for another perspective as homo fictus see Gottschall, Jonathan, The Storytelling Animal:
How Stories Make Us Human (New York: Mariner Books, 2012).
3
For “lay hold” see Auerbach, Erich, “The Philology of World Literature,” in Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach:
Time, History, and Literature, ed. James I. Porter, trans. Jane O. Newman (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014), 262.
4
See Goyal, Rishi, “Narration in Medicine,” in Handbook of Narratology, second edition, eds. Peter Hühn, Jan
Christoph Meister, John Pier, and Wolf Schmid (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 406-18; see also Kirmayer, Lawrence J.,
“Towards a Medicine of the Imagination,” New Literary History, 37 (2006): 583-605.
2

There is no one consistent terminology nor Lovejoy “unit-idea” for “the storytelling cure”
in any of the cultures that I’ve studied, and certainly not across these cultures.5 Nevertheless, a
broader, closely related idea has been shown by scholars to be widespread in each. This is the idea
of psychosomatic medicine. In 1958 Pedro Laín Entralgo highlighted a compelling series of terms
that capture elements of psychosomatic medicine running through classical Greco-Roman
cultures, from the terpnos logos of the Homeric Epics to catharsis in Aristotle.6 In a more recent
study of the Hippocratic medical tradition, Brooke Holmes has offered a complementary portrait
by focusing on how the Hippocratic doctors used their disciplinary position at the intersection of
psuchē (spirit, mind) and sōma (body) to present themselves as “guardians” of the whole self.7
Looking at the Roman imperial period, Susan Mattern, has compared hundreds of Galen’s case
histories and coined the idea of a “rhetoric of healing.”8 In 1973 Johann Cristoph Bürgel
established the importance of psychosomatic therapies in medieval Arabic medicine, and his work
was followed up by Michael Dols’ seminal study Majnūn: The Madman in Medieval Islamic
Society, which contains countless examples of the principle of psychosomatic medicine in action,
ranging from ninth-century doctor and philosopher Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s al-ʿilāj al-nafsānī, “soultherapy” to thirteenth-century hospital physician Badr al-Dīn al-Muẓaffar ibn al-Qāḍī alBaʿlabakkī’s mufarrih al-nafs, “a gladdening of the soul” through the body.9 Roy Porter’s Flesh

5
For “unit idea” see Lovejoy, Arthur, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 15,
originally 1936.
6
See Entralgo, Pedro Laín, La Curación por La Palabra en la Antigüedad Clásica (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos,
1958), 32. “Decir placentero” is Entralgo’s translation of terpnos logos.
7
Holmes, Brooke, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 182.
8
Mattern, Susan, Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
9
See Bürgel, Johann Cristopher, Psychosomatic Methods of Cures in the Islamic Middle Ages (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1973); Dols, Michael, Majnūn: The Madman in Medieval Islamic Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),
160-170; and more recently Koetschet, Pauline, “Experiencing Madness: Mental Patients in Medical Arabo-Islamic
Medicine” in Homo patiens: Approaches to the Patient in the Ancient World, eds. Georgia Petridou and Chiara
Thumiger (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 224-44.
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in the Age of Reason likewise draws attention to the prevalence of psychosomatic inquiries and
therapies in the eighteenth century, and one could hardly do better than to suggest Rousseau
himself as a figure who embodies a belief in the deep connection between the mind and the body.10
In the absence of a single ancient or medieval lemma that could be presented as the basis
of a unifying concept of the storytelling cure, the scholar interested in carrying out such a study
must either prioritize a particular premodern culture’s terminology or outline a modern definition
against which the variety of older instances can be compared. In this project, I have opted for the
latter, and rather than give the impression of having located the germ of the storytelling cure in a
single historical context, I proceed on the assumption that, given the widespread prevalence of
psychosomatic therapies involving stories across all three cultures, “storytelling cures” likely
emerged in a variety of forms at many times and in many contexts, no one of which deserves
precedence in the context of the present study. Single-emergence stories have dominated recent
histories of the body, such as Charlotte Epstein’s Birth of the State: The Place of the Body in
Crafting Modern Politics or Ed Cohen’s A Body Worth Defending: Immunity, Biopolitics, and the
Apotheosis of the Modern Body. These are rich studies that seek to lay bare the singular origins of
particular ideas about the human body such as “immunity.”11 However, I have found it untenable
to adopt this genealogical approach with “the storytelling cure.” As an idea, “the storytelling cure”
seems to me to emerge everywhere, and that is part of what draws me to it as a comparatist.
So, it falls to me in this introduction to pose the question and give an answer––What is a
storytelling cure? How do we think about this idea today? I find it helpful to answer these questions

10

See Porter, Roy, Flesh in the Age of Reason: The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul (New York: Norton,
2004), 44-61.
11
See Epstein, Charlotte, Birth of the State: The Place of the Body in Crafting Modern Politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2021); Cohen, Ed, A Body Worth Defending: Immunity, Biopolitics, and the Apotheosis of the
Modern Body (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).
4

on three levels––first, a definition of the “storytelling cure” as a literary trope; second, a definition
of it as a medical idea; third, a definition of it as a kind of imaginative experience, which can be
analyzed in contemporary Comparative Literature under the broad rubric of “reception.” As a
literary trope a “storytelling cure” is a situation in which a character in a story is cured by a story.
As a medical idea a storytelling cure is a situation in which the teller of a story, the listener to a
story, or both are cured by the telling or (and) the listening. In addition to these two definitions,
the idea of a storytelling cure also points to an imaginative experience, which reflects a “mode of
reception,” by which I mean the following. When people compare stories, they notice patterns in
the stories’ content. These are literary tropes, such as the rags-to-riches trope, the motherhood
trope, the anti-villain trope, and the apocalypse trope. In addition to these, I find it helpful to speak
of a set of “tropes of audience expectation.” Different people expect stories to do different things,
and these expectations influence their experience of the story. Some expect stories to entertain.
Others expect them to teach. Some expect stories to bring people together. Others expect stories
to deceive. Some expect stories to manipulate. Others expect stories to inspire. These “modes of
reception” are of course not mutually exclusive, and it is very difficult to prove that just one of
these is the correct expectation in any individual case. Still, being aware of these tropes of
expectation can help us not to assume that our own expectations about what stories do are always
the correct ones and projecting these onto all audiences. As a “mode of reception,” the defining
aspect of the storytelling cure lies in its special claim that a part of what stories do is heal, not only
the mind, but also (through a psychosomatic principle) the body.12
Defined thus, an example of a storytelling cure is now useful. Bertha Pappenheim and
Freud’s “talking cure” still largely stands as the paradigmatic example of this idea for modern

12

Goyal “Narration in Medicine,” 415.
5

audiences, and so we can begin with an example from psychoanalysis. However, for reasons I will
make clear below, I have chosen to take as my point of departure, not Freud, Melanie Klein, or
Jacques Lacan, but the less familiar figure of Donald Winnicott, who came to psychoanalysis
through pediatrics. In Playing and Reality, Winnicott tells a story about a boy whose mother
became ill while he was still very young.13 The illness manifested in a variety of forms from
preoccupation to incapacitation and led to interventions ranging from surgery to rehabilitation in
a mental hospital for a period of two months. As a result of these upheavals, the boy developed an
illness of his own and in March of 1955 he was brought to Paddington Green Children’s Hospital
by his parents, where he met Winnicott. Together the two played something Winnicott calls “the
squiggle game.” In the squiggle game, Winnicott makes an impulsive line-drawing and then hands
the pen over and invites the child to turn it into something else. Then, on the next turn, the child
makes his own squiggle and hands it to Winnicott to transform. The process is repeated many
times.
In this meeting, Winnicott was struck by the fact that this child turned all of Winnicott’s
squiggles into something having to do with string—a lasso, a whip, a string in a knot, another
whip. Winnicott interprets this as a kind of “laziness,” since the imaginative work involved in
transforming a squiggle into string appears almost provocatively minimal. In clinical contexts,
however, “laziness” for Winnicott should not be understood as a character judgement, but rather
as one of many opposites of “aliveness,” a quality of fundamental evaluative importance for
Winnicott in responding to, understanding, and explaining illness. For Winnicott, “aliveness” is
not just “liveliness” or “vitality” (though these are also generally indicators of health). “Aliveness”
refers to the presence of a resilient principle of growth in the individual, which is both mental and

13

This story can be found in Winnicott, Donald, Playing and Reality (New York: Routledge, 2005), 20-27,
originally published in 1971.
6

physical, and encompasses not only the positive, enjoyable, and restorative processes of life, such
as happiness, humor, and forgiveness, but also the “aliveness” of passions and disruptive drives,
including aggression, anger, and the greediness that for Winnicott announces our claim to life’s
nourishment as individuals.14 Together, the constructive and destructive states form a cycle of
rupture and repair that for Winnicott is of the essence of a healthy human life, the opposite of
“deadness,” and the context for sanity. As a result, in his evaluation of patients like this boy,
Winnicott’s emphasis often falls, directly or indirectly, on indicators of “aliveness,” a fact which
plays an important role in the nature of the “storytelling cure” that unfolds between the two of
them.
In this light, Winnicott’s mid-twentieth century approach to psychotherapy reflects
principles that can also be found in approaches to literature from the same period. In the American
School of Comparative Literature two of the most important figures, Erich Auerbach and Lionel
Trilling, write in a way that reflects their commitment to such principles of “aliveness” as well.
For Auerbach, this aliveness depends upon the vitality of our relationship to history, and in
particular it is connected to the cultivation of a historical perspective that centers what he calls our
historical “experience of diversity.”15 Trilling’s emphasis on aliveness in some ways goes even
further. At the end of The Liberal Imagination he claims that the robustness of a literary culture
depends upon how it conceives of “the nature of ideas.” If ideas are thought of as “pellets of
intellection” and entirely “defined by their coherence and their procedural recommendations,” then
they will deteriorate in the midst of what he postulates are the stultifying forces of oversystematization, which for Trilling paradoxically accompany the vindication of individual freedom

14
Winnicott, Donald, The Family and Individual Development (New York: Routledge, 2006), 67-69, originally
published in 1965.
15
Auerbach, “Philology,” 256.
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in liberal democratic society.16 But if, on the other hand, we “learn instead to think of ideas as
living things…as susceptible of growth and development…as showing their life by their tendency
to change…” then a literary culture of aliveness can flourish and contribute to the health of what
Karl Popper had called six years earlier “the open society.”17
Winnicott’s pediatric and psychoanalytic work reflects this turn towards life in midtwentieth-century Anglo-American and Jewish humanism, but unlike Auerbach and Trilling for
Winnicott observations about “aliveness” and “growth” are not only metaphors for culture. To the
contrary, his language is grounded in his work as a pediatrician, where he observed not only the
physical realities of the human body passing through the changes that we undergo as we grow up,
but also the social realities of families with sick children, and the institutional realities of the British
hospital system.18 Through this clinical work as a pediatrician (which he says is “one of the
legitimate ways” into psychoanalysis) Winnicott recognized the fundamental role of the outside
world in shaping the inner one, and he established a principle of reciprocity between the two, such
that in the earliest stages of life “…the unit is not the individual, the unit is an environment. The
center of gravity of the being does not start off in the individual. It is in the total set-up.”19 In this
respect, it must be said that Winnicott’s “aliveness” is less a universal psychoanalytic principle
than a distinctive synthesis of his own between body, mind, and outside world, a difference that is
worth highlighting because it is sometimes assumed that all psychoanalytic approaches are the
same. During the boom of literary psychoanalysis in the late-twentieth century, Winnicott’s

16

Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (New York: New York Review of Books, 2008), xix-xx.
Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, 302-3, originally published in 1951; Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its
Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), originally published in 1944.
18
See Winnicott, Donald, Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis: Collected Papers (New York: Routledge, 2014).
From the preface to this volume: “My clinical experience has been varied. I have never cut loose from paediatric
practice which was my starting point. It has been valuable to me to keep in touch with social pressure, which I have
had to meet as a physician at a children’s hospital” (ix). See also Winnicott, The Family, 144-47.
19
Winnicott, Through Paediatrics, 99.
17
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emphasis on the concept of a growth environment received little attention from scholars. Instead,
this period was dominated by frameworks that offer more structurally contained pictures of
selfhood, whether constituted by the drama of inner psychic forces (Klein) or bound by the forces
of linguistic structure as viewed through the lens of phenomenology (Lacan).20 Because of these
differences, the “laziness” of the boy playing the squiggle game with Winnicott reads differently
in Freudian, Kleinian, and Lacanian terms. For Winnicott, this “laziness” is key because it may
point to a kind of inner dying out that can eventually lead to a loss of touch with reality, a situation
which for Winnicott is both a clear indicator of and a subsequent cause of further illness.
But what does Winnicott mean by “reality”? This is a question we have to ask of any
storytelling cure, and in the three studies contained in this project, the ideas of “reality” reflect a
complex mixture of the vision of the storyteller (or storytellers) and a wider set of cultural and
historical factors. Because of this and because of the comparative nature of this project, before
turning to Winnicott’s definition, I want to briefly contextualize the idea of “reality” in late
twentieth and early twenty-first century Comparative Literature, especially as it pertains to the
closely related idea of “truth-telling.” Since the early fifties, prominent figures in the field have
actively questioned the idea of “reality.” In 1946 in an essay entitled “Reality in America,” Trilling
critiqued a widespread tendency to associate “reality” with material difficulty, resistance,
impenetrability, and unpleasantness, and he observed that “that mind alone is felt to be trustworthy
which most resembles this reality by most nearly reproducing the sensations it affords.”21 In the
last thirty years the question of “reality” in American life expanded to encompass a much wider
range of phenomena, and there are two fields in particular that have expressed a deep interest in

20
See Abram, Jan and R.D. Hinshelwood, The Clinical Paradigms of Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott:
Comparisons and Dialogues (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1-7; Kirshner, Lewis A., Between Winnicott and Lacan:
A Clinical Engagement (New York: Routledge, 2011), ix-xviii.
21
Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, 13.
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understanding the relationship between narrative, reality, human illness and healing––trauma
studies and critical theory.
Though critical theory is better known among academics, trauma studies is arguably the
field most responsible for popularizing the potential of storytelling as a kind of cure in
contemporary American society. In her seminal work, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of
Violence––From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, psychiatrist and scholar Judith Herman
begins by announcing in a single sentence an interdisciplinary program that would follow in the
wake of her book: “Remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both
for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims.”22 In the course of
developing her influential model for thinking about recovery from traumatic experience, Herman
not only centers individual truth-telling but also emphasizes the importance of approaching
traumatic experience with a detailed social and cross-cultural awareness that takes into account
how different populations are impacted differently by catastrophic events. Additionally, especially
in the later stages of recovery, she emphasizes the constructive role of the imagination.23
Psychologist Mary Harvey likewise defines the seventh and final stage of recovery as the point at
which a person has “reconstructed a coherent system of meaning and belief that encompasses the
story of their trauma.”24
Even in more recent treatments of the subject that place greater emphasis on the role of the
physical body, neuroscience, and neuroplasticity, such Bessel van der Kolk’s The Body Keeps the
Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma, scholars and doctors working with people

22

Herman, Judith, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence––From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror
(New York: Basic Books, 1992), 1.
23
Ibid., 202.
24
I quote Harvey from Herman (page 213) since the passage is from an unpublished manuscript, An Ecological
View of Psychological Trauma (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge Hospital, 1990).
10

who have experienced traumatic events still emphasize that “helping victims of trauma find the
words to describe what has happened to them is profoundly meaningful,” even if it does not
provide full and immediate resolution and healing.25 Originally, it was advocacy by and for combat
veterans, especially those returning from the Vietnam war, that appears to have played the pivotal
role in legitimating the idea of traumatic experience in American culture, but as Herman
documents Feminism played an equal role, and what bridged the two was the reality of an
underlying similarity in the response of the physical body to traumatic events.26 Herman and
figures like sociologist and activist Diana Russell make no bones about the disproportionate impact
of trauma on populations made vulnerable by their status within a marginalized social class or
cultural group, but in doing so they also emphasize the importance of the physical body. “The
ordinary human response to danger is a complex, integrated system of reactions,” writes Herman,
“encompassing both body and mind,”27 and the traumatic event itself is understood not only to
surpass the social, political, and linguistic dimensions of human life, but to a degree even human
individuality, as an equalizer almost on the order of mortality itself. 28
By contrast, the interrelated fields that came to be grouped under the rubric of critical
theory emphasized, above all, the reality of language, understood as a linguistic structure exerting
a broad, even universal impact on human life. What is more, whereas the physical body, embodied
cultural differences, and telling one’s own story all form essential resources for understanding
“reality” in trauma studies, in critical theory scholars highlighted the ways that biological accounts
of the body, comparative knowledge of different cultures, and self-narrative both had and could

25

See van der Kolk, Bessel, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (New
York: Penguin, 2015), 21.
26
Ibid., 30-32.
27
Ibid., 34.
28
“Individual personality characteristics count for little in the face of overwhelming events” (Herman, 57).
11

continue to present potential threats to the safeguarding of human difference. Here are three
examples of seminal texts in late twentieth and early twenty-first century theory that voice these
concerns. In relation to the physical body, I cite Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank from 1995
summarizing a once widely held view:
Here are a few things theory knows today. Or, to phrase it more fairly, here are a
few broad assumptions that shape the heuristic habits and positing procedures of
theory today…when it offers any account of human beings or cultures: 1) The
distance of any such account from a biological basis is assumed to correlate near
precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference (individual, historical, and
cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative force, and to the possibility of
change. 2) Human language is assumed to offer the most productive, if not the only
possible, model for understanding representation…”29
In relation to the knowledge gained about a particular culture through cross-cultural comparison,
I cite Homi Bhabha’s disaggregation of “cultural diversity” and “cultural difference” from The
Location of Culture in 1994:
Cultural diversity is an epistemological object––culture as an object of empirical
knowledge––whereas cultural difference is the process of the enunciation of culture
as “knowledgeable,” authoritative, adequate to the construction of systems of
cultural identification. If cultural diversity is a category of comparative ethics,
aesthetics or ethnology, cultural difference is a process of signification through
which statements of culture on culture differentiate, discriminate, and authorize the
production of fields of force, reference, applicability, and capacity…Through the
concept of cultural difference I want to draw attention to the common ground and
lost territory of contemporary critical debates. For they all recognize that the
problem of cultural interaction emerges only at the significatory boundaries of
cultures, where meanings and values are (mis) read or signs are misappropriated...30
And in relation to self-narrative I cite Judith Butler from 2005, Giving an Account of Oneself, the
work that arguably most widely disseminated the idea of suspect coherence in self-narrative within
Comparative Literature:
But here, for the time being, I am concerned with a suspect coherence that
sometimes attaches to narrative, specifically, with the way in which narrative
29
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsy and Adam Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Sylvan Tomkins,” in Touching
Feeling: Affects, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 93.
30
Bhabha, Homi, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 50, originally published in 1994.
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coherence may foreclose an ethical resource––namely, an acceptance of the limits
of knowability in oneself and others … Indeed, if we require that someone be able
to tell in story form the reasons why his or her life has taken the path it has, that is,
to be a coherent autobiographer, we may be preferring the seamlessness of the story
to something that we might tentatively call the truth of the person....31
Each of these passages forms part of a work addressed to a very different set of questions, and in
grouping them I do not mean to imply that they are addressed to the same problem. Sedgwick and
Frank are analyzing the relationship between cognition, emotion, affect and biological
essentialism. Bhabha is analyzing the legacy of colonialism in literary texts in the hopes of
outlining a framework that avoids looking at culture through reductive binaries.32 Butler is
analyzing the relationship between self-narrative and moral inquiry. I have chosen these diverse
texts precisely to highlight that in the face of a wide variety of complex human problems to which
they are each addressed, the scholars emphasize a similar kind of solution––a turn to the linguistic
structure of language as a privileged place from which to gain a perspective on the concept of
reality.
In a sense, for all their differences, Trilling, trauma studies, and critical theory all
emphasize the importance of truth-telling, and frame it as a gradual and ethically-charged process
of working through false realities towards more true ones, but the terms in which they understand
this journey are quite different and can be fruitfully compared. In his essay, Trilling sees a
particular, nineteenth and twentieth-century American cultural idea as the problem––an idea of
“toughness” as a criterion for judging the real, which underplays the constructive role of the
imagination. In trauma studies the problem of reality begins with the fact that before the 1980s the
reality of thousands suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was not widely acknowledged
in American culture and not formally recognized by the medical community at all. In critical
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theory, many scholars contend that the key to understanding reality is understanding violence, not
only the violence of governments and individual actors, but also a deeper and impersonal set of
forces understood to be at work in language and culture.
Winnicott’s view represents yet another perspective on the enduring question and difficulty
of “reality.” In Playing and Reality Winnicott adopts a model of reality that has three levels––an
inner reality, external reality, and an intermediate reality between the two. As with other
psychoanalytic approaches, he identifies these levels of reality as they emerge in infant and earlychildhood development. One way to easily understand his point of view is to see that the inner and
outer reality are delineated in relation to a person’s level of mind control over them. Inner reality
is the space in which our minds have the full power to shape how things appear, “an inner world
that can be rich or poor and can be at peace or in a state of war.”33 External reality is the world of
“objects” for Winnicott and it is defined as a realm which is made “real” for us in part through its
failure to “adapt” to all of our desires, since, he postulates, “exact adaptation resembles magic and
the object that behaves perfectly becomes no better than a hallucination.”34 The intermediate
reality for Winnicott is the realm of “transitional objects” and “transitional phenomena,” an area
which he calls, “an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both
contribute.” 35 This intermediate space is the is essential one for understanding how the storytelling
cure with the boy who was brought to Paddington Green’s children hospital works, for this
intermediate, transitional space, is the world of the squiggle game. “It is an area that is not
challenged,” writes Winnicott.” Instead it simply exists “as a resting for the individual engaged in
the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated.”36 When
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Winnicott points to the boy’s “laziness” in the squiggle game, he is identifying a problem the child
is having in this intermediate realm of experience.
After the game, Winnicott debriefs with the boy’s parents. He shares with them his
observation about the boy’s tendency to turn every squiggle into something to do with string. Then,
he learns something remarkable:
After this interview with the boy I had a second one with the parents, and asked
them about the boy’s preoccupation with string. They said that they were glad that
I had brought up this subject, but they had not mentioned it because they were not
sure of its significance. They said that the boy had become obsessed with
everything to do with string, and in fact, whenever they went into a room they were
liable to find that he had joined together chairs and tables; and they might find a
cushion, for instance, with a string joining it to the fireplace.37
It wasn’t laziness! The boy has been hard at work. This moment embodies something essential
about Winnicottian storytelling cures––not just surprise, but the fact that they always involve the
environment. Family plays a major role in this environment, but so do objects, not just
representations of string, but real string and “chairs” “tables” “cushions” and “fireplaces.” In this
light, the storytelling cure that begins in the traditional psychoanalytic framework of a clinical
interview, pours into the environment and a squiggle game that seemed like it was act one emerges
as a middle chapter in a story that the boy has been telling his family with real-life string. “String,”
writes Winnicott, “can be looked upon as an extension of all other techniques of communication.
String joins…”38 Like language, too, it can also potentially do harm. At the time of seeing
Winnicott this boy had at least once tied a string around his sister’s neck.39 So how does a story
told with string become a cure?
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Winnicott’s response to this new information must be understood in the context of his
clinical practice at the children’s hospital. Winnicott saw a huge number of patients. Sometimes
he estimates he participated in the treatment of 60,000 children over the course of his lifetime.40
However, he did not undertake full psychoanalytic treatment with a majority of these patients.
Instead, he developed a series of models for maximizing the positive impact his knowledge and a
short series of visits could have upon the families that came to him with sick children. The
foundation of these modules rests upon a characteristic feature of Winnicott’s approach to therapy–
–a high level of regard and respect for the healing resources that already exist (if dormantly) in
many ordinary families.41 “In this particular kind of interview,” writes Winnicott of the boy with
the string, “I knew I had limited opportunity for action: it would not be possible to see these parents
or the boy more frequently than once in six months, since the family live in the country.”42 As a
result, Winnicott decides to tell the boy’s mother his interpretation of the boy’s string story
directly, though he is aware his perspective is limited. He tells her that the boy was suffering from
a debilitating fear of separation and the string was either a way of communicating this or an attempt
to deny the reality of separation at all.
Many things could have happened at this juncture, but in this case, the mother had an open
mind, reflected on experiences of separation that her child might have experienced, and had her
own conversation with her son about them:
She had felt that what I had said was silly, but one evening she had opened the
subject with the boy and found him to be eager to talk about his relation to her and
his fear of a lack of contact with her. She went over all the separations she could
think of with him with his help, and she soon became convinced that what I had
said was right, because of his responses. Moreover, from the moment that she had
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this conversation with him the string play ceased. There was no more joining of
objects in the old way.43
In this storytelling cure, the string cures by connecting people, and in this sense the boy is
remarkably successful in his storytelling. This reflects a principle that Winnicott often expresses,
which is that the ordinary processes of growth contain within them much of the resources that we
need to recover from illness. However, it is also true that this storytelling cure is not only a story
told by a boy with string. It is also a series of conversation, over a period of months, and it involves
the boy, a therapist, the boy’s family, and many different kinds of physical objects, with which the
boy (and eventually his family, too) plays. For Winnicott, this kind of play ultimately “facilitates
growth and therefore health.”44
Such a cure raises many interesting questions. What happened next? How did the family
continue to grow and adapt? How common is the use of string? How does it interface with the
particulars of different cultures? Here, however, marks the end of this project’s direct engagement
with contemporary examples and modern theories of the storytelling cure, and I refer the interested
reader to Winnicott’s writings. In what follows, I shift in time and attempt to bring us through a
cross-cultural study of the idea of a storytelling cure as it moves from the ancient Greek language,
into classical Arabic, and finally the French of the Enlightenment, through a kaleidoscope of social,
cultural, political, and religious change. As a result of this complexity, I have kept the chapterspecific literature reviews contained within the individual chapters, and I provide the historical
and cultural context for each study in the chapters as well. My goal in this introduction has been
to present and define my core idea of the storytelling cure, describe and defend my methodology
for studying it, relate the questions I find in it to twentieth and twenty-first century Comparative
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Literature, and to provide an exemplary case study in miniature, taken from the field that I believe
modern readers are most likely to associate with the idea of the storytelling cure––but also
presenting an example from within this field from a less familiar figure.
If I were limited to a single sentence to prepare the reader for what happens next in this
dissertation it would be this: In the way that psychoanalysis provides an overall framework and
shared point of reference for understanding the idea of a storytelling cure in contemporary
European and American cultures, in the preindustrial cultures to which I now turn this central role
is played by the Galenic medical tradition, and in particular, its shared point of reference lies in
the humoral theory. I will describe this theory in greater detail at the appropriate time in the
chapters, but in short, the humoral theory was an idea that our physical bodies are made up of a
mixture of fluids, typically called humors (though the word “humor,” chumos, does not actually
occur in the key Hippocratic text that established the theory).45 On this theory, our health, both
physical and mental, depends upon whether or not these humors achieve a state of balance, which
is particular to each individual person. Psychosomatic cures, like storytelling cures, are easily
made sense of through such a theory, for the imagination (Greek: phantasia; Arabic: wahm;
French: imagination) is understood as having the power to affect the balance of humors––and thus
health. The details of how this framework is applied in the case studies I look at here differ
considerably, as do the cultural meanings of the storytelling cures themselves. However, the
general principles of the humoral theory largely form a consistent, overarching backdrop, like the
fundamentals of psychoanalysis do for many today, against which one can appreciate the richly
diverse workings-out of each individual cure.
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At the same time, in many ways Galen and Winnicott also form a compelling dyad. Both
begin from a perspective in which the mind and body are deeply interdependent, and they see the
health of society as driven and determined by the health of individuals.46 Both achieved a high
profile as practitioners but also continued to serve a large and diverse group of patients throughout
their lives.47 Both are fiercely anti-sectarian, and have been criticized, at times, as insufficiently
systematic in their thinking. Both worked in the wake of military conflicts and witnessed the effects
of political violence firsthand. Winnicott dedicated years to working with evacuated children
during World War II.48 Galen saw a legion of soldiers die around him when a pandemic struck
(and nearly died himself), and he also witnessed the widespread political murders carried out by
one of his own patients, the emperor Commodus.49 Despite this intimate contact with human
violence, both figures also believed that within the human being there is a self-curative tendency,
which generates forces within the body to ward off illness, and can also extend through the mind
into the outside world through healing action.50 Both, however, also admit the limits of this power,
and their understanding of their clinical work is deeply informed by their acceptance of these
limits.
Many of these points of individual comparison could perhaps be extended to other classical
Greco-Roman Mediterranean and twentieth-century figures as well, but in one respect Galen and
Winnicott share something that is both less common in general and important for the idea of
storytelling cures in particular, for despite the strong connection that has been established between
storytelling cures and the realms of adult experience, the idea of storytelling itself still bears a deep
46
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relationship to childhood. In this respect, it seems worth pointing out that both Winnicott and Galen
owe many of the fundamentals of their theory of human nature to the patient, serious, and
appreciative observation of children. I have already analyzed how important this is for Winnicott.
For Galen, observing children provided him with the framework for developing his concept of the
“good mixture” (eukrasia), a concept which on his own account represents one of his few entirely
original contributions to Hippocratic humoral theory.51 In short, Galen is fascinated by the fact that
infants are already very different from one another, and he concludes from his observations that
we come into life already having a certain “mixture,” which does not determine, but does
predispose us towards health and illness, as well as shapes our experience of the passions (pathē).52
As a result, in seeking to restore a patient’s humoral mixture, Galen chooses not to operate on a
rigid idea of how the humors are supposed to be balanced, but instead hypothesizes that, although
there is a state of mathematically balanced mixture, this is not the one that is most useful in clinical
work because people do not correspond to a mathematical ideal. Instead they are a complex,
individual product of an environment. In the introduction to Playing and Reality Winnicott writes
in a similar spirit:
In writing this book around the subject of transitional phenomena I find myself
continuing to be reluctant to give examples. My reluctance belongs to the reason
that I gave in the original paper; that examples can start to pin down specimens and
begin a process of classification of an unnatural and arbitrary kind, whereas the
thing that I am referring to is universal and has infinite variety. It is rather similar
to the description of the human face when we describe one in terms of shape and
eyes and nose and mouth and ears, but the fact remains that no two faces are exactly
alike and very few are even similar. Two faces may be similar when at rest, but as
soon as there is animation they become different.53
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Reading a passage like this it is tempting to make the comparison in the other direction as well,
and to say that, in a certain light, since Winnicott ascribes to transitional experience the work of
both the arts and the sciences,54 one could play with the idea of humoral mixture itself as a kind of
“transitional phenomenon,” animating our different faces as we tell our stories and wind through
centuries like string.

54

Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 3-4; 19.
21

1

The Gospel of Galen
Prognōsis as a Storytelling Cure
This past and future thing then becomes
a matter of the here and now.
—Winnicott

What is the message of Galen’s On Prognosis?1 This text tells the story of a handful of
Galen’s most famous cures in Rome in the decade before the Antonine pandemic struck the city
in the mid-170’s CE. Generically speaking, it displays a mixture of autobiographical and didactic
elements.2 Stylistically, it appears to put flesh onto the skeleton of the centuries-old Hippocratic
case history form.3 Its narrative structure is intricate and arranged to evoke an experience of
discovery. Twentieth-century readers of On Prognosis have emphasized its combative dimension,
and held, to varying degrees, that the Galen we see in it is the archetype of sophistic selffashioning, whose only real message is “I am the greatest.”4 There is, however, another dimension
to this text that the emphasis on rivalry and self-interest has obscured, for the stories Galen tells
1

For references to Galen’s work, I cite page and line numbers from the most recent critical editions, followed by the
editor’s name. I also include the Kühn pages in parenthesis for reference. For the full bibliographic information see
the Works Cited page in this dissertation.
2
Nutton, Vivian, “Galen and Medical Autobiography,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 18.198
(1972): 50-62. See also On Prognosis, ed. and trans. Vivian Nutton, CMG, V.8.1 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1979),
59-61.
3
Lloyd, G.E.R., “Galen’s Un-Hippocratic Case-Histories,” in Galen and the World of Knowledge, eds. Christopher
Gill, Tim Whitmarsh, and John Wilkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 115-32.
4
This line of interpretation forms a recurring theme in scholarship on this text. See Bowersock, Glen, “The Prestige
of Galen,” Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 59-75; Nutton, Vivian, On
Prognosis, 59-63; 145-46; Swain, Simon, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek
World, AD 50-250 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 357-363; Von Staden, Heinrich, “Galen and the Second
Sophistic,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 68 (1997), 33-54; Holmes, Brooke, “Disturbing
Connections: Sympathetic Affections, Mental Disorders, and the Elusive Soul in Galen,” in Mental Disorders in the
Classical World, ed. William V. Harris (Leiden: Brill 2013), 147-76; Van Nuffelen, Peter, “Galen, Divination, and
the Status of Medicine,” The Classical Quarterly, 64.1 (2014): 337-52; Lightfoot, Jessica, “Galen’s Language of
Wonder: Thauma, Medicine, and Philosophy in On Prognosis and On the Affected Parts,” in Medicine and
Paradoxography in the Ancient World, ed. George Kazantzidis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 163-82.
22

about his prognōses not only reflect an epideictic culture of self-staging, they also embody a
medical practice grounded in a set of principles that encompass an orientation towards human life
as a whole.5 Galen does not directly state such a principle in On Prognosis, but he does express a
desire to be a source of common good for ordinary Romans (koinon agathon), to live a life of
reverence, and to be a good neighbor.6 He also puts these ideas into more principled statements in
other works.7
In On the Medical Names, for example, Galen offers a particularly memorable formulation
of his orientation towards life and knowledge. He begins by saying that it is understandable that
different ṣanāʿāt (professions)8 have their own specialized languages, made up of asmāʾ (names)
and alqāb (terms), which only the people who practice the profession understand. Engineers have
their shop talk. Musicians have their terms of art. Doctors have cyclic semitertiary fever, swamp
fever, and erysipelas (a skin infection). No one understands these words but them, and this nonmutual intelligibility is part of what defines a technē as such.9 However, for Galen, even the most
competitive articulations of professional spheres do not stand in and only for themselves. Instead,
in On the Medical Names, the logic of differentiation entails a principle of sharing and even love.
As Galen writes, “As a social body (maʿshar) the only thing our names and terms offer us is the
chance to teach each other how to put situations and meanings that we wish to express into
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words.”10 He goes on to describe that if we were not able to share our ideas in this way, “we would
have no real advantage over the deaf and the mute when it comes to discovering new things.”11 He
then substantiates this claim by observing that people typically create new words after they have
discovered something new, rather than the other way around, and he concludes with a far-reaching,
principled synthesis:

ﻓﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎن ﻣﻨﮭﻢ ﻻ ﯾﺤﺐ ان ﯾﺸﺮﻛﮫ اﺣﺪ ﻓﯿﻤﺎ اﺳﺘﺨﺮج ووﺟﺪ ﻟﻜﻦ ﯾﺮﯾﺪ ان ﯾﺨﻔﯿﮫ
وﯾﺴﺘﺮه ﺑﺨﻼ ﻣﻨﮫ وﺣﺴﺪا ﻋﻠﯿﮫ ﻓﺎن اﻟﺘﻤﺎﺳﮫ ﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻻﺳﻤﺎء واﻻﻟﻘﺎب وﺣﺮﺻﮫ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﺎ
 واذا ﻛﺎن اﻻﻣﺮ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﺎﻟﻨﺎس اﻧﻤﺎ ﻋﻨﻮا واھﺘﻤﻮا ﺑﻮﺿﻊ اﻻﺳﻤﺎء واﻻﻟﻘﺎب ﺑﻌﺪ.ﺑﺎطﻞ
 ودﻋﺎھﻢ اﻟﻰ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﺎ اﺣﺒﻮا ﻣﻦ اﺷﺮاك ﻣﻦ ﯾﺤﻀﺮھﻢ وﯾﻘﺮب،اﺳﺘﺨﺮاﺟﮭﻢ ﻟﻼﺷﯿﺎء
 وٱن ﻛﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ھﻮ ﻋﻠﯿﮫ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻈﻢ اﻟﻘﺪر ﻓﻲ، وھﺬا ﺑﺎب.ﻣﻨﮭﻢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺘﻠﻚ اﻻﺷﯿﺎء
اﻟﺤﺚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺤﺒﺔ اﻟﻨﺎس وﻧﻔﻌﮭﻢ ﺣﺘﻰ اﻧﮫ ﻟﯿﺲ ﯾﻮﺟﺪ ﺷﻰء اﺧﺺ ﻣﻨﮫ ﺑﺎﻻﻧﺴﺎن وﻻ
12
اوﻟﻰ ﺑﮫ ﻣﻨﮫ اذ ﻛﺎن اﻻﻧﺴﺎن ﺣﯿﻮاﻧﺎ ﻧﺎطﻘﺎ ﻣﻄﺒﻮﻋﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺷﺮاك ﻏﯿﺮه ﻓﯿﻤﺎ ﯾﻌﻠﻢ
If there is anyone among them who does not wish to share what he has learned and
discovered, but instead wishes to jealously hide and conceal his knowledge
withholdingly, his plea for our understanding a new set of names for his knowledge,
and indeed his whole endeavor, is absurd. It is on this principle that people seek to
give names to things that they discover––namely, a love for sharing with those
around them the knowledge of these things. This is the key. One of the greatest
capacities in human beings is this impulse of love towards humanity. It is so much
a part of us that there is actually nothing more distinctive about us than this, and
nothing more fundamental. We are beings of language, wired to share what we
know with others.
Here, linguistic creation is connected to a sense of shared humanity, and the important thing isn’t
to avoid new words, but rather to understand that the only point of creating new language is to
share what we know with others about the story of the world, a sharing which, for Galen, also
fulfills a distinctive aspect of our nature as human beings. One could perhaps argue that this, too,
represents a kind of self-fashioning, but if so the “self” that is being fashioned here is part of an
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interdependent social body (maʿshar), constituted not only by rivalries but also by a shared mutual
need for expression, the only alternative to which is a state of disability captured by Galen’s
comparison with “muteness” and “deafness.” Put another way, the creation of a specialized
medical language in On the Medical Names is not just about a system of professional labels, it is
also about how languages can extend the power of our individual bodies and senses by allowing
us to share what we know.
Taking this passage as my point of departure, in this first chapter I return to On Prognosis
and argue that the stories in this text not only reflect Galen’s cultural milieu and professional
ambitions, but also embody an idea––namely, that human life is an ongoing process of change
filled with countless, interdependent, meaningful details, which call for the creative deployment
of language, whose fullness the doctor, the patient, and the audience discover together in the
practice known as prognōsis. In this respect, Galen’s elaboration of the storytelling dimension of
the traditional Hippocratic case history is not simply an ornament to dress the form up in a more
sophisticated linguistic fabric. It is through the details of the telling that three things happen: the
patient’s trust is won, the doctor provides an exemplary case for his students to learn through
embodied practice, and the patient’s suffering is eased through a joyful experience of discovery at
a time of fear and uncertainty. In other words, I see each Galenic case history in On Prognosis as
the staging of a new medical “name,” in which each individual cure, and each individual who is
cured, becomes an instrument in the sharing of knowledge that, for Galen, is one of humanity’s
essential callings.
I proceed in three steps: First I introduce the historical and cultural context of Galenic
prognōsis. In particular, I present Galen’s version of this practice at the intersection of the
epideictic culture of the Second Sophistic and a variety of body-based consolation practices that
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responded to the mortality crisis of the Antonine pandemic. Second, I analyze Galen’s underlying
theory of prognōsis through a close reading of the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis.
Concretely, I argue that Galen adopts much of the Hippocratic theoretical framework, but goes
beyond this tradition in his willingness to see that social and cultural elements form an essential
part of an ever-changing human nature (phusis). As a result, Galen rethinks the nature of prognōsis
itself, and this leads to both practical success and a new problem of reception, which lies in the
question of how to label what he is doing. Third, I offer a reading of the most famous of Galen’s
cures, the one that launched his career as a courtly doctor in the Age of the Antonines––the cure
of his teacher, the peripatetic philosopher Eudemus. In this first storytelling cure the narrating of
future events is not only about demonstrating Galen’s knowledge of what is to come, the act of
storytelling also works to heal Eudemus’s body through consoling his mind and brings the readers
in as well to celebrate a shared experience of discovery.

1. Contextualizing Galenic prognōsis––Second Sophistic, Pandemic
Hippocrates and the tradition that bears his name are the first on record to suggest two
related things: first, that doctors should practice prognōsis, and second, that this form of talking
about the future was different from prophecy and divination. Broadly speaking, in this Hippocratic
tradition the doctor eschewed explanations that relied on the idea of daemonic (divine) causes of
illness and instead sought naturalistic explanations based on a concept of phusis, “nature,” as
understood through a group of related theoretical and empirical disciplines including anatomy, the
theory of the four elements (earth, water, fire, air) the four humors (blood, yellow bile, black bile,
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phlegm), and a theory about the impact of environmental factors.13 At the same time, in the form
of the famous Hippocratic oath, they also introduced an ethic that played a role in both the practice
and transmission of their knowledge. Within this framework, the doctor practicing prognōsis could
of course make astute observations about visible phenomenon (blood, sweat, swelling, pallor),
catching things less observant practitioners had missed, but what was most distinctive and
celebrated about this tradition was its ambition to make inferences from the visible phenomena on
the surface of the body to the invisible phenomenaa happening in the body’s depths (keneōn, the
“cavity”).14 In short, the Hippocratic doctor observes the patient, questions him or her about
symptoms, and applies a specialized knowledge of the nature of the human body to make
inferences from these visible signs (sēmeia) and symptoms to the illness’s invisible causes
(aitiai).15 Finally, the doctor assesses whether the natural power (dunamis) of the patient’s body is
enough to overcome the strength of the disease.16 In order to do this, Hippocratic doctors developed
a sophisticated sign-based framework that emphasized eklogizesthai, the drawing of inferences,
on the basis of which the Hippocratic doctor could then make a distinctive set of therapeutic
recommendations, as well as predictions about when and how the patient would live or die.17
In the second century CE in which Galen lived, the attention prognōsis gives to the physical
human body places it in conversation with a number of different body-centered narrative practices
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that were popular. Each of these sits within what Heinrich von Staden has called the period’s
distinctive “epideictic culture,” a culture in which the public display of knowledge formed an
integral part of the mechanisms of both social mobility and daily life.18 For example, during
Galen’s lifetime there were famous orators like Polemo and Favorinus who turned to the body as
an arena in which to present competing views over the nature of masculinity. In their surviving
writings each orator emphasizes the meaningfulness of facial features, gestures, and the sound of
the voice in their theories of masculinity. In making his case, Polemo in particular drew on the
field of physiognomy, which Maud Gleason has called “a technology of suspicion” which was
“indigenous” to the culture,19 observing also that “Polemo was not a master sophist only; he
presented himself also as a master physiognomist, whose gaze could peel back the carefully
constructed integument of another man’s self-presentation to penetrate the inner recesses of his
private thoughts.”20
To the degree that Polemo’s Physiognomy was deployed as a tool to demean his rivals
through disparaging language, its aim was antithetical to goal of prognōsis, which was to help heal
a sick patient. However, the two share an emphasis on semiotics and the physical body, and both
were practiced as part of a wider culture of public display known as “the Second Sophistic.” In its
ordinary formulation the Second Sophistic was a movement in the second century of the Roman
empire unified by a shared concern with recreating, reimagining, and bringing back to life an
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idealized version of a Greek past in which Attic philosophy, literature, and oratory flourished.21
The most famous figures of the Second Sophistic were orators who performed “retellings” (meletē)
of famous speeches, but the popularity of these public speeches also inspired a wide variety of
different public speech acts that were often competitive, like physiognomy. These drew in a variety
of ways on the Greek pasts and embodied an ideal of paideia, a “cultured” education.22 At the
same time, Roman imperial epideictic culture was not only a Greek phenomenon. It also has
historical roots in the long history of Roman spectacula (spectacles), which according to Roger
Dunkle, have their roots in religious practices whose goal was to entertain the gods and win their
favor.23
In 129 CE Galen was born into this culture to a well-off and well-established family of
architects and surveyors in the storied and respected provincial city of Pergamum.24 Edward
Gibbon famously described the century that spans Galen’s life as the “most happy and prosperous”
in the history of mankind, but in reality it was a complex mixture of prosperity and terrible illness.
On the one hand, it was a time in which the long shadow of the violence of the Augustan revolution
appeared to emerge (for some at least) into the promise of a saeculum aureum, “a golden age.” In
the generation before Galen, Emperor Hadrian, was celebrated as a patron of the arts. He also
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emphasized an orderly government, military fortification on the empire’s borders, and the stable
rule of law. Three years before Galen’s birth coins were stamped with concordia, “concord.”25 It
was the time of the pax romana.26 On the other hand, at the borders of the empire’s far-flung body,
the threat of military conflict was constant, and worse still, through this conflict Roman soldiers
came into contact with a deadly pathogen (likely smallpox) responsible for the catastrophic
pandemic now known as the “Antonine plague,” which Galen witnessed and responded to
firsthand. As he writes in his autobiographical work, On My Own Books:
Επιβάντος οὖν μου τῆς Ἀκυλίας κατέσκηψεν ὁ λοιμὸς ὡς οὔπω πρότερον, ὥστε
τοὺς μὲν αὐτοκράτορας αὐτίκα φεύγειν εἰς Ῥώμην ἅμα στρατιώταις ὀλίγοις, ἡμᾶς
δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς μόλις ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ διασωθῆναι πλείστων ἀπολλυμένων...27
On my arrival in Aquileia, there was an outbreak of the pandemic which caused
destruction on a scale previously unknown. The emperors immediately fled to
Rome with a small force of men; for the rest of us, survival became very difficult
over a long period. The majority, in fact, died.28
In the most thorough recent evaluation of the mortality of this pandemic event, Kyle Harper has
estimated that conservatively eight million people died as a result. In an empire of seventy-five
million, that is just under one in every ten people.29 The geographic scale of this event is also
staggering, and the horror it aroused is attested in literary sources, inscriptions, votive objects, and
empire-wide attempts to placate the pestilence of what was widely understood to be the vengeful
breath of a treacherous Apollo––paradoxically, a figure of both healing and wrath.30
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In the context of such a catastrophic event, it is not surprising that alongside body-focused
practices like physiognomy that emphasized competition, a variety of other ways of narrativizing
bodily experience emerged that focused on healing, bringing relief either in the form of religious
consolation, such as in the cult of Asclepius, social connection, such as in the letters of Marcus
Aurelius and his teacher Fronto, or philosophical therapy, such as in the Stoic practice of reasoned
extirpation of the passions. In the context of the second century, Galen’s reception of the
Hippocratic tradition of prognōsis belongs in this category of practices as well, since, according
to the Hippocratic tradition the purpose of prognōsis is to improve upon the chances of life when
a person is suffering from an acute illness.31 As a way of establishing a more concrete sense of the
context of these diverse healing practices I will briefly look at one example of each of the three
that I just mentioned.
First, it is during this period that Aelius Aristides, arguably the most famous orator of the
century, wrote a new kind of text about his own struggle with sickness, the Hieroi Logoi, The
Sacred Tales, which he tells us consoled him as he suffered from chronic illness for most of his
life.32 In this text, probably written in the same decade as Galen’s On Prognosis, Aristides
describes in incredible detail the story of his physical, emotional, and spiritual suffering through a
combination of autobiography and analepsis, “flashbacks.”33 He also describes his discovery of
and subsequent initiation into the devotional practices of the God of healing Asclepius, especially
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the many cures that this God prescribed to him through a dream-based, medico-religious practice
known as incubation.34 The practice of incubation, which dates to at least the 4th-century BCE,
involved large numbers of sick people whom doctors had not been able to cure going to temples
of Asclepius, spending the night, and requesting that the God visit them in a dream and prescribe
a cure.35 These practices were alive and well in Galen’s day. In his devotion to them, Aristides was
not alone. One of the most important temples to Asclepius was in Galen’s home city of Pergamum,
and Galen himself did not disapprove of incubation. To the contrary, he considered himself a
devotee (therapeutēs) of Asclepius, and not only does he tell us that he became a doctor because
Asclepius came to his father in a dream, but he himself also claims to have received multiple
medical dreams from the god that provided cures and perhaps even saved his life.36
As an incubant Aristides would spend nights at the temples dedicated to Asclepius and wait
for the God to come to him in a dream and prescribe a cure. As a result of these dreams, Aristides
developed a richly detailed relationship with Asclepius and his daily regimen fundamentally
changed. He didn’t bathe for five years. He underwent two and a half years of increasing fasting
and vomiting. He stayed awake late. “I have not bathed for five consecutive years and some months
besides,” writes Aristides, “unless, of course Asclepius ordered me to use the sea or rivers or wells
in winter time.”37 Aristides had many medical procedures conducted as well. “The purgation of
my upper intestinal tract has taken place in the same way for nearly two years and two months in
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succession,” he writes, “together with enemas and phlebotomies, as many as no one has ever
counted, and at that with little nourishment and that forced.”38 Passages like this one from the
Hieroi Logoi also illustrate that some of Asclpeius’s recommendations were dangerous (i.e.
bathing in a river in winter). Once Aristides believed that the god wanted him to ride a ship during
a storm through a harbor.39 Equally, however, the text records many safer daily life changes that
pertained to Aristides’ profession as an orator. For example, he claims that Asclepius once gave
him a tumor in order to draw his friends to him so he could declaim directly from his bed. Another
time he writes that he dreamt that he had been asked by the god to take on a new student.40
Incubation represents an example of a religiously-oriented practice. Other body-based
narrative practices focused on social connection. For example, from this period we also have the
famous letters between the emperor Marcus Aurelius and his North African teacher, advisor, and
intimate confidant Fronto. In many of these letters (over eighty within the collection), the two
exchange summaries, sometimes detailed, of their day-to-day experiences of illness. Like the
Hieroi Logoi the Correspondence are autobiographical in nature, and often focus on sickness, but
unlike the Hieroi Logoi, they are a dialogue between two sick people, for both Emperor Aurelius
and Fronto describes their symptoms.41 The topic of illness in private correspondence was not
entirely new, as the examples of Pliny and Libanius attest, but what is new in Fronto and Aurelius
is the degree of focus on the physical details of sickness.42 In one exchange, for example, Fronto
writes to Emperor Aurelius a short letter describing some neck pain. Aurelius writes back:
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noctem sine febri uideor transmisisse; cibum non inuitus cepi, nunc ago leuissime.
nox quid ferat, cognoscemus. sed, mi magister, ceruicum dolore te arreptum, quo
animo didicerim, profecto ex tua proxima sollicitudine metiris. vale mi
iucundissime magister. mater mea salutat te.43
I seem to have passed the night without fever. I have eaten without reluctance, now
I do very well. What the night brings we shall see. But, my teacher, you may
certainly ascertain, based on your own recent anxiety, how I felt, on learning that
you had been seized by neck-pain. Farewell, most delightful teacher. My mother
sends greetings to you.44
On the one hand, the letter appears to speak of the mundane details of illness, but on the other hand
in the context of the collection and the relationship as a whole, these descriptions clearly played a
complex and important role, helping to create a sense of solidarity during a time of pandemic, and
embodying a tender concern for the other. Also, some of the mundane details likely had more
particular meanings. For example, it was Galen’s observation about the Antonine pandemic that
those who were able to eat lived, and those who could not uniformly died. In this context, Aurelius’
letter contains very good news indeed.45
Third, the schools of Hellenistic philosophy had long included narrative practices and
“therapeutic arguments” as a part of their overall method, but one in particular came to prominence
in the first two centuries of the Roman empire, and this one was also the Hellenistic school that
associated itself most closely with medicine––Stoicism.46 In saying as much, what I have in mind
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is not the relationships of individual Stoics to medicine, but rather one central current in Stoic
thought that had in the century before Galen received enormous emphasis from both of the two
most prominently positioned Stoics in Roman empire––Seneca and Epictetus. In both Seneca’s
Epistles to Lucilius and Epictetus’s Discourses, philosophy itself is framed as a medicine for the
soul, and the philosophical teacher is in the position of being the student’s doctor.47 As Epictetus
famously writes in book three of his Discourses:
Ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον· οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλ’
ἀλγήσαντας. Ἔρχεσθε γὰρ οὐχ ὑγιεῖς, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ὦμον ἐκβεβληκώς, ὁ δ’ ἀπόστημα
ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ κεφαλαλγῶν. Εἶτ’ ἐγώ καθίσας ὑμῖν λέγω νοημάτια καὶ
ἐπιφωνημάτια, ἵν’ ὑμεῖς ἐπαινέσαντές με ἐξέλθητε, ὁ μὲν τὸν ὦμον ἐκφέρων οἷον
εἰσήνεγκεν, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, ὁ δὲ τὴν σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ τὸ
ἀπόστημα; Εἶτα τούτου ἕνεκα ἀποδημήσωσιν ἄνθρωποι νεώτερποι καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς
τοὺς αὑτῶν ἀπολίπωσιν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον, ἵνα
σοι οὐᾶ φῶσιν ἐπιφωνημάτια λέγοντι; Τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἐποίει, τοῦτο Ζήνων, τοῦτο
Κλεάνθης;48
The classroom of a philosopher is a hospital, men. It is not a place you leave feeling
pleasure, but pain, for you came in a state of ill-health. One of you had a dislocated
shoulder, another an abscess, another a fistula, another a headache. Am I just
supposed to sit here and regale you with easy thoughts and fine sayings, so that
you’ll go out singing my praises? Then what? One of you will have your shoulder
just as messed up as it was when you came in. Another will have his head in the
same state, another still having his fistula, and another his abscess? Is it for this that
young men are to leave their homes, their parents, friends, relatives, and whatever
bit of property they have, so they can shout “Woo!” when you declaim your clever
sayings? Is that what Socrates did? Zeno? Cleanthes?
In this passage, Epictetus vigorously defends a picture of philosophical training as an active form
of personal medicine, one which requires not only the endurance of suffering, but also a
willingness to leave one’s home, friends, and belongings. In this it shares aspects with the practice
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of incubation, as many of Aristides’ cures involved enduring suffering, and incubants often left
their homes to travel to the temples of Asclepius.
During Galen’s lifetime all the Hellenistic schools flourished, but it was the Stoics whose
social vision and political theory extended furthest into society because these were based on two
closely related ideas: first, that all people were endowed with a capacity to self-heal through the
exercise of human reason, and second that part of practicing philosophy lies in contributing to the
creation a just society.49 “Their diagnosis of the diseases of the passions,” writes Nussbaum,
“becomes the basis for a diagnosis of political disorder.”50 One of the most influential expressions
of this social vision intersecting with this medical analogy occurs in the Epistles of Seneca. The
fiftieth letter to Lucilius opens with a story about a woman who thinks the world is getting darker,
and doesn’t realize that she is going blind. Seneca writes:
Quid nos decipimus? Non est extrinsecus malum nostrum; intra nos est, in
visceribus ipsis sedet, et ideo difficulter ad sanitatem pervenimus, quia nos
aegrotare nescimus.
Si curari coeperimus, quando tot morborum tantas vires discutiemus? Nunc
vero ne quaerimus quidem medicum, qui minus negotii haberet, si adhiberetur ad
recens vitium. Sequerentur teneri et rudes animi recta monstrantem. Nemo
difficulter ad naturam reducitur, nisi qui ab illa defecit.51
Why do we deceive ourselves? The problem (malum) is not outside of us. It lies
within us, in the fibers of our being, and for this reason we have a very difficult
time arriving at a state of health, since we do not even realize that we are sick.
Even after we begin therapy (curari), how long will it be until we shed such
a powerful illness? Even at the present advanced stage we do not seek the doctor
out, whose work would be easier if he had had the chance to begin at the beginning.
Younger and greener minds would follow his clear instructions. The only one who
finds it difficult to return to nature is the one who has left it.
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This passage exemplifies Seneca’s version of the therapeutic Stoic inner dialogue. In it, he not
only advances a position on the state of human beings vis-à-vis nature, he also embodies the
method of inquiry that he believes is the cure. He begins with a question posed to all of humanity
(why do we deceive ourselves). He follows with a premise (the source of the problem is within),
and from this premise he establishes the terms for responding to the problem by developing an
analogy between the confusion represented by the woman who thinks the world is getting darker
and a physical disease that takes over the body from within. Finally, he advances a hypothetical
on the basis of the idea that his premise and analogy were accepted, saying, in short, if things are
the way I say they are, then the next question is “How long will the cure take?” At the center of
this practice is the analogy between the health of the mind and the health of the body, and the
implicit promise is that through the exercise of reason, narrativized in this way, one can become a
doctor to the illness (malum) in oneself and others.
When Galen arrives in Rome he is surrounded by these body-centered practices. In theory,
such a cultural climate would seem to give prognōsis an easy point of entry since it too, like these
practices, focused on relieving the sick. In fact, however, Galen received a mixture of encouraging
and hostile reactions to his prognōsis. These hostile reactions are given their most vivid
formulation by Galen near the beginning of On Prognosis. In the second paragraph of this text,
Galen begins with a complaint about the deterioration of professional practices (technai) in his
day. He goes on to claim that this deterioration (dustuchia) has many manifestations in medicine,
but one that concerns him most of all––prognōsis. Then, he describes in detail a typical reaction
that he received, which involved suspicion, confusion, and accusations of divination that were
intended to harm his reputation.52 In addition, he describes feeling trapped when people ask him
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whether he bases his way of practicing prognōsis on earlier authorities or has discovered it himself.
If he says that he is following Hippocrates, he worries he will implicitly insult his audience’s
knowledge of Hippocratic texts. If he says that he has discovered it himself, he worries he will
seem hubristic.53 On Galen’s own account there were doctors present who knew the Hippocratic
tradition, such as the Roman Martianus,54 and in this light Galen’s concern about the trickiness of
answering this question is legitimate. However, the question itself––that is, the basis of Galen’s
version of prognōsis, its theoretical underpinnings, its position vis-à-vis other body-based healing
practices––is also legitimate, for as I will show in the next section of this chapter, Galen only partly
follows the Hippocratic tradition. In other ways, he transforms it, and in this sense, it is a perfectly
good question to ask how Galen is thinking about prognōsis, achieving his remarkable results, and
recording his practice in a new version of the Hippocratic case history that places a greater
emphasis on storytelling.

2. A Body Heuristic: The Promise and Problems of Galenic prognōsis
For a long time the Hippocratic55 texts known as the Epidemics stood as “a paradigm of
pure clinical observation, devoid of theoretical commitments.”56 Here is a short, but typical case
history from Epidemics I:
Κρίτωνι ἐν Θάσῳ, ποδὸς ὀδύνη ἤρξατο ἰσχυρὴ ἀπὸ δακτύλου τοῦ μεγάλου
ὀρθοστάδην περιιόντι. Κατεκλίνη αὐθημερόν· φρικώδης, ἀσώδης, σμικρὰ
ὑποθερμαινόμενος· ἐς νύκτα παρεφρόνησεν.
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Δευτέρῃ, οἴδημα δι’ ὅλου τοῦ ποδὸς καὶ περὶ σφυρὸν ὑπέρυθρον μετὰ
ξυντάσιος· φλυκταινίδια μέλανα· πυρετὸς ὀξύς· ἐξεμάνη· ἀπὸ δὲ κοιλίης ἄκρητα,
χολώδεα, ὑπόσυχνα διῆλθεν· ἀπέθανεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς δευτεραῖος.57
Crito in Thasos had a violent pain in the foot which came on while walking; it
started from the big toe. The same day he took to his bed with shivering, nausea
and slight fever; at night he became delirious.
Second day: the whole foot became swollen; it was reddish about the ankle
where there was some contraction and small black blisters appeared. He developed
high fever and madness. He passed rather frequent unmixed bilious stools. He died
on the second day from the beginning of his illness.58
The spareness of the descriptions and the focus on specific sense-based details creates a picture of
objectivity, and it is not only modern readers who have received the Epidemics in this way.59 The
school of ancient medicine known as the Empiricists interpreted the absence of explicit theorizing
in the Epidemics as support for their contention that it is not the doctor’s job to search into the
hidden causes of disease, but rather to work only with what is available to the senses.60 More
recently, however, scholars of ancient medicine have challenged this longstanding idea of the
Epidemics as “pure” observation. John Wee has emphasized instead that the Epidemics are
“narratives created from certain points of view and for intended purposes.”61 Likewise, Chiara
Thumiger has adopted a narratological approach to the Epidemics and argued that even the sparestseeming case histories are “interactive” and have “an irreducible, narrative humanistic
component,” which is best approached through both scientific and literary lenses.62
If this is true of the Epidemics it is doubly––or triply––true of Galen’s On Prognosis, for
in this text Galen makes no pretense at all of presenting a simple list of symptoms. Instead, he
appears to embrace the case history form as a complex act of literary creation. For example, in
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recording his cure of a woman suffering from lovesickness, he creates a whole atmosphere of
suspense as he gradually discovers the key details. What is more, these details lie not only in the
flush of the woman’s face, but also in Galen’s musing about love and a chance conversation he
has with someone as he walks towards the woman’s house.63 Likewise, in his cure of the emperor’s
son Commodus, Galen stages a dramatic scene, which includes a richly comparative picture of the
prognōses of other court doctors, as well as allusions to Galen’s complex personal relationship to
the ruling family. Furthermore, he once again openly concludes that no small part of his success
with Commodus was the result, not of an objective inference, but of chance––this time, it is a
“lucky touch” in taking the pulse.64
In interpreting Galen’s decision to record his case histories in this way, emphasizing both
storytelling and luck, scholars have tended to understand his choice as primarily motivated by his
ambition to illustrate his “own merits” rather than systematizing “the disease.”65 On these readings,
Galen’s stylistic choices in On Prognosis reflect yet another example of his desire to insert himself
as a “vivid, forceful authorial presence” into all of his texts.66 However, G.E.R. Lloyd has
expressed what he calls a “hunch” that “the divergences between the case histories in the
Epidemics and Galen’s On Prognosis, in fact, reflect a deep-seated methodological division,”67
and I agree with him. The historian of science John Forrester has called “thinking in cases” a “style
of reasoning,” but what emerges in comparing Galen’s On Prognosis with the Hippocratic case-
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histories is not one but two distinct ways of thinking in cases, and two different “styles of
reasoning.”68
Following up on Forrester’s work, Markus Asper has emphasized that the narrative
dimension of thinking in cases “makes the case able to cross boundaries towards the realm of
literature.”69 Combining Lloyd’s hunch, Forrester’s formulation, and Asper’s gesture towards
literature, I think Galen’s choice to write his case histories as full-blown stories can be explained
like this: in the traditional Hippocratic case history, the framework is semiotic and focused on
eklogizesthai, drawing inferences based on patterns of correspondence between the signs of illness
(sēmeia) and future outcomes.70 In this light, the Hippocratic case histories are designed to teach
students about a key, but also relatively fixed inventory of signs from which they are to interpret
the patient’s illness. By contrast, in Galenic prognōsis the Hippocratic semiotic framework is no
longer an end in itself, but rather a heuristic tool––a body heuristic––for teaching students to make
a complex judgement about the course of illness that is not as simple as an inference, but instead
represents an intuitive synthesis.
As I will argue below, the conceptual basis for this turn towards intuitive judgement has
its roots in Galen’s different understanding of both nature (phusis) and human nature. In short,
Galen sees a greater complexity in both ideas, which makes a traditional inferential framework
ultimately implausible as the basis of effective prognōsis. As a result, Galen’s version of prognōsis
cannot be learned through the mastery of even a very complex and flexible formula but instead the
skill must be gradually developed through close attention to the performances of an exemplary
practitioner. These performances are what On Prognosis records, and it is from performances like
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them that a student has the chance to gradually acquire not just the inventory of signs but the whole
art of Galenic prognōsis. It is more like learning to play an instrument than mastering a table of
predictive signs. In this light, while it is true that the performative element of Galen’s case histories
reflects the epideictic culture of the Second Sophistic, it is also true that this turn towards
storytelling illustrates a specific, conceptual intervention that Galen makes within the Hippocratic
tradition of prognōsis. I believe I can demonstrate this through a close reading of Galen’s technical
manual on the art of prognōsis, the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis.
Galen says he wrote the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis for people who wanted
to learn to practice prognōsis, rather than those who simply wanted to theorize about it.71 In this
sense, it belongs squarely to the genre of Galenic “teaching” commentary, as opposed to the ones
he claims to have written for his own reference.72 In his first example in the Commentary on
Hippocrates’ Prognosis, Galen walks his readers through a case of fever. This case can be taken
as an exemplary case, not only because of its position near the beginning of the text, but also
because cyclic fevers, such as those caused by malaria, were among the most common reasons to
seek out a prognōsis.73 In this case study Galen covers a number of possible diagnostic signs
including a darkened face, a sharpened nose, and insomnia.74 When he finishes, however, his point
of focus lies not in the memorization of a patterns of signs, and still less in a formalized calculus.
Instead, he emphasizes the need for his student to internalize a technique of observation and a
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practice of interpretation that they will ultimately have to discover for themselves through
imitating him:
τοιοῦτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ τὸ προειρημένον πρόσωπον ἐργαζόμενοι πυρετροί. ταῦτα δέ,
ὡς ἔφην, δύσρητα μέν ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἄρρητά γε παντάπασιν οὐδὲ δυσδιάγνωστα
τοῖς γυμνασθεῖσιν ἀμφ’ αὐτὰ καὶ πολλάκις ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τεθεαμένοις τὰ τοιαῦτα
προλεγόμενα πάντα καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀσκοῦσι γνωρίζειν, ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων διὰ
τῶν προγνωστικῶν ἐδιδάχθησαν πραγματειῶν, ἐκ μὲν τοῦ θεάσασθαι τὰ
προλεγόμενα τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτῶν ἔργῳ μεμαθηκότες, οὐ προαπογινώσκοντες δέ, ἃ
ἐν ἀρχῇ φαίνεται δυσδιάγνωστα· διδύμους γὰρ ἀδελφοὺς ὁμοιοτάτους μὲν ἅπαξ ἢ
δὶς θεασάμενός τις οὐ διαγινώσκει, τῶν δ’ οἰκείων οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ.75
These are the ways that a fever can affect the look of a face, as I mentioned before.
I’ve also mentioned before these things are difficult to put into words (dusrēta), but
they are not unsayable (arrēta). Nor are such things so hard to interpret for those
who embody them through practice (gumnastheisin) and have closely watched me
make prognōses myself in situations just like this. Still less are such predictions
difficult for those who make a habit of recognizing all the things they’ve been
taught by manuals (pragmateiōn) on prognōsis in their own practices (epi tōn
ergōn). From seeing all this for themselves, they learn that predicting such things
is possible in reality, even if they encounter an unfamiliar situation, which at the
beginning of their training would have seemed too hard to interpret. It’s like
identical twins. If you’ve only seen them once or twice, you will mistake them, but
no one mistakes the twins they know.
In this passage, Galen emphasizes the difficulty of prognōsis through the repeated use of the prefix
dus, but he also reassures his students that, despite the difficulty, it is possible to learn to do it.
Moreover, the process is not only difficult for the doctor, it is also difficult for the patient, for
whom the symptoms of illness are also hard to express (dusrēta).76 In this way, the difficulty of
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the practice of prognōsis from the beginning is connected to the limits and nature, not only of the
body, but of language as well.
In general, Galen prefers to avoid metaphorical language in technical context like this one
where he is trying to explain a pragma, something concrete (here, the signs of illness).77 His strong
preference is for onomata kuria, “literal names.”78 This makes it all the more striking that he ends
this important passage with a simile.79 Prognōsis, he says, is like getting to know identical twins.
If you’ve only met them once or twice, you’ll mix them up. Once you know get to know them, you
never will again. This simile of the identical twins suggests that for Galen learning to interpret the
signs of illness when performing a prognōsis is less like the application of a preexisting set of signbased rules than an act of attunement to an individual, for there is no preexisting rule that can help
you differentiate between twins.
This line of interpretation is supported by a second layer of attunement that Galen calls for
in the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis that revolves, again, around the fact that for Galen
many symptoms are hard to express, gnōrisma dusrēta.80 As a result of this difficulty in connecting
one’s knowledge of one’s own bodily state to apt descriptors, Galen observes that patients
invariably leave things out of their own accounts of illness, and no small part of prognōsis lies in
the doctor’s ability to fill in what the patient has “left out.”81 The key word in this aspect of the art
of prognōsis is paraleipein, “to leave out” or “to skip over.” Galen partly takes this idea from the
Hippocratic tradition, for the Hippocratic text Prognosis mentions this word and idea in the very
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first paragraph.82 However, Galen also extends and transforms it through a subtle, sustained
analogy between the significance of paraleipein in two seemingly different contexts.
In short, for Galen paraleipein is not only a feature of patient narratives, it is also a feature
of Hippocratic texts. In explicating the Hippocratic Prognosis, Galen regularly says things like
“Hippocrates left this out (paraleloipe),” “It appears this was left out (paraleiphthai) by
Hippocrates,” “Hippocrates left out (parelipen) this.”83 Indeed, the idea is so deeply rooted in
Galen’s Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis that he at one point states that “leaving things
out” is one Hippocrates’ defining habits.84 Brooke Holmes, Heinrich von Staden, and Rebecca
Flemming have all highlighted how Galen makes use of Hippocrates’s sparse style in order to
present his own ideas.85 This certainly seems true, but I would add to it that one of the most striking
ideas he presents is the one that lies implicit in the connection he makes between what is “left out”
of Hippocratic texts and what is “left out” by patients. Namely, to the degree that prognōsis focuses
on “filling in” what the patient has left out, it is not only what I have called a body heuristic, but
also involves a principle of exegēsis, which holds the patient’s knowledge in high esteem (like
Hippocrates) and frames the challenge of prognōsis as a form, not of inference-making but of
commentary.
These differences between Hippocratic and Galenic prognōsis are not only a matter of
different practices and pedagogies. They also reflect a change on the theoretical level. In particular,
they appear to me to grow out of Galen’s different views about the nature of “human nature,” the
phusis phuseōs anthrōpinou. In The Greek Concept of Nature, Gerard Nadaf demonstrates that the
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Greek word phusis means essentially “growth.” Through this root meaning, phusis comes to mean
“nature” in Pre-Socratic, classical, and imperial Greek texts as a result of three different equally
valid points of emphasis––nature as origin, nature as process, and nature as result.86 In the
Hippocratic tradition of prognōsis, however, the emphasis tends to fall on either nature as origin
or nature as result. For example, in the Hippocratic treatise known as On the Nature of the Human
Being the focus is on nature as origin. The writer of this text argues that the human body originates
in the compound and pluralistic nature of the entire physical world (and thus is compound and
pluralistic as well).87 For another example, in the Hippocratic text known as On Ancient Medicine,
the writer emphasizes that the nature of the body for doctors should be looked at as the result of
habitual practices, especially what we eat and drink:
ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἰητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι καὶ πάνυ
σπουδάσαι ὡς εἴσεται, εἴπερ τι μέλλει τῶν δεόντων ποιήσειν, ὅ τι τέ ἐστιν
ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενά τε καὶ πινόμενα καὶ ὅ τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα
καὶ ὅ τι ἀφ’ ἑκάστου ἑκάστῳ συμβήσεται.88
… indeed, it seems to me, what a physician must necessarily know about nature––
and he must be at great pains to know it––if he is going to do something of what he
has to do, is this: namely, what a human being is in relation to what he eats and
drinks, and what he is in relation to other habitual practices, and what will happen
to each person because of each of these things.89
For Galen, by contrast, as I will demonstrate below, the emphasis tends to fall on phusis as an
unfolding process, and Galenic prognōsis reflects this reality in its emphasis on more processbased styles of reasoning (heuristic, commentary).
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Galen’s different emphasis arises out of an additional layer of complexity surrounding the
role of phusis in the practice of prognōsis. In theory, within the Hippocratic tradition of prognōsis
the doctor evaluates the meaning of the signs of illness in relation not only to nature-as-origin or
nature-as-result, but in fact to two “natural” standards (each of which can be framed as origin,
process, or result)––first, a universal standard of the nature of the human body (i.e. what is normal
for all of us) and second an individual standard based on a person’s typical state.90 The former is
captured in phrases like kata phusin (according to nature) and para phusin (contrary to nature) and
the latter is expressed most often with the term ethos, “habit, character,” though phusis idiē is also
commonly used.91 In practice, however, it is virtually impossible to give an account of how, in the
actual making of a Hippocratic prognostic inference, the two standards are related. Instead, they
collapse into one another. A good example of this can be found in Hippocrates’ Prognosis. In the
one instance in this text where the word phusis occurs as a standard of universal assessment, it is
also equated with the word sunēthes, a word that generally refers to an individual’s “ordinary
state.” This formulation collapses the distinction between the two natures––universal and
individual:
Περὶ δὲ ὕπνων ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν σύνηθες ἡμῖν ἐστι, τὴν μὲν ἡμέρην
ἐγρηγορέναι χρή, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καθεύδειν. εἰ δ’ εἴη τοῦτο μεταβεβλημένον, κάκιον
γίνεται. ἥκιστα δ’ ἂν λυπέοι, εἰ κοιμῷτο τὸ πρωὶ εἰς τὸ τρίτον μέρος τῆς ἡμέρης. οἱ
δ’ ἀπὸ τουτέου τοῦ χρόνου ὕπνοι πονηρότεροι εἰσιν. Κάκιστον δὲ μὴ κοιμᾶσθαι
μήτε τῆς νυκτὸς μήτε τῆς ἡμέρης. ἢ γὰρ ὑπὸ ὀδύνης τε καὶ πόνου ἀγρυπνήσει ἢ
παραφρονήσει ἀπὸ τουτέου τοῦ σημείου.92
As regards sleep, the patient should follow, according to nature, our particular habit
and spend the day awake and the night asleep. If this habit be disturbed, it is quite
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bad. Nevertheless, it is better that a patient should sleep during the morning and
early afternoon rather than later [in the afternoon]. It is worst of all when he sleeps
neither night nor day; it may be that pain and distress is keeping him awake, or this
sign of insomnia may precede delirium.93
On the one hand, the hēmin is clear––in this passage there is an “our” (universal standard), but it
hangs ambiguously ascribed to both kata phusin, which is generally the universal standard, and
sunēthes, the individual standard. In this light, this passage which is supposed to explain how
phusis and sunēthes are to be related, instead points to a more general conceptual problem in the
Hippocratic prognostic framework itself. Namely, though the process of prognōsis is theoretically
an inference-based practice based on two standards of nature, it proves very difficult to give a fully
formulated account of how one makes inferences about the future course of an illness based on
both a universal and an individual standard. As Oswei Temkin has put it in a study of the reception
of this problem, “medicine suffers from a fundamental contradiction: its practice deals with the
individual while its theory grasps universals only.”94
Given that it is precisely here in this lemma that the Hippocratic tradition of prognōsis runs
into a difficult, perhaps even insoluble conceptual problem, it is not surprising that in his
Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis, it is also here that Galen takes the opportunity to
intervene and differentiate his own views about phusis from the views of his venerable master. 95
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In this intervention, he does not depart from the general picture that assessing a patient involves
both individual and universal considerations. Nor does he try to solve the problem of two natures
by reducing the metric to a single nature. To the contrary, he accepts the complexity of working
with both an individual and a universal standard, and adds another complication––he focuses on
phusis itself as a process. According to Galen, not only are there two standards by which we must
judge a patient’s symptoms, but hēmin phusis, “our (universal) nature” itself also changes over
time:
οὕτω δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σύνηθες ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνηθες
μοχθηρόν. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους χρόνων οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἦν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἄλλα
δὲ τὰ ἔθη, νυνὶ δὲ ἔμπαλιν οἱ πλούσιοι δρῶσιν ἐν ἄλλοις τέ τισι καὶ κατὰ τοὺς
ὕπνους, τῆς μὲν ἡμέρας κοιμώμενοι, νύκτωρ δὲ ἐγρηγορότες. ἐπὶ τούτων οὖν ὡς ἂν
παρὰ φύσιν εἰθισμένων ζῆν οὐκ ἀληθής ἐστιν ἡ εἰρημένη πρὸς Ἱπποκράτους
διδασαλία. κυριώτερον γὰρ ἔν γε τοῖς νῦν χρόνοις ἐστὶ τὸ ἔθος τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἐπὶ
τῶν πλουσίων γυναικῶν μόνον, ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων.96
In relation to a patient’s ordinary life (ethos), symptoms that accord with their
ordinary condition (sunēthes) are good. Those that diverge are bad. However, in the
time of Hippocrates there was no difference between patients’ ordinary lives (ta
ethē) and their natural states (to kata phusin). Now, however, things are upside
down (empalin). The wealthy have different ways of life both in their sleep patterns
and in other aspects of their lives. They sleep during the day. They are awake at
night. As a result, people today have made living contrary to nature (zēn para
phusin) an ordinary way of life (eithismenon). Because of this, part of the
framework (didaskalia, lit. “teaching”) set out by Hippocrates is no longer true
(alēthēs), for today this norm (to ethos) is more normative (kuriōteron) than nature–
–and not only among wealthy women, but also among more than a few men.
In this passage the tensions that animate Galen’s interpretation of the practice of prognōsis are on
full display. Not only must a doctor consider phusis as a universal standard (phusis hēmin), not
only must he consider a patient’s individual nature (ethos), but there is a social nature which,
through the collective impact of changes in habits of life (especially eating, drinking, and sleeping),
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exert enough force on the human body to bring about a change in humanity’s shared nature––a
phusis hēmin 2.0.
In this light, it is important to realize that for Galen excessive wealth, greed, and
consumption are not just markers of Rome’s moral failures. The changes in patterns of sleeping
and eating that accompany them represent a deep shift in the makeup of and the meaning of the
physical body. In this way too, like the Stoics, Galen places great value on knowledge of what is
happening in the body, not only for its own sake, but also because it reflects what is happening in
the world, and it can provide a point from which to engage moral questions as well. “Quod facit,
corpus est” (Anything which can act upon something, is a body), writes Seneca in letter 106, and
“those things which are a good thing (bonum) for the body are bodily (corporeal).” Such good
things, Seneca goes on, “agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quae propria sunt
corporis (awaken the mind and form and shape that which belongs to the body), but “that which
belongs to the body” includes the soul, for “et hoc corpus est,” (the soul is also a kind of body).97
And, again, in letter 113, Seneca pushes even further and defends the idea that virtues such as
iustitia (justice), fortitudo (courage), and prudentia (prudence) are animalia “living beings,”
because the soul is a living thing (animal) and a virtue “nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo
se habens” (is nothing other than a soul conducting itself in a certain way).98
Letters like this demonstrate that Galen is working in a culture with a rich tradition of
thinking about the connection between knowledge of the body and knowledge of the soul, but
Galen in many ways goes beyond the point where Seneca’s letters stop precisely because he is also
engaged with making sense of the practical and theoretical shortcomings of the Hippocratic
concept of phusis. Seneca, too, of course, places great emphasis on the study of natura, “nature,”
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but as Pierre Hadot captures in Philosophy as a Way of Life, the long Mediterranean tradition of
turning to the contemplative study of nature that Seneca participates in is in many ways “a view
from above,” that focuses on using the study of nature as a way to learn about one’s place in a vast
cosmos.99 By contrast, Galen’s engagement with the problem of the two natural standards in
Hippocratic prognōsis is very much a “view from below,” and this view appears to have taught
him that applying such standards in the actual practice of prognōsis is extremely difficult because
human nature is subject to continual change.
One way that Galen tries to wrestle with this is through a subtle distinction he makes
between ethos and sunēthes, between a patient’s “individual profile” and a patient’s “ordinary
state.”100 In the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis sunēthes is differentiated from ethos by
its association with human social nature and cultural practice. In short, it is an “individual profile”
(the ethos) viewed in the light of a social body that is always undergoing a process of change as
the metabolic habits that determine the nature of this body are changed by changing cultures. As
evidence for this, I offer the following: in the same key lemma in which Galen intervenes to
introduce the idea that “our nature” (hēmin phusis) has changed over time, he distinguishes
between ethos and sunēthes. He says, in short, with regards to a patient’s ethos (kata ethos), that
which is sunēthes is healthy (agathon), and that which is asunēthes (i.e “not sunēthes”) is
unhealthy (mochtheron). The structure of this definition suggests that for Galen, ethos is the
broader category that encompasses both sunēthes and asunēthes as a subset, and I suggest that this
subset is defined, at least in this text, by the relationship between bodies and culture. This is what
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Galen highlights in his commentary on the key Hippocratic passage on sleep,101 and this is where
he most clearly goes beyond the Hippocratic tradition of phusis.102
But how does this conceptual departure inform Galen’s decision to incorporate more
storytelling elements in the case histories recorded in On Prognosis? I think the answer is that such
a complex sense of nature cannot be systematized as a list of symptoms, and thus calls for a more
narrative approach, as well as for the figure of the individual doctor to comes forward in a new
way as an active and visible interpreter. Hippocratic case histories, as I explained above, read like
objective descriptions that feature only the patient and the illness. Such a framework implies that
such objectivity is possible, and I am not sure that Galen ultimately thinks it really is. What is
more, even if individual observations can be understood as objective, there is no way to give a
fully explicit account of how the inferences from these observations are to be drawn in relation to
an ever-changing standard of nature. In short, there is no real basis for assuming that what Galen
calls a koinon logismon, a “shared inferential practice,” could truly serve as the foundation of
prognōsis.103 As a result, in his recording of the case histories in On Prognosis Galen moves away
from the sense-based properties of the signs of illness, not because they are unimportant, but
because he has come to see their role as less fundamental than in the Hippocratic tradition. Put
another way, rather than giving his students the impression that they will be able to make
prognostic predictions based on inferential reasoning alone, Galen offers a new solution, which
may not appeal to modern scientific sensibilities but is coherent––namely, prognōsis is not a
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calculus but an embodied technique of observation, narration, and intuition that one learns, not
only as a science, but also as an art and an act of storytelling.
This idea is already present in the first case study on fevers in the Commentary on
Hippocrates Prognosis with which I began above.104 There he tells his students that they will have
to embody the practice (gumnasthai) as they observe (theasthai) it coming to life in him. The
section before this passage is also useful at this point. In it, as I described above, Galen is walking
students through a first case study of the prognōsis of fevers.105 It begins in a traditional
Hippocratic way. Galen goes through the ordinary process of question and answer that the patient
and doctor undertake together, and then he continues with his explication. This passage concerns
a famous Hippocratic symptom, the prosopon nekrōdes, the “corpse face.”106 As we would expect
within a semiotic framework, Galen begins by interpreting the possible meaning of this symptom,
though we might be surprised to learn that something Hippocrates called the “corpse face” is
actually not a univocal indicator of immanent death. To the contrary, there are degrees. It is
“extremely deadly” (olethrion eschatōs), Galen explains, if it is not accompanied by any other
external causes.107 It is less deadly, he goes on, if there is some other identifiable reason for the
“deadly face,” such as malnourishment or insomnia. Then, finally, Galen gives an account, not of
the meaning of the sign itself, but of the conditions under which the “corpse face” emerges in its
most dangerous form––during the first days of an illness unaccompanied by other external causes.
In other words, Galen begins within a semiotic framework, qualifies it, and subtly moves on from
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it to a physiological framework, which, rather than instruct his students how to interpret specific
signs, teaches them how to understand the processes that lead to such signs.
In this case, he highlights the role of the humor yellow bile, heated up within the body in a
particular way, but the point is not actually in these details. It is in the shift from semiotics to
physiology.108 As a way of emphasizing this, Galen ends what may have initially appeared to be a
physiological digression by saying:
ταῦτ’ οὖν γινώσκων τις οὐκ εἰς πρόγνωσιν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς θεραπείας εὕρησιν
ποδηγηθήσεται σκοπὸν ἔχων στηρίζειν τὴν δύναμιν εὐστομάχοις τροφαῖς. ἀλλὰ
τοῦτο μὲν ὁδοῦ τι πάρεργον οὐ σμικρὸν εἰρήσθω.109
Whoever understands these things [I’ve just said] will manage to make a discovery,
not only in prognōsis but also in the appropriate therapy, as long as they keep in
mind the need to strengthen the power of the patient’s body with simple foods. But
just to be clear––know that this digression I just took is no small detail.
In short, through gradual sliding away from the Hippocratic commitment to semiotic inference and
returning instead to the signs of illness as physiology, Galen accommodates the expectations of
his audience for an sign-based framework, but also leads them somewhere new. In this he moves
step by step like a good teacher from a framework that understands the signs of illness as of
semiotic-predictive value to one in which the same signs become a part of a much more openended thing, which I’ve called a “body heuristic,” whose expansiveness reflects the fluid nature of
nature and whose efficacy depends on the accumulated power of experience, intuition, and
storytelling.
As a heuristic, Galenic prognōsis cannot (and does not) promise either perfect results or a
fully explicit theorical exposition. Galen never claims otherwise. He only says two things: It works
and I can teach you how to do it. When it works, I believe it does so through a combination of
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observation, reasoning, and social attunement, all of which are brought together through an act of
intuition in which a judgement about the future is made. The signs of illness thus become for Galen
a temporary tool that helps, like a musical scale, to orient one to the kinds of possibilities a given
situation affords. As a result, prognōsis as Galen understands it cannot be learned from a book like
Hippocrates Prognosis, but instead must be learned mimetically as an embodied technique that
relies on a student’s direct experience of watching Galen do it, and that, again, is the reason why
On Prognosis features precisely and only this––examples of Galen doing it.
In this, however, from another angle, one could argue (as Galen always preferred to do)
that in his transformation of the practice Galen has actually only brought the true idea to greater
fruition. The basis for this claim can be found in an idea the pervades the Hippocratic corpus but
which the corpus itself only partially realizes. In a passage in Hippocrates’ Epidemics I focused on
the dangerous and decisive moments when an illness has reached a crisis, the writer returns to the
fundamentals of the prognostic practice as he understands it. After suggesting the prognosticator
attend to details in the discharge of bodily fluids he writes:
Λέγειν τὰ προγενόμενα, γινώσκειν τὰ παρεόντα, προλέγειν τὰ ἐσόμενα· μελετᾶν
ταῦτα [ἀσκεῖν]. Περὶ δύο τὰ νοσήματα· ὠφελέειν ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν. Ἡ τέχνη διὰ
τριῶν, τὸ νόσημα, καὶ ὁ νοσέων, καὶ ὁ ἰητρός· ὁ ἰητρὸς ὑπηρέτης τῆς τέχνης·
ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι τῷ νοσήματι τὸν νοσέοντα μετὰ τοῦ ἰητροῦ.110
To decide which course is likely you have to look at other things, too. Narrate what
has come before. Know what is happening now. Speak the future. Make a practice
of this. Regarding illnesses there are two things to keep in mind––be of help or at
least do not harm. Regarding the technē of medicine there are three things––the
illness, the patient, and the doctor. The doctor is in the service of the technē and the
one who is sick must do what they can to recover from the illness with the help of
the doctor.
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Here, there are three things: the patient, the illness, and the doctor, and so Galen’s emphasis on the
importance of his own particular presence as a narrator (or co-narrator) with the patient at their
time of illness is not exactly a theoretical anomaly in the Hippocratic tradition. Indeed, especially
considering that pain itself was thought of as an agent of destruction (including the pain of fear),
the presence of a particular, trusted doctor clearly contributes to the curative power of prognōsis
by comforting the patient and helping to relieve the fear of the unknown.111
In this respect it is worth recalling that Galen’s age was a time in which fear of sickness
itself was extremely high, and prognōsis was one of a number of body-based healing practices. In
this sense Galenic prognōsis can be thought of alongside things like the dream-based practice of
incubation, the letters of Marcus Aurelius and his teacher Fronto, and the Stoic tradition of
therapeutic argument as disseminated by figures like Seneca and Epictetus. It is similar to these in
the sense that all of these traditions reflect an idea that a calm mind supports a healthy body, but
prognōsis is also different in the sense that the calming effect is not the result of the direct
intervention of the god Asclepius, reassuring communication with a friend, or the patient’s exercise
of reason, but instead arises as a multi-conditioned result of a patient succeeding in putting their
symptoms into words, the doctor succeeding in helping them to do so, and the two forming a plan
to respond to illness that inspires confidence and hope. In this sense, prognōsis arguably bears the
closest resemblance to the dialogue that often characterizes the Stoic therapeutic arguments, but
prognōsis is also different from these in that the patient is more dependent upon the doctor for
understanding how to respond to their illness, whereas in Stoicism the emphasis tends to fall more
on the pupil’s rational independence. Such a distinction could be pushed too far, as both situations
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involve complex mixtures of dependence and independence, but the basic difference seems to
meaningfully hold.
And the more important point for this chapter is this: as Galen worked creatively to
reinterpret the Hippocratic tradition of prognōsis he changed a number of points of emphasis in
the older tradition, shifting from an inferential-semiotic model to one that emphasized the body as
a heuristic and prognōsis itself as a process of discovery that requires fuller narration. In doing so,
however successful he was as a medical practitioner, from the perspective of reception, Galen
introduced a complex problem about how to label what he was doing because the healing power
of narrative had not typically been a major part of the Hippocratic tradition, which Galen claimed
to represent. This labeling problem comes up everywhere in Galen’s huge corpus of work, but it
emerges in a particularly focused way in Galen’s text, On My Own Books, when he turns to explain
why he temporarily retired from giving public presentations and prognōses. There is a key word I
would like to focus on here––logiatros:
καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ νέος ὢν ἔτι τοῦτ’ ἔπραξα τέταρτον ἔτος ἄγων καὶ τριακοστόν. ἐξ
ἐκείνου δ’ ὥρισα μήτε διδάσκειν ἔτι δημοσίᾳ μήτ’ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι προσδεξαμένης
με τῆς κατὰ τοὺς θεραπευομένους εὐτυχίας μείζονος εὐχῆς. εἰδὼς γὰρ τοὺς
ἀντιτέχνους, ὅταν ἐπαινῆταί τις ἰατρός, ὡς φθονοῦσιν αὐτὸν λογίατρον
ἀποκαλοῦντες, ἀπορράψαι τὴν βάσκανον γλῶτταν αὐτῶν ἐβουλήθην οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τῶν
θεραπευομένων φθεγγόμενός τι περαιτέρω τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὔτε διδάσκων ἐν
πλήθει, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν, οὔτ’ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἔργων τῆς τέχνης
μόνον ἐνδεικνύμενος ἣν εἶχον ἕξιν ἐν τοῖς θεωρήμασιν αὐτῆς.112
From that moment on I decided to give no more public lectures or demonstrations,
but to dedicate myself to the greater cause of the healing of the sick. For I was well
aware of the philistines who cannot bear to hear a doctor praised without dismissing
him as a “word doctor.” In the hope of avoiding their slanderous tongue, I resolved
to say nothing more than was absolutely necessary at the patient’s bedside; to
refrain from lecturing before large crowds as I had preciously; and to perform no
public demonstrations. Rather, my practice of the art alone would suffice to indicate
the level of my understanding.113
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The context makes it clear that being called a logiatros was a painful charge, but what exactly did
it mean to Galen? Peter Singer has offered the calque, “word-doctor.”114 Liddell and Scott (citing
the passage above) give “a physician only in words.” Neither really gives a clear picture of what
Galen means here.
After looking at different usages of this word, which appears to be only extant in Galen’s
works, I believe a logiatros is someone who focuses to an impractical and obfuscating extent on
the semantic, linguistic dimension of medical practice, either out of sheer ignorance or of
intentional deception.115 In this sense, it is closely related to Galen’s concern about the conflation
of genuine medical practice and sophistry, but it is also connected to Galen’s confidence that
ordinary people (idiōtai) are able to learn to practice the fundamentals of medicine in a sound way,
without any fancy training. In Method of Medicine, the meaning of logiatros appears to be someone
who is “excessively complicated; obscure.”116 In the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Nature of Man,
Galen attributes the word to the ancients (hoi palaioi), and he says that they rightly (orthōs) called
people logiatroi who, like some sophists, pretended to know about medicine but who were not
familiar with ordinary professional distinctions like the difference between pus and raw humors.117
In the short treatise On the Purgative Powers of Drugs the meaning of logiatros is again connected
to a comparison between a sophist’s knowledge of medicine and the knowledge of an ordinary
person (idiōtēs).118 The ordinary person’s medical knowledge proves superior, which leads Galen
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to say (as he claims to have said regularly) that any ordinary person is a better medical practitioner
than a logiatros. In addition to these three instances of the word and the one cited above from On
My Own Books, there are only two more extant instances of logiatros and they both occur in a
single passage in the Commentary to Hippocrates’ Prognosis.
In turning to this passage, I would like to highlight an interpretive angle that I will take,
which is to follow up on an allusion that Galen makes in the passage to Plato’s Theatetus. This
dialogue bears many connections to Galen’s concern with the word logiatros. First, the Theatetus
is a dialogue about the problem of true knowledge, and thus it is deeply connected to the question
of sophistical knowledge as well. Second, in the Theatetus Socrates compares himself to a medical
practitioner, not a doctor, but a “midwife.” He is the “midwife of ideas,” helping them to come to
life and stay alive––or not. What is more, in the passage where logiatros occurs in Galen’s
Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis, Galen is also explicating a lemma from the Hippocratic
Prognosis that has to do with women giving birth. As often happens in Galenic commentaries, this
specific question leads to reflection on a broader topic, and eventually Galen arrives at a forceful
critique of the people around him who spend hours debating semantics instead of working towards
a useful prognōsis. In his final remark on the subject, he brings up the idea of a logiatros:
ταῦτα γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ διακρίνειν οὐκ ἰατρῶν εἰς τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἔργα σπευδόντων,
ἀλλὰ σοφιστῶν λόγοις σχολαζόντων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων
προβλημάτων ἐφ’ ὑψηλοῦ θρόνου καθήμενοι σεμνῶς πάνυ καταντλοῦσι λόγοις οἱ
πολλοὶ τοὺς μαθητάς, ὁποῖον δε τι γενήσεται τῷ κάμνοντι, “μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς λέληθεν
ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης χόες.” ἕτεροι δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἱκανοὶ μέν εἰσι καὶ διαγνῶναι τὰ
νοσήματα καὶ προγνῶναι τὰ γενησόμενα, λέγειν δ’ οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν εἰς τὰ λογικὰ
ζητήματα καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἄλλοι μὲν ἰατροὶ νομίζονται παρὰ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, ἕτεροι δὲ σοφισταὶ καὶ λογιατροί. καλοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω, κἂν
θεάσωνταί τινα βιβλίον ἀναγινώσκοντα καὶ λόγῳ χρώμενον εἰς ἑρμηνείαν τῶν
χρησίμων φαρμάκων, ὑποπτεύουσι τοῦτον ἐκ τῶν λογιατρῶν εἶναι.119
Making distinctions like these is not the work of doctors focused on their practice,
but of sophists wasting their time with words. It’s because of this kind of thing and
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these kinds of “problematics” that many people, solemnly enthroned, crush their
students with words, for with regard to one’s actual patients, it is (supposedly)
better to know the “volume of the sea” and to forget them. On the other hand, some
doctors are able to diagnosis the illness and to prognosticate what will happen, but
they have nothing to offer the pursuit of “intellectual” matters. For this reason,
people call the latter “doctors” and the others are called sophists and logiatroses.
That’s what they call them–– “logiatros.” And if they are seen reading a book and
putting words to use towards an interpretation of useful medications, people suspect
they are one of the logiatroses.
The reference to “volume of the sea” is the allusion to the Theatetus that I mentioned, and the
context is extremely illuminating for understanding the nature of the problem Galen faces as he
sees it and captures it with this important word.
In the section of the Theatetus where the phrase “volume of the sea” occurs Socrates is
asking his interlocutor, Theodorus, about people who do philosophy badly. He is sorting out what
it is that these bad philosophers know. Like good philosophers, they do not involve themselves
(and thus do not know) the details of the material and political dimensions of life––the courts, the
tribunals, the political clubs. But unlike good philosophers, they do not know that they do not know
how these things work, so they end up making a mess of things––claiming to be philosophers
through their lack of involvement in the world, but presenting as something very different than the
Socratic ideal. The difference is a subtle, but essential one. The Socratic philosopher appears lost
in a special way that reflects his deeper understanding about how we are all lost, and this awareness
provides a basis on which answer engage questions of deeper importance in new, more substantive
ways. As Socrates puts it, the good philosopher may not know whether he is truly a human being
or not, but that is because he is searchingly involved in asking what a human being really is. By
contrast, the bad philosophers also do not seem to know much about being human, but their
ignorance brings with it no deeper, illuminating questions. What these bad philosophers know
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instead is, according to Socrates, the “volume of the sea.” Here is the passage. Socrates is speaking
to Theodorus:
Λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς
γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; οὗτοι δε που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς
ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι κοινὸν
ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα
οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ’ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα
καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς
τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἤ τί τῳ κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδῶν ἢ
γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα
πάντ’ οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν.120
So we’re to do it, it seems, since you think we should. And lets talk about the leaders
of our chorus; why would anyone want to discuss people who do philosophy badly?
The leaders, I imagine, first of all haven’t known since they were children how to
get to the marketplace, or where to find a law court, a council chamber, or any other
of the city’s public meeting places. Laws and decrees, spoken or written down, our
chorus leaders neither see nor hear. Political clubs scrambling after office; parties;
dinners; reveling with pipe girls: not even in their dreams does it occur to them to
join in. If someone in the city is born well or badly, or something bad has come
down to someone from his ancestors, male or female, our chorus leader knows less
about it than about the proverbial number of pitchers-full there are in the sea. And
he doesn’t even know that he doesn’t know any of this.121
Since Galen refers to this passage in the course of writing his Commentary on Hippocrates’
Prognosis, and in particular in the course of defining the word logiatros, it seems safe to say that
he had on his mind a parallel between the frustrating difficulty of distinguishing a truly good doctor
from a bad one. In his analysis of the term logiatros, he captures this difficulty in the idea that the
problem revolves around how doctors use words, how these words are interpreted, and how they
ultimately impact his audience. This seems true, but it points to a difficult question that Galen
never quite answers––isn’t Galenic prognōsis a lot about how Galen uses his words?
In a once famous but seemingly forgotten study, Laín Entralgo pointed out that the
Hippocratic tradition largely rejected what Entralgo called la curación por la palabra, “the therapy
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of the word,” precisely because for the Hippocratics the idea of language having power over the
body was associated with the magical cures they sought to distinguish their naturalistic inferences
from.122 In this book, Entralgo does not mention Galen, but if he had I believe he would have
immediately seen the problem Galenic prognōsis introduces and been fascinated by it. On the one
hand, Galen embraces the Hippocratic tradition and sees himself as its representative. On the other
hand, in his actual formulation and practice of prognōsis he lends such an emphasis to the role of
words, language, and narrative that he reintroduces something quite like Entralgo’s curación por
la palabra,123 and whatever we conclude about Galen’s record of medical efficacy, this
reintroduction appears to have confused at least some members of his audience. One way to think
about this is a question: At what point does an account of a patient’s symptoms of illness become
so filled with individual detail that it ceases to be a case history and becomes a bios, the story of a
life? And at that point, what special claim does the medical technē have over the interpretation of
a life? In light of questions like these, it seems better to me to understand the sometimes hostile
reactions Galen received for his prognōsis as reflecting not only an arbitrary and envious contempt,
but also an aspect of reality––namely, that Galen’s prognōsis was, in the best possible way,
genuinely weird. In the last section of this chapter, as a way of exploring these ideas further, I
would like to look at one of Galen’s prognōses in greater detail.
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3. The Cure of Eudemus
So far in this chapter I have argued that the storytelling elements in the text On Prognōsis
not only reflect Galen’s cultural milieu in the Second Sophistic, but also embody his vision of how
prognōsis really works, as well as how it can be taught to others. Galen reiterates the fundamental
problem at the beginning of A Method of Medicine to Glaucon, a text likely written between 170174, a couple of years into Galen’s second (and longer) period in Rome, and just a few years before
he wrote On Prognosis (177) and the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis (178).124 Because
of nature’s complexity, Galen argues, and because of the complexity of the individual and the
society in which they live, there is no general way to speak in a full and exhaustive manner about
individual natures:
ὅτι μὲν οὐ τὴν κοινὴν μόνον ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐπίστασθαι
χρὴ τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἑκάστου, πάλαι τε πρὸς Ἱπποκράτους ὀρθῶς
εἴρηται καὶ ἡμῖν δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν, ὡς οἶσθα, τῶν ἔργων τῆς τέχνης ἱκανῶς
ἐσπούδασται. οὐ μὴν γράφειν γε δυνατόν, ὥσπερ τὴν κοινήν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν
ἑκάστου, ἀλλ’ ὑπεναντίως ἔχει τὰ γράμματα πρὸς τὰς πράξεις, ἄλλοθί τε
πολλαχόθεν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν τοῖς νῦν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ γραφομένοις.125
A long time ago, Glaucon, Hippocrates rightly said it is necessary for the doctor to
know not only the nature (phusis) common to all people, but also the nature (phusis)
specific to each individual. As you know, I have been totally committed to these
realities of the art. However, it is not possible to write about the nature of the
individual person in the same way that it is possible to write about the nature that
all of us share. Letters get in the way of life (praxis), in so many instances, not least
among them in these things that I am supposed to write about now.126
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This point of view about the irreducibly individual nature of individuals implicitly represents a
principle of plenitude––the idea that each individual nature is more full of detail than can possibly
be generalized, even within the scope of the medical technē. This passage also brings us back in a
different way to the passage with which I began this chapter––the beginning of On the Medical
Names––where Galen tells us that introducing new terminology is to be welcomed as long as two
conditions are met. First, the terminology must be clear, and Galen gives a definition of what he
means by clear: Clear means it makes the path to the thing (pragma) that has been discovered
shorter. Second, the terminology must be shared with others. If either of these two conditions fail,
for Galen, the introduction of new terms is bāṭil, “absurd.” In this light, as I suggested briefly
above, Galen’s choice to write On Prognōsis as a series of stories, rather than a Hippocratic case
history, is a bit like him introducing a new “medical name,” but instead of an individual term it is
a whole story.
Galen has no objection to stories, he just asks that they have a logos, a purposeful and
reasoned account within them.127 The stories Galen tells in On Prognosis meet this criteria, and as
stories they also acquire new layers of meaning. They contain practical value as a heuristic tool to
learn to practice Galenic prognōsis mimetically through the close observation of an exemplary
practitioner, and they also embody principles, questions, and an orientation towards life as a whole.
In this sense, we can ask a simple but very interesting question, “What is the message of On
Prognosis?” I believe it is this: Human life is an experience of individual discovery, whose richness
corresponds to the singularity of each individual person. Some of this can be put into words, other
parts of it cannot, and the individual’s experience of discovery often unfolds in the midst of hostile
forces. These, however, can ultimately be overcome through a combination of intellectual training,
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social attunement, and a resilient spirit of maḥabba al-nāss, philanthropia, love for humanity.128
This comes through clearly in Galen’s most famous cure––the cure of his teacher Eudemus. As in
the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis, it comes through in the emphasis on the language of
seeing, discovery, and wonder, but it goes further as well because as a story these themes also enter
narratologically in the way that Galen stages the discovery as if it is happening before our very
own eyes for the first time.
Eudemus has malaria.129 He is an old man, but we know a little more about his physical
make-up than most of Galen’s patients, because Galen describes Eudemus’s constitution in a
passage in the second book of his text on elemental and humoral theory called Mixtures. He says
that Eudemus was “thin (ischnos), hairy (dasēs), muscly (muōdēs), black (melas), well-veined
(phlebōdēs), and noticeably hot (themōs hikanōs).”130 Generally speaking, these are criteria of
strength and vitality, and this is the backdrop against which Eudemus becomes ill. It is the fall in
Rome around the year 163.131 Like Galen, Eudemus is from Pergamum, one of the most important
cities in Asia Minor. He probably arrived in Rome about a decade before his student, and he seems
to be at least three, perhaps four decades Galen’s senior. He is a recognized expert in Aristotelian
philosophy, and many of the figures that surround him in Galen’s story are also accomplished
Peripatetics.132 They, like many of their contemporaries, are in the habit of gathering and
discussing philosophy in both private and public spaces, and their days, as Galen outlines them,
are organized around mealtimes and the baths.
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Galen stages On Prognosis as a dialogue, not only with Eudemus and his circle, but also
in a formal sense. He is the narrator of the text, but he is constant conversation with a man named
Epigenes.133 It is not entirely clear who Epigenes was to Galen, but he may have been Eudemus’s
ordinary doctor, an imperial official and friend of Eudemus, or perhaps a colleague or pupil of
Galen’s.134 The text beings like this: Hoson men epi tois pollois tōn iatrōn, ō Epigenes, adunaton
esti progivōskein ta tois kamnousin esomena kath’ hekastēn noson (O Epigenes, it is impossible to
explain to most doctors how to practice prognōsis for each individual illness).135 After a short
introductory remark regarding the sorry state of medical practice in Rome, Galen turns to his cure
of Eudemus. The way he frames it is important. This is the first cure in the text, and it is also the
one that will launch Galen’s career. Right before he describes Eudemus’s first symptoms, Galen
emphasizes that he himself is beginning from a state of ignorance. He is agnoōn “unknowing” and
also ouden huphormenos “naïve, unsuspecting.”136 This language not only reflects his culture
shock as an immigrant in Rome, it also signals the key point of departure for learning prongōsis–
–ignorance, a state of not-yet knowing––and it sets the stage for the experience of discovery. Thus,
on the one hand, when he sets himself up as a character in his own story, Galen positions himself
not as the established master, but more like the students he addresses in the Commentary on
Hippocrates’ Prognosis. On the other hand, through the framing device of the Epigenes character,
Galen is also able to signal to the reader that he is telling the story of his former ignorance from a
later position of understanding and knowledge. Right after he describes his state of unknowing,
the narrator (Galen) makes an aside remark to Epigenes: hōs epistasai su ho malista parōn tēi
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nosōi pasēi mechri telous ap’ arches Eudēmou tou Peripatētikou philosophou (You, Epigenes, you
already know all of this very well, since you were there for the philosopher Eudemus’s illness from
beginning to end).137
The first symptoms we learn about are not alarming. To the contrary, they are distinctly
mild. Eudemus is experiencing “a slight deviation” from his normal state of health (anōmalia tis
autōi).138 Then he develops a bit of shiver, and decides, out of an abundance of caution, to skip an
evening meal and let his body recover.139 He seems to feel better. A couple of days pass without
incident. On the third day, he goes to visit Galen, which was his ordinary routine (hōs ethos). He
continues to eat cautiously, but he is optimistic and believes that his illness has departed.140 On the
fourth day (i.e. from the onset of the first symptom) something very important happens, both for
Eudemus and for Galen. Eudemus is feeling better and he playfully turns to Epigenes (Galen’s
interlocutor in the framing device) and asks him whether he thinks that Eudemus should still be
cautious or can return to his normal way of eating, bathing, and being.141 Epigenes says that he is
confident Eudemus has recovered and recommends that he return to a normal routine. Then,
suddenly, at this point, we learn that this whole conversation has actually been happening in the
presence not only of Epigenes, but of a group of unnamed others as well (hoi t’alloi pantes hoi
parontes).142 This is an important detail, not only because it expands the setting and prepares the
stage for other characters to enter later, but also because it allows for Eudemus to poll the room on
the state of his illness. We are not told that this group of unnamed people are doctors, but it is
implied by the fact that they are said to agree with Epigenes (offering a medical opinion) that
137
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Eudemus’s illness has passed.143 Then, within this group, as his first act of exemplary prognōsis
Galen says this: egō de esiōpōn monos (I alone remained silent).144
Thus, the first two actions in Galen’s first cure are ignorance (agnoōn) and silence
(espiōpōn). Why is this? Eudemus is wondering this, too, it turns out, and so he turns to Galen and
says “Why are you silent?” This, of course, gives Galen the chance to respond. It seems plausible
that Galen’s silence here is partly a matter of being a newcomer. Eudemus had been his philosophy
professor in Pergamum, but it had been perhaps a decade since they had seen each other, and Galen
was not yet familiar with life in Rome. In this scene, he is surrounded by the upper crust, the elite
and courtly, and it would be understandable if he felt that he did not know enough about the “room”
yet to speak openly. At the same time, the silence has another layer of meaning that picks up
Galen’s instructions to his students in the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis. There, they
are told to theasthai to “behold” what is going on in the patient (and the exemplary practitioner,
too).145 In this sense, Galen’s silence at the beginning of his cure of Eudemus is not only a
reflection of his cultural dislocation, but it also embodies an important principle of Galenic
prognōsis––close observation of the patient involves a kind of quiet, even stillness.
Galen’s response to Eudemus is equally meaningful, both medically and narratologically.
Medically he tells Eudemus that his silence reflects the fact that he has not yet developed a clear
enough sense of Eudemus’s condition to comment. This response reflects two important principles
of Galenic prognōsis: First, since prognostic signs are judged against a universal standard of nature
(kata phusin or para phusin), a standard based on the patient’s individual profile (ethos), and an
individual-social standard based on what is ordinary for the patient in their historical and cultural
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context (sunēthes), the doctor has to spend a lot of time getting to know the patient as an individual
and cultural being. In this respect, it would be fair to assume that Galen has some advantage with
Eudemus, since the two knew each other in Pergamum. In fact, this may be the way that the cure
of Eudemus led to Galen’s “break,” because in taking on Eudemus as a patient, Galen did have the
advantage of having known him for years before the illness. However, by the same token, Galen’s
statement that he does not yet know enough shows just how high the bar is for really knowing a
patient, according to Galen. Despite their long acquaintance, Galen doesn’t yet feel he knows
enough about the bodily details of Eudemus’s make-up, which is why he says that he wasn’t able
to get a clear reading of a key diagnostic indicator––the pulse.146
Narratologically, this passage is key because it is through it that we learn that in this text
not everything is being fully narrated. Things are happening behind the scenes as well. As Galen
narrated these first events to the reader, the only part he had let us see was the debate between
Epigenes and the doctors about whether Eudemus was recovered. Then, Eudemus turns to him and
asks why he is remaining silent, and Galen answers by saying that when he took Eudemus’s pulse
earlier he had not been entirely without suspicion (ouk einai moi teleōs anupopton) that Eudemus
might still be sick.147 We did not see him take Eudemus’s pulse earlier! This way of telling the
story accomplishes several things: first, it creates surprise; second, it relieves Galen of having to
narrate the symptoms as a list (and risk giving the false impression that the list is what matters);
third, and most importantly, it forces the reader to themselves weave the present, past, and future
together. Galen, as the narrator, is not going to present things in a straight temporal line. Instead,
he presents elements of the past, present, and future in a scattered, even disorganized way. This
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gives the reader the chance to order the past, present, and future for themselves, even as they watch
Galen eventually do it. This leaving out of elements of the past (i.e. the taking of the pulse that
happened behind the scenes) reflects one of the basic claims of both the Hippocratic and Galenic
traditions of prognōsis. As Hippocrates insists at the beginning of his Prognosis, and as Galen
echoes through his reception of this tradition, prognōsis is not only about the future, it is also about
figuring out what happened in the past as well.148
In response to Galen’s claim that the first pulse was inconclusive, Eudemus asks him to
take his pulse again. Galen does so, but even afterwards he says that he still does not know enough
to announce that Eudemus has truly recovered. To the contrary, his lack of clear knowledge in this
respect has left Galen concerned for his teacher.149 Out of an abundance of caution, Eudemus
decides to continue a cautious dietary regimen and wait to see what happens on the next critical
day, four days later.150 In the meantime, the circle of doctors who appear to normally attend
Eudemus are consulted and they express confidence that he has recovered. The truth is that
Eudemus himself is feeling well, too. This is important because it highlights how prognōsis was
expected to responded not only to the symptoms of illness, but also to the worry about illness even
when there were no clear symptoms of it. In this respect, the timing of Galen’s composition of this
treatise seems meaningful. As I mentioned above, the events surrounding Eudemus’s cure
probably happened in the early 160’s, but Galen didn’t write On Prognosis until 177, 178, or
179.151 A lot changed in this decade, but nothing was more impactful that the arrival in Rome of
the Antonine pandemic. Thus, we have to understand, even though the pandemic hadn’t reached
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Rome at the time of Eudemus’s cure, by the time Galen is telling the story in On Prognosis Rome
had been devastated by the most terrifying wave of illness in its history. In this light, Galen’s
emphasis on Eudemus’s concern about sickness (even when he is feeling well) may reflect even
more than something about prognōsis. It may also reflect something about the later years in Rome
when, as Kyle Harper has demonstrated, there was not only a biological pandemic, but also a
psychological pandemic of worry and fear. In this respect, too, we should be cautious not to
underestimate Galen’s own worry for his teacher. Eudemus was an old man. Winter was coming,
and cyclical fevers killed people by the tens of thousands in second century Rome even before the
pandemic.
As Eudemus is waiting anxiously to see what his body will do on the next critical day,
Galen shifts the frame and narrates a short conversation that he has with Epigenes. Galen claims
that Epigenes asked him for his (Galen’s) opinion about Eudemus and Galen says that he
responded honestly by saying that he had a hunch (hupopsia) that Eudemus was suffering from a
tetartaias periodou, “quartan fever,” a cyclical fever that recurs on a four-day cycle and can
increase in intensity with time.152 This explains to the reader the counting scheme that Galen has
been employing and also why Eudemus is waiting to see what happens on the seventh day, but
before we can learn more, Galen is called away to go and attend to another patient who “lived
somewhat far away” (arrōston ouk engus oikounta).153 During Galen’s absence, Eudemus’s
symptoms begin to intensify. He has a hot flash throughout his whole body.154 Initially, however,
Eudemus ascribes it to the wine that he risked drinking at dinner. His normal circle of doctors
concur, so he continues to eat and drink in his normal way undeterred. Then, clear signs of fever

152

On Prognosis, 76.15-18, Nutton (Kühn, XIV.607).
Ibid., 76.17 (K, XIV.608).
154
Ibid., 76.19-20.
153

71

emerge, and since it is the day on which a fever would be expected to emerge if it was a quartan
fever, he decides that this must be what he has.155
This is a turning point in the story, for once Eudemus makes this self-diagnosis, he begins
to praise and trust Galen as his doctor. Once again, Galen has hidden from us a key event that
happened in the past, but it surfaces now in the present, for Eudemus clearly ascribes to Galen a
correct prediction and credits him as interpreting his pulse accurately. The readers, however, never
saw Galen tell Eudemus his interpretation. That information was transmitted to the reader in a side
conversation that Galen had with Epigenes (about the past). Once again, this narrative structure
not only reflects a conversational element that permeates the medical situation, it also highlights
the way that in a prognōsis, some things happen in a hidden way in the background, and the
prognosticator must discover them from the signs that occur in the present moment. There is an
additional paradox that emerges as well. When Galen’s interpretation of the quartan fever proves
correct, Eudemus is surround by his “ordinary” doctors (sunēthesin iatrois).156 In principle, as I
demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, in Galenic prognōsis what is “ordinary” for
the patient (sunēthes) is good, and what is out of the ordinary is bad. However, in praising Galen’s
correct assessment of his quartan fever, Eudemus is, in a sense, leaving his “ordinary” doctors
behind.
As he does this, Eudemus becomes more curious about Galen’s recent life, and Galen the
narrator thus has the chance to tell us more about his past. What we learn, above all, is that in the
intellectual community that Galen was from in Pergamum, in which Eudemus was one of his
teachers, Galen was thought of primarily as a philosopher. In fact, this seems to be part of the
reason why Eudemus doesn’t initially trust Galen’s prognōsis over the predictions of his ordinary
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doctors. To him, Galen was a philosopher with a high level of aptitude for analyzing the arguments
of Aristotle, not a medical practitioner, but now he begins to see that Galen is both. As he puts this
together, Galen introduces yet another element of the past, the story of how the god of medicine,
Asclepius, came to Galen’s father in a dream. At the time, Galen had been planning to be a
philosopher, but in the dream Asclepius tells Galen’s father that the his son must be trained in
medicine, and not just as a hobby, but as a vocation.157 The entrance of these details serves not
only to establish Galen’s credentials as a philosopher, they draw attention to the way that Galen
was received differently in Pergamum than he is in Rome, and this prepares the way for the reader
to critically assess the hostile reactions of other Roman doctors that Galen will receive in response
to his cures.
Just as we are learning these important details about Galen’s past, however, another
important element of prognōsis intrudes, which I highlighted earlier in two other cures from this
text as well––luck.158 By chance at this moment (tote kata tina tuchēn) Galen tells us that he was
called away to treat another young man who also had a fever. Apparently, Epigenes accompanies
Galen to see this patient, and so Galen can once again narrate the past through a present
conversation with this interlocutor. In treating this boy, Galen correctly identifies the presence of
a quartan fever, prescribes treatment, and facilitates the patient’s recovery. Eudemus apparently
hears about Galen’s success with this boy and feels an increase in confidence in Galen as a doctor
as a result.159 However, Eudemus also continues to listen to the advice of his ordinary doctors, and
this sets the stage for the final act of the story. These doctors look at the facts of the case and decide
to administer a medication, “theriac,” in response to Eudemus’s fever. Eudemus asks Galen for his
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opinion and Epigenes is apparently next to them both when Galen responds. Galen says that he
does not think the theriac is a good idea. Eudemus asks why, and Galen says that he believes
Eudemus’s illness has not yet metabolized (i.e. it is still apepton, “uncooked”) and that as a result,
the medicine would not have any positive effect and may well worsen the next outbreak of fever.160
The next day Eudemus’s ordinary doctors return, and while Galen and Epigenes are away
they administer the theriac to Eudemus, who is described by Galen as being too ashamed
(aidesthenti) to contravene his ordinary doctors’ advice,161 a detail that speaks to the social and
emotional complexity of this kind of situation, where bodily illness, knowledge, and vulnerability
all meet. The effect of the theriac is negative. The next bout of fever returns and it is stronger than
the last. Eudemus’s doctors tell him that sometimes the theriac takes time to take full effect. They
assure him that the drug is working, and they go away confidently. However, the drug does not
work. The fever comes back and this time it comes back off cycle, not on the expected day but
sooner, a change that is interpreted as an intensification of the illness and which poses a significant
danger to the patient.162 In response, Eudemus’s ordinary doctors rush back and decide to give him
a second dose of theriac. Eudemus is then subsequently struck by two more waves of illness, and
at that point he turns to Galen and finally asks what will happen next, and it is only at this point,
after approximately ten days of observation that Galen says he is familiar enough with Eudemus’
ordinary pulse to make a more confident prognōsis.163 Still, however, he needs more information
to be sure, and thus he asks for some samples of Eudemus’s urine. He examines one vial in the
moment and comes back the next morning before dawn to compare it to a second vial. Then, he
leaves Eudemus and says he will come back later in the day to offer his prognōsis.
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This brings us to the final chapter of the story. While Galen is away two of Eudemus’s
friends come back, as they were accustomed to, to exchange news, discuss philosophy, and check
on their old friend. These figures are Sergius Paulus and Flavius Boethus.164 Both are leading
men, not only in Roman society, but also in the provinces. Sergius Paulus would later become a
deputy to the emperor in judicial affairs, a position that would give him jurisdiction over virtually
all crimes in Rome. Flavius Boethus was of Syrian origin and thus also an immigrant to Rome,
and he had already served as a consul and would later become the governor of the Roman province
of Palestina.165 The two men expand the audience of the prognōsis and provide a mechanism
through which the story of Galen’s medical success can spread to wider circles. Both men, like
Eudemus, were Aristotelians, and their arrival represents the presence of a group of Galen’s
supporters. Each of them is impressed with Galen and both independently invite him to lecture on
medicine at other venues in Rome. In this way, the entrance of these figures does the opposite of
the conversation with Epigenes. Epigenes allows Galen to stage elements of the past (e.g. the pulse
that he took without showing the reader), Sergius Paulus and Flavius Boethus allow Galen to stage
the future that would result from his cure of Eudemus. As with the framing device of Epigenes,
this not only provides a convenient way to include more autobiographical information, it once
again challenges the reader to learn to move between the past, the present, and future as one has
to do in making a Galenic prognōsis.
When we return from this future to the present situation of Eudemus, the matter has turned
grave, so grave in fact that Galen tells us that Eudemus ordinary doctors have given him up for
lost: kataponoumenos gar hupo tōn triōn tetartaiōn apēlpisto pros tōn iatrōn ontos ēdē pou mesou
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cheimōnos (Since the old man was thoroughly exhausted by three bouts of fever already, he was
given up for lost by his doctors, especially considering it was almost winter).166 This opens on to
a subtle point Galen may be introducing into the story. In traditional Hippocratic prognōsis it was
important for the doctor to do one’s best to cure the patient, but it was equally important to
realistically assess whether the patient will live or die, not only for the patient’s sake, but also so
that the patient wouldn’t die under the doctor’s care, a situation that could lead to serious
retributive claims against the doctor.167 In this light, when Galen mentions the other doctors
leaving, it isn’t only a personal abandonment. Such a departure in some situations represented (at
least tacitly) accepted medical practice and a practical way for doctors to protect their reputations.
Galen does not make a big deal of this, but this element of understatement itself may serve as a
signal to the students who want to learn prognōsis from him of something important––namely,
that they must pay attention to both the technical and ethical elements of the practice. In this case,
Galen embodies the idea of taking a risk for a patient.
The way he explains this is a mixture of principled conviction and chance. He says he
stayed by Eudemus for two reasons. First, Galen says he happened to live nearby, and second, he
says Eudemus was his teacher, and this seems to have created a bond between them that interacts
with Galen’s decisions as a medical practitioner. It also meant that Galen was expected to visit
Eudemus twice daily to share news and information: Egō de kai hoia didaskalōi men alla kai kata
tuchēn oikōn autou plēsion anangkēn eichon hupakouein dis tēs hēmeras kalounti (Since Eudemus
was my teacher and I happened to live nearby, I was obliged to attend to his twice daily
summons).168 The relationship between Galen and Eudemus, in this sense, may have left Galen in
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a situation where he could not plausibly recuse himself from the case, even at the risk of Eudemus
dying under his care. Imagine, for ten days Galen does his best to cure his teacher. Then things go
south. What does he do? Does he announce that he can no longer see Eudemus in a professional
medical capacity, but will still visit him for intellectual discussions as he dies?
Regardless, the delicacy of this moment allows for the entrance of a final set of characters,
and these are antagonistic. When Eudemus’s ordinary doctors abandon him, two other prominent
Roman doctors, Antigenes and Martianus, enter into the story and ridicule Galen for standing by
his teacher. Galen tells us Antigenes said, “Eudēmon hexēkoston kai triton etos agonta, treis
echonta tetartaious en mesōi cheimōni therapeuein hupischneitai Galēnos” (Look at Eudemus!
He is in his sixty third year. He has had three dangerous fevers in the middle of winter, and Galen
is going to cure him).169 Antigenes’ remark emphasizes the danger that Galen has himself
undertaken in staying with Eudemus under perilous conditions. On one level, there is no question
that this emphasis paints Galen in a brave light, though such a reading I think is qualified by the
reading I offered above where Galen in a sense has no real option to leave the charge of Eudemus.
More importantly, however, the ridicule of Antigenes reflects something about prognōsis that is
implicit in the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis and which Galen takes time to make
explicit here––namely, because of its public (or semi-public) nature pronōsis can lead to social
conflict, precisely because different people will interpret different situations differently, and with
different interests in mind. As a result the doctor must not only know how to do prognōsis, he must
also be prepared to be criticized even for doing it well.
Galen, of course, does do it well, though I do not think that the case of Eudemus was a
guaranteed win for him. It seems to me, given the medical information Galen communicates, that
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Eudemus may well have died under Galen’s care. The risk, I think, was quite real. Luckily,
however, after weathering the attack of Antigenes, Galen tells us that he correctly predicted three
subsequent bouts of fever, and as he was able to see them coming in advance, he prescribed
therapies that helped Eudemus’s body to win the fight against the disease. In response to Galen’s
success, another Roman doctor, Martianus, accuses him of being a mantis, a “diviner.” However,
in a humorous interlude Galen tells us that other lay members of the audience asked Martianus
what kind of diviner (bird divination, sheep liver divination, horoscopes, etc), and Martianus gets
flustered and says that it is all of them combined, a response that reveals that he knows too little
about divination to asses Galen’s credentials as a diviner. More importantly this episode brings in
the support Galen has from his audience. As he puts it at the end of this cure, “Hoi men idiōtai tēs
iatrikēs technēs akouontes tauta, koinon agathon hēgoumenoi me tois en Romēi genēsesthai pantes
echairon” (When lay practitioners of medicine heard these things [i.e. the cure of Eudemus], they
were all delighted to think that I was going to be a public good for the inhabitants of Rome).170
Following his success Galen and Eudemus have a chance to debrief. In this conversation
Galen recapitulates his cure and demonstrates how it reflects his own understanding of both
prognōsis and human life. Galen begins this cure in a state of ignorance, both of the medical
situation and the social situation. Gradually, at first only through silence, and then step by step
using language and reasoning he works out his own individual understanding of the situation, and
through this is able to weather the opinions of others and also help to save his teacher. The
prognōsis has the basic elements of the traditional Hippocratic model (the reading of signs like
urine, the observation and assessment of an ordinary bodily state, a principle of non-intervention
until knowledge has been secured), but it has additional elements as well. I believe the most
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important of these is that in how he chooses to narrate the story, Galen emphasizes the individual
doctor’s unfolding experience of discovery. This, as I argued in section two of this chapter, is the
core of Galenic prognōsis, and it is in this respect that it differs most from its Hippocratic
prototype.
Once Eudemus is cured, he wants to know all the details. He demands from Galen a full
case-study account of how he interpreted the signs and connected them to future events.171 Galen’s
first response to Eudemus’s desire to know how Galen succeeded is very important. He plays with
him. He says kagō mediasas, «ti allo», ephēn, «ē agatha?» (Smiling I said to him “What is there
but good news?”).172 Eudemus is unsatisfied with this playful response, and Galen teases him
saying “Isn’t a summary enough?” From one angle, Galen’s initial withholding of the details of
his prognōsis could be seen as just a way of building suspense. “How did he do it?!” But, as I’ve
argued throughout this chapter, these responses also embody other principles and aspects of
Galen’s thinking about medicine. From this angle, I believe Galen’s playful withholding is a way
of communicating to Eudemus––and more importantly to the reader––that the details aren’t the
most important thing. The recovery is the most important thing, and without saying it in quite this
way, I do also see Galen’s withholding of the details as subtly suggesting that the details of how
he carried out his prognōsis are not entirely expressible. As we have seen, he tells us that such
details are often difficult to express in his Commentary on Hippocrates Prognosis.173 What is
more, unlike Eudemus, we the readers of the text have had a privileged perspective on Galen’s
whole practice, and at this point we ourselves do not know the answer to the kind of question
Eudemus is asking about the prognostic calculus either. I think the reason is because for Galen
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prognōsis is not ultimately a calculus, and it is this light that I think we must read Galen’s eventual
response to Eudemus, where he does provide a short conventional summary of the prognostic signs
that he followed: «haimorragias men oun» ephēn, «esomenēs tade kai tade proēgeitai sēmeia,
kathaper ge kai hidrōtōn tauti» (Well, this and this group of signs leads to haemorrhage, and these
others ones lead to sweats).174 The language, as G.E.R. Lloyd notes in his essay on the difference
between Hippocratic and Galenic case histories, is quite general.175 It would be impossible to make
a prognōsis based on these details. But narratologically speaking we know that prognōsis is
possible because we just watched Galen do it. This tension between the insufficiency of the
prognostic signs and the irrefutability of Galen’s success suggests to me the following, which I
also concluded about Galen’s Commentary on Hippocrates Prognosis: at the core of Galen’s
prognōsis the semiotic dimension is not the mechanism of calculation but a heuristic device that
helps the doctor bring together the signs of illness in an organized way that leaves him in the best
position to make an assessment which is ultimately intuitive and inseparable from the doctor’s
individual experience of discovering the patient as an individual.
For this Eudemus says that Galen deserves both praise (epainein) and wonder
(thaumazein),176 and though he celebrates Galen for giving a “rational account” (sunelogisō) of
how he made his prognostic discovery, the readers are in a position to see that there are elements
in play that are not encompassed by the idea of a rational account alone.177 Indeed, Eudemus
doesn’t actually seem to see it through the lens of reason alone either. The morning after their
debriefing, Galen and Eudemus are having breakfast together and Epigenes supposedly came over
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to hear all of the details from Eudemus. At this final meeting, Eudemus describes Galen’s
prognōsis like this:
…οὐχ ὑπομένοντος μετρίως φθέγγεσθαι τοῦ φιλοσόφου καθάπερ εἴωθεν
κεκραγότος δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμᾶς τοὺς εἰσιόντας φίλους ὡς ὁ Πύθιος Ἀπόλλων
διὰ τοῦ Γαληνοῦ στόματος ἐβουλήθη θεσπίζειν τοῖς νοσοῦσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
θεραπεύειν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάττειν τε τελέως αὐτοὺς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ προρρηθείσῃ. τὴν γοῦν
γεγενημένην λύσιν τοῦ νοσήματος––πέπεισμαι γὰρ ἤδη τελέως ὑγιαίνειν––
ἐπαγγειλάμενος ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ τῆς θεραπείας και τῆς προρρήσεως ἔτυχεν.
ἀπήλλαξε δέ με τριῶν τεταρταίων οἷς ἐξ ἀκαίρου πόσεως τοῦ θηριακοῦ φαρμάκου
περιέπεσον, ὁπότε καιρὸς αὐτῆς ἐγένετο μηδὲν ἐκείνων φθεγγομένων δοὺς οὗτος
ἀπήλλαξέ με, καταγελώμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν εἴ γε νομίζει γέροντα χειμῶνος ὥρᾳ
κάμνοντα τρισὶ τεταρταίοις ἀπαλλάξειν.178
The philosopher Eudemus abandoned his normal moderated manner of speaking
and shouted out loud to all of his friends as we entered the house that Pythian Apollo
himself deigned to speak to the sick through the mouth of Galen, and then treat
them and cure them completely on the predicted day. “Galen announced my
recovery from this illness long ago: I am convinced that I am already fully fit, and
he has succeeded both in his treatment and his forecast. He has cured me of three
quartan fevers, to which I succumbed after drinking theriac medicine at the wrong
time. When the time for it was right, although they [i.e. his ordinary doctors] said
nothing, this Galen gave it to me and cured me, despite being ridiculed by the others
for taking the risk of trying to cure a three-fevered old man headed for winter.
Scholars have often highlighted, and understandably, Galen’s negative reaction to being associated
with divination, but his response to Eudemus’s comment here is a positive one, and this seems to
me to represent an important point of balance in assessing the religious dimension of prognōsis
for Galen. Twentieth-century readers have emphasized a picture of a divided Galen, half sophist,
half scientist, but we know that he was a lifelong devotee of Asclepius, who he felt had saved him
through a medical dream, and in many places Galen openly makes a place for the divine in his
medical practice. As he writes in the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognosis:
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ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἕν τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην εἶναι χρὴ τὸ θεῖον τοῦτο καὶ μὴ
μόνον ἐπῃνῆσθαι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ πρὸς Ἱπποκράτους, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεδεῖχθαι,
πρόδηλον παντί.179
One of the elements of the medical technē is the divine. This is true for everyone.
Hippocrates not only celebrated knowledge of the divine, he also gave an account
of its role.
The divine provides one angle from which to begin to grapple with the intuitive dimensions of
Galenic prognōsis, too. Nature provides another. Earlier on in the commentary Galen compares
the good prognosticator to a kubernētēs, the pilot of a ship.180 In this key passage, he says the
prognosticator gets ready (proparaskeuazomenos) for his patients like the pilot of a ship gets ready
for a storm. But how does the pilot of a ship get ready for a storm? He or she reads the signs, to be
sure, but that is not the whole story. Each individual practitioner must know the sky, their ship,
and the ocean in a deep way, too. It is a good image for a storytelling practice that I see celebrating
life as an unfolding discovery in the company of others, at times against the odds.
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2

Shahrazad’s Listening Cure
Imaginative Humoral Therapy

In the medieval Islamic world Galen was received as an exemplary ḥakīm, a “wise man,”
“a sage,” and a “doctor,” and he was celebrated by figures like thirteenth-century physician and
historian Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿah as a thinker of wide and venerable knowledge.1 In this chapter I
analyze a second storytelling cure that lies roughly in the middle of the arc of Galenic reception
that runs from Galen’s own day to Jean-Jacques Rousseau––Shahrazad’s famous cure of king
Shahriyar in the collection of stories known as Alf Layla wa Layla, 1001 Nights.2 I call this cure a
“listening cure” because king Shahriyar is cured through listening to Shahrazad’s stories. But how?
Medicine forms an important theme throughout the Nights, and Galen was the most influential
medical figure in the medieval Islamicate world from which the Nights come.3 His works and
legend entered this world first through the ʿAbbāsid translation movement, and then diffused

1

See Swain, Simon, “The Greek Chapters and Galen,” in A Literary History of Medicine: The ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī
ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ of Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿah, eds. Emilie Savage-Smith, Simon Swain, and Geert Jan van Gelder, with
Ignacio Sánchez, N. Peter Joosse, Alasdair Watson, Bruce Inksetter, and Franak Hilloowala (Leiden: Brill, 2020),
142-78.
2
This collection is also known as The Arabian Nights, and I refer to it in the rest of this chapter as the Nights. There
are two main Arabic recensions of the Nights, but both recensions are referred to today by both names, The Arabian
Nights and 1001 Nights.
3
The term “Islamicate” was introduced by Marhsall Hogdson in The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a
World Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) as a way of highlighting that Islamic society has
historically included aspects that are not specifically Islamic. I find the term helpful in this chapter, since both the
Nights and the medieval Arabic reception of Galenic medicine intersect with a number of religious traditions. For
“islamicate” in Hogdson, see The Venture of Islam, 57. For a recent treatment of this complex term see Dresler,
Markus, Armando Salvatore, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Islamicate Secularities: New Perspectives on a Contested
Concept.” Historical Social Research, 44.3 (2019): 7-34. For medieval Islamicate medicine as a “multiconfessional
maze,” see Pormann, Peter E., “Islamic Medicine Crosspollinated: A Multilingual and Multiconfessional Maze,” in
Islamic Crosspollinations: Interactions in the Medieval Middle East, eds. Anna Ayşe Akasoy, James Montgomery,
and Peter E. Pormann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 76-93.

83

through medical practice, philosophical enquiry, hospitals, and sessions of courtly learning known
as majālis into a wider ambit of reception that eventually includes storytelling as well.4
Many scholars have seen Shahrazad’s storytelling as therapeutic, but in making their case
most have relied upon modern psychological, philosophical, and medical frameworks to articulate
the mechanism of therapy. In 1986, for example, Jerome Clinton demonstrated that a psychological
dimension unites Shahrazad’s first cycle stories up to THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING,5 but
he explained this unity in terms of nineteenth-century Freudian ideas of neurosis and psychosis.6
In 1998 Daniel Beaumont drew on the psychological dimension of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic
to explain Shahrazad position vis-à-vis the king, and he then explained king Shahriyar’s crisis
using twentieth-century Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts of the “imaginary” and “symbolic”
order.7 More recently scholars have explored alternatives to traditional psychoanalysis. In 2007,
for example, Richard van Leeuwen presented a new picture of Shahrazad as a “high-priestess of
storytelling,” whose stories brings Shahriyar through an “initiation,” but his concept of ritual
retains a contemporary cast through its reliance on Foucault.8 The eclectic narrative tradition of
the Nights accommodates these modern readings well, but there is also a rich world of medieval
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Arabic medicine and philosophy that serves equally well as the basis for explaining the mechanism
of Shahrazad’s cure.9 Beginning here also allows us to frame a new question like this: As a
character of medieval Arabic literature, how might Shahrazad herself understand her own cure?
In this chapter, I argue that Shahrazad’s stories represents an example of imaginative
humoral therapy, by which I mean two things: First, I mean that Shahrazad cures Shahriyar by
activating his imagination to bring about a salutary change in his bodily state according to the
principles of humoral theory as it was understood in the medieval Islamicate world.10 The
framework for understanding these principles is the theory of the four humors, according to which
the human body is conceived of as a mixture of elements and humors (Greek: chumoi; Arabic:
ikhlāṭ al-insān), the combination of which gives rise to a “temperament” (Greek: krasis; Arabic:
mizāj).11 In both Galen’s writing and medieval Arabic medical literature a person’s states of the
mind are interdependent with their temperament. This framework implies that a change in the
body’s temperament can bring about a change in the mind, and vice versa. In short, a principle of
reciprocity.12 As a result, in medieval Arabic medical literature there are many examples of what
we would call today psychosomatic therapies,13 and the theoretical and terminological basis for
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such therapies was an important topic for centuries.14 Furthermore, because imaginative
experience is a kind of psychological event, this principle of reciprocity was also connected to an
implicit principle about the therapeutic potential of the imagination (Greek: phantasia; Arabic:
taṣawwur). This “imagination principle” received a simple, but authoritative formulation in the
most important medical compendium in medieval Arabic medical literature––Ibn Sīnā’s Qānūn
(The Canon of Medicine), published in the early eleventh century.15 In a section on the causes of
disease Ibn Sīnā writes that a person may “experience the alteration of temperament (tabaddul almizāj) by imagining (taṣawwur) a happy or sad matter.”16 According to humoral theory, illness
arises as a result of a bad temperament (Greek: duskrasia; Arabic: mizāj ghayr muʿtadil). If this is
true, and if it is also true that by imagining a happy or sad matter one can bring about a change in
the temperament, then it is possible to understand that listening to a story may bring about a
salutary and even lifesaving change in the temperament, the body, and the mind.
Second, by “imaginative humoral therapy” I mean that Shahrazad’s cure is an imaginative
and poetic version of such a therapy, which reflects a literary transformation of medical ideas. As
such it follows no strict or formulaic rules and is embedded in a narrative that embodies not only
medical principles but also philosophical questions.17 One of the most important of these is this:
How do we repair trust once it has been broken? Is it possible to do so? Galen emphasizes that
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strong emotional disturbance can lead to sickness and even death. As he writes in his Commentary
on Hippocrates Epidemics VI:
Those who get angry at anything often fall because of this into sickness, which it is
difficult to save them from. Many die not because of the bad state of their illness
but because of the bad state of their soul and worry. So, I know a large number of
people who have been overcome by fear of death, first made ill by it and then died
because of it. Sometimes a dream was the initial cause, sometimes a perceived
sign.18
In this framework someone like Shahriyar who has experienced a serious betrayal of trust faces
not only a broken contract, but also the possibility of contracting of an illness, a scenario which
raises an important question that is central to the Nights as a whole: Can such an illness be healed?
The storytellers of the Nights narrativize this question through the execution trope that forces
Shahrazad to face an extreme form of distrust. Not only does king Shahriyar distrust all women,
but he distrusts them to such an extent that after sharing a single intimate night he executes them
to avoid being betrayed. Thus, unless she can make an early breakthrough with the king and delay
his violence, Shahrazad’s cure will have little chance.
Scholars have long pointed to Shahrazad’s use of the cliffhanger as an effective delay
technique and speculated that it works by arousing the king’s curiosity and desire for the pleasure
of knowing a story’s outcome. The tenth century Baghdad scholar and bookseller, Ibn al-Nadīm
is already calling this technique an effective ḥila, “trick.”19 To me, though, I wonder whether a
king who had grown so distrustful and violent would either be so thoroughly fooled or so strangely
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tolerant unless something else was also going on. As an alternative to these readings that emphasize
seduction and deception, I argue that Shahrazad provokes Shahriyar’s interest in her stories by
being honest and immediately telling stories that bring the king’s core emotional problem in all of
philosophical and emotional depths to the front––the problem of broken trust. As I will
demonstrate in my readings, Shahrazad advances this theme with subtlety and skill, beginning with
her very first story and following it up with a series of stories that delicately wed the problem of
trust to medicine. In these stories she does not idealize or conceal what Shahriyar already knows–
–people, doctors, and thus medicine can be extremely dangerous. Instead, she presents a realistic
picture in which medicine is sometimes used to cure people and sometimes used to harm them––
by both women and men. Through the honesty of these portraits, she wins the king’s trust and the
time needed for her imaginative humoral therapy to take effect.
In pursuing this interpretation I proceed in three parts: First, I introduce the Nights as a text
and narrative tradition, and I also explain my methodology for working with Galen (in Arabic,
Jālīnus) and his reception in medieval Arabic literature. Second, I use a Galenic framework to
interpret Shahriyar as someone suffering from what Galen refers to (and Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq
translates as) “bestial” or “predatory” melancholic delirium (paraphrosunē thēriōdēs te kai
melancholikē; Arabic: al-sirsām al-sabʿī al-sawdāwī).20 Third, I present three interconnected
readings of Shahrazad’s first cycle of stories, which are unified by the theme and role of medicine
in their plots. Though this analysis, in addition to exploring the theme of humoral therapy, I
substantiate my claim that Shahrazad wins Shahriyar’s trust not through seductive or deceptive
20
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delay-tactics but by courageously addressing his real problem with trust and presenting a realistic
portrait of the risks involved in trusting someone. These stories are THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN
AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN, TAWADDUD, THE STORY OF KING ʿUMAR IBN AL-NUʿMĀN, and THE STORY
OF THE HALF-STONE PRINCE. Thus, my path in this chapter is––context, diagnosis, cure. For those

less familiar with THE FRAME TALE of the Nights, I include a summary immediately below before
proceeding.
THE FRAME TALE of the Nights

Once there was a King named Shahriyar who ruled the land of Sassan, and his younger
brother, Shahzaman, ruled the land of Samarkand.21 Each ruler enjoyed a period of prosperous rule
for about ten years, and each was considered just. Then, one day, Shahriyar feels a sudden longing
to see his younger brother Shahzaman. He sends his vizier to Samarkand to invite Shahzaman to
his kingdom. Shahzaman happily accepts his brother’s invitation. He packs up his belongings and
gets ready to go. On his way out, however, something calls Shahzaman back to the city, and he
returns to his palace, at which point he catches his wife in bed with an enslaved member of his
palace staff. Furious, he draws his sword and kills them both right on the spot, leaves his palace,
and continues on the journey to his brother’s kingdom without another word.
When he arrives at his brother’s palace, Shahriyar greets him warmly, but Shahzaman is
clearly in distress. The signs are especially clear in his body. Shahriyar notices, but decides at first
to give his brother space. Instead of questioning Shahzaman, Shahriyar invites him on a hunt for
some recreation. Overcome with grief and rage, however, Shahzaman declines, and chooses to
stay behind in the palace while his brother goes hunting. While Shahriyar is away on this hunt, his
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Sassan may refer to the area of the ancient Sassanian empire, roughly modern day Iran, and Samarkand is the
Khurasan region of eastern Iran and central Asia.
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brother Shahzaman witnesses another betrayal taking place, this time against Shahriyar. In the
palace’s garden, Shahzaman sees Shahriyar’s wife having sex with an enslaved member of the
palace’s staff. Not only that, but all Shahriyar’s concubines and courtesans are also having sex
with other enslaved members of the palatial staff. In this scene the race of the women is not
specified, but the men are described as aswad, “black,” a description which would place them in a
category of enslaved people of African origin, a class often regarded by the racial and geographic
prejudices of the time as representing the lowest social class.22
Seeing all of this, Shahzaman is shocked, but he also feels a sudden relief from his own
grief and loss. This relief is said to arise from his realization that what happened to him can happen
to others as well. His physical and mental condition begins to improve. When Shahriyar returns,
he notices the improvement and asks his brother about the change. Shahzaman confesses to him
that his initial distressed state had been the result of his wife’s betrayal in Samarkand. He tells
Shahriyar the first part of the story, but he is reluctant to explain what has suddenly led him to feel
better. However, Shahriyar insists that Shahzaman tell him what happened to bring this change
about, and Shahzaman cannot refuse. He shares with Shahriyar what he witnessed in the palace
garden––Shahriyar’s wife’s betrayal in a group sex act involving his concubines, courtesans, and
slaves of African origin. Shahriyar’s first response is silence. Then, he says that he must see it for
himself. So the two brothers plan a kind of stakeout. Shahriyar pretends to leave the palace, but
stays behind, and with his brother they sneak to a window overlooking the palace garden. There,
Shahriyar sees his wife’s betrayal with his own eyes, as well as the defiance of the rest of his harem
and a large portion of his male staff.
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Upon witnessing this something terrible happens in the recesses of Shahriyar’s mind. He
cannot speak, but unlike his Shahzaman, Shahriyar doesn’t immediately kill his wife, his
concubines, or any of the palace workers. Possibly, they collectively represent too great a number
of important people to lose. Alternatively, Shahriyar may be in a kind of shock. Whatever the
reason, after a moment, he suggests to his brother that they both leave their kingdoms and search
the world for examples of other people to whom this kind of betrayal has happened. Shahzaman
agrees, and the two brothers set out. Eventually, they arrive at a beach and encounter a terrifying
jinn. 23 This monster has imprisoned a human woman in a series of boxes, one inside of the other.
While the two brothers are hiding in the trees nearby, the enormous jinn comes to shore and falls
asleep on the sand. While the jinn sleeps, the woman normally imprisoned in the boxes temporarily
escapes and notices Shahriyar and Shahzaman hiding in a tree. She immediately orders them to
have sex with her. Both brothers initially refuse, but she threatens to wake the jinn and accuse
them of forcing themselves upon her, unless they do as she commands. The brothers comply. The
female character, sometimes known the “box woman,”24 then demands their rings, and adds them
to a large collection of rings from all of the men upon whom she has forced sex.25
At this point the brothers have in a sense found what they were looking for––this allpowerful seeming jinn has also been tricked and cheated on by a woman. Not only that, but the
box woman’s rings prove that it has happened hundreds of times. Shahzaman seems satisfied with
this and concludes that his own experience of betrayal need not reflect a shortcoming in his own
sense of power. The jinn represents a level of power beyond any human being, and yet he, too, is
23
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subject to being tricked by a woman he believes is under his control. Shahriyar, on the other hand,
rather than feeling relief, appears to experience only a deepened sense of confusion and disbelief,
which ultimately culminate in sickness. Without further conversation, the two brothers return
home. Shahzaman shows no further signs of violence, and returns to rebuild his life in Samarkand,
but it is here that Shahriyar takes an infamously dark turn. Upon returning to his palace, he not
only kills his wife, he kills all of his concubines and all of his courtesans. He also kills all of the
men involved in what he appears to have experienced as both a betrayal and a political crisis, for
two historically disempowered groups––enslaved men and women––have successfully risen up
against him behind his back. In response to this, somewhere in the darkest corners of his soul, he
hatches a awful plan. The next night he takes a new woman as his “wife,” but in order to avoid the
possibility of her ever tricking or betraying him, he has her executed in the morning. The next
night he does the same thing, and the pattern continues for a period of about three years, until one
of the few women left alive in his entire kingdom is the daughter of his vizier, Shahrazad.
It is at this point that the storytellers of the Nights introduce the single most determining
act of THE FRAME TALE. Having witnessed the majority of the women in her kingdom married and
murdered by King Shahriyar, Shahrazad goes to her father and asks him to marry her to the king.
Her father angrily refuses, and tells her to stay in her place as a woman, but the paradox (which
Shahrazad knows) is that by offering herself up as yet another sacrificial wife to the king, she is in
fact assuming what has become the place of women in Shahriyar’s kingdom. There is, however,
one decisive difference between Shahrazad and King Shahriyar’s previous doomed wives.
Shahrazad brings with her a plan to stop the kings violence by curing him of the illness which his
murders represent. In this Shahrazad follows one of the adages of the ninth-century Islamicate
world from which she comes. “For any suffering (kul alam),” writes the doctor and philosopher
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al-Kindī, “whose roots remain unknown (ghayr maʿrūf al-asbāb), the cure will not be found (ghayr
mawjūd al-shifāʾ).”26
In order to discover the roots of the Shahriyar’s illness, Shahrazad must extend the time
she can spend around the king. To help her do this she enlists her sister, Dunyazad. On the night
before she is to marry the king, Shahrazad pulls Dunyazad aside and asks her to come to the king’s
bedchamber after the wedding has been consummated and ask for a chance to say goodbye. If the
king grants this wish (which he does), Shahrazad instructs Dunyazad to say something like this,
“Oh Shahrazad, how I wish we had one more night of listening to your amazing stories.” When
the night of the wedding comes, Dunyazad follows her sister’s instructions perfectly. The king
grants her the chance to say goodbye, and she mentions Shahrazad’s stories. The king becomes
curious. When he asks Shahrazad to tell a story, she responds that she would be happy to, but she
doesn’t have enough time left before being executed. He orders to her to begin anyway. Shahrazad
complies, and begins to tell her first story, THE STORY OF THE MERCHANT THE JINN, but as
predicted, dawn comes before she can finish. She tells Shahriyar that she is ready for the
executioner, but he scolds her and says that she must remain alive another night so that he can hear
the end of the story.
Thus, for the first time in three years in Shahriyar’s kingdom, a night passes and no woman
is executed. Shahrazad lives to continue her story, and night after night, one story leads into the
next, so that Shahriyar’s violence is gradually stayed. We as the readers do not get to see exactly
how this process happens. The passages that connect Shahrazad’s different stories are formulaic.
In this sense the process of Shahriyar’s healing is left to the imagination of the reader. What we
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can say, however, is that Shahrazad’s listening cure, however it works, proves remarkably
successful, not only in its capacity to delay the king’s violence, but also in its ability to restore the
king’s own capacity to love and trust, a reality that is embodied at the end of the Nights, when
Shahriyar lifts the threat of execution and gratefully accepts Shahrazad as his queen. Together the
two have three children.

1. The Nights and the Arabic Galen
The Nights has been subject to a large variety of methodologies, from structuralism and
poststructuralism, to narratology and traditional psychoanalysis, to feminism and historical and
political analysis, as well as to a variety of receptions studies.27 The methodological pluralism that
surrounds the Nights reflects something important about the many perspectives these stories
accommodate, as well as the wide range of interests that have brought scholars to them for
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centuries.28 In this sense, the Nights is a receptive text, hospitable to many different readers and
capacious enough to bear different points of view without strain. This receptivity in part arises as
a result of the Nights’ formal structure and composition history. Unlike other originally oral
traditions like the Homeric epics, the Nights are today an “open corpus” in which countless
manuscripts, versions, editions, and retellings are accepted under the rubric of a single title. What
is more, no author’s name is ascribed.29 No one version of the collection stands as the most
authoritative in all respects, not even the critical edition prepared by Muhsin Mahdi in the late
eightes. Instead, different collections of the stories exist alongside one another, and the corpus
continues to expand through new receptions today.30
Structurally speaking, the Nights is a long, entangled set of stories. They do not follow a
single linear path, but are all ultimately framed by a literary device known as a “frame tale.”31 In
this the collection bears a strong resemblance to other medieval Arabic texts like Kalīla wa
Dimnah, a collection of didactic and courtly animal fables translated into Persian from Sanskrit
sources and then later from Persian into Arabic.32 Through its framing device, the Nights also
resembles pieces of western medieval literature like Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and Bocaccio’s
Decameron. In THE FRAME TALE of the Nights, a main storyteller, Shahrazad, tells many stories
to king Shahriyar. Very often, some of Shahrazad’s characters themselves tell stories, too, and
sometimes the characters within Shahrazad’s character’s stories also tell stories. Within these
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stories, one finds an eclectic narrative tradition,33 which in terms of themes, narrative technique,
and settings, can be see blending elements of different genres of Arabic prose writing, such as
collections of historical accounts (akhbār) like al-Tanūkhī’s al-Faraj baʿd al-shidda (Deliverance
Follows Adversity), anecdotes (nawādir) of respected thinkers such as Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq’s
Nawādir al-falāsifa (Anecdotes of Philosophers), travel literature, and the popular epic (sīra), such
as the narrative cycle known as Sīra ʿAntar.34
The Nights also has an especially complex composition and manuscript history. As I have
already indicated, the roots of these stories lie in Persian and Indian storytelling traditions, 35 and
from the earliest attestations we have of the Nights they are described as a translation.36 In this the
Nights was not so different from many other pieces of Persian literature being translated into
Arabic in the ninth and tenth centuries. To the contrary, as Mashall Hodgson points out in The
Venture of Islam, the translation of Persian literature formed a key part of the “first great impulse”
of Arabic prose literature, a wide field that would come to revolve around the idea of adab, a
concept of literary culture akin to paideia in Galen’s time and belles lettres in the time of
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Rousseau.37 At the time of the Nights’ first circulation, the standard of cultured storytelling within
adab was Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s translation of Kalīlah wa Dimnah from Persian into Arabic.
The texts that are known today as 1001 Nights (or The Arabian Nights) are based primarily
on two different Arabic recensions, an older 14th/15th century Syrian one and a later 19th-century
Egyptian one.38 Thus, even the older of the two traditions is separated from our earliest attestation
of the Nights by more than five hundred years, and scholars like Muhsin Mahdi are right to caution
against assuming too close an equivalence between the collection of stories that we now know as
the Nights and the stories as they originally circulated in Baghdad and Egypt in the ninth century.39
One likely scenario is that the stories were first performed live by both amateur and professional
storytellers (qāṣṣ) for a wide audience, especially in urban centers like Baghdad, and then
subsequently redacted by a variety of literate editors.40 For this reason, it is both historically
accurate and analytically useful to speak simply of “the storytellers of the Nights.”
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These storytellers, as well as their character Shahrazad are clearly familiar with Galen’s
therapeutic writings because two of Shahrazad’s characters, Tawaddud and Nuzhat al-Zamān
name Galen and describe elements of his theories in detail. What is the historical context that
explains Galen’s inclusion in the Nights? The earliest attestation of the Nights places it in the
ʿAbbāsid age in the mid to late ninth century.41 Scholars like Hodgsen, Garth Fowden, and W.
Montgomery Watt have emphasized that this was a time of change and cultural efflorescence after
an earlier period of violent conflict that culminated in the ʿAbbāsid revolution.42 In short, in the
middle of the eighth century the ʿAbbāsids, a group who belonged to the Quraysh but also had
geographic roots between eastern Iran and western Central Asia, took control of the Islamicate
world. Compared to the Syrian-Arab Umayyad dynasty from whom they took power, the
ʿAbbasids offered to resolve longstanding ethnic disputes and they promised a world in which the
tensions of this new multicultural normal could be governed, harnessed, and unified through an
Islamic society, the Arabic language, and, to borrow a phrase from Dimitri Gutas, a “conquest” of
the world’s knowledge.43 As Patricia Crone puts it in a section entitled, “The ʿAbbāsid
contribution,” the ʿAbbāsids succeeded in becoming “a supra-ethnic polity, a political organization
in which people could have a sense of belonging wherever they might hail from and with which
they could identify. This was the great achievement of the ʿAbbāsids…”44
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The early part of the ʿAbbāsid age forms a part of a broader interval of time known since
Watt’s seminal work as the “formative period” of Islamicate society.45 Today, this terminology
coexists with the older language of an Islamic “golden age.” Both draw attention to the enormous
contributions made by a variety of intellectuals from this period to what is called today global
intellectual history.46 During this formative period philosopher-doctors like al-Kindī (d. 873), Abū
Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 935), and Ibn al-Jazzār (d. 979) emerge and do their work. So, too, do the Ikwān
al-Ṣafāʾ (The Brethren of Purity), a Shīʿite intellectual collective and secret society, focused on
unifying the legacy of Neoplatonism and their own interpretation of a distinctively Islamic set of
principles. The two most influential Nestorian Christian doctors Yuḥannā Ibn Māsawayh (d. 857)
and his student Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq (d. 873), as well as Melkite Christian doctors like Qusṭā Ibn
Lūcā (d. 912) are all from this first part of the ʿAbbāsid age as well, as are important Qurʾānic
commentators like al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) and several of the most famous names in Arabic literature––
from the writers like al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 868) to al-Tanūkhī (d. 994). What is more, many of the best
known later figures from the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries––figures like Ibn Sīnā, Ibn
Tufayl (d. 1185), Maimonides (d. 1204), and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198)––are deeply engaged with the
legacy of this formative period, as both proponents and critics.
It is also during this period that Galen’s texts were most fervently translated, commented
upon, celebrated, and circulated through a large empire-sponsored translation movement that took
place under the patronage of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate, starting from the time of al-Manṣūr (r.
754-775) and lasting up until about the turn of the millennium.47 This ʿAbbāsid translation
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movement focused on Greek philosophical and medical texts, but it also included a large Persian
tradition in both Pahlavi and Syriac.48 The translator, doctor, and philosopher Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq is
the best known representative of this movement, surpassing even his teacher Yuḥannā Ibn
Māsawayh.49 It is to the lifelong work of individuals like these two that we owe the majority of
Syriac and Arabic translations of Galen. Their work is characterized by a technical mastery of
Greek, Syriac, and Arabic, an emphasis on a consistent translation theory for medical texts,
original philosophical and medical treatises, and an interest in Greek wisdom literature.50 Through
the translations they undertook and supported, figures like Ḥunayn and Ibn Māsawayh not only
introduced a new technical Arabic vocabulary for medicine based largely in Galen’s texts,51 they
also promoted an image of Galen as an exemplary moral figure, legendary healer, and philosopher
and provided a repository of texts to support this status.52 In studying Galen’s complex presence
in medieval Arabic texts, scholars have understandably focused on Galen’s roles in medical and
philosophical writing, but as Gotthard Strohmaier has shown, through the legends that reverberated
out from the translation of Galen’s works, Galen also had a strong presence in Arabic literature.53
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2. King Shahriyar, a Diagnosis of Body and Mind
This intersection between Galen and Arabic literature finds an especially generative point
of correspondence in one of the most important themes in the Nights––madness. As Michael Dols
pointed out thirty years ago in his pioneering study of the figure of the madman in medieval Islamic
society, a broadly Galenic framework provided the backdrop for much of medieval Arabic
medicine’s exploration, debate, and treatment of mental illness. In his evaluation of the source
material available to historians for constructing a view of how mental illness was treated, Dols
drew a distinction between texts that focus on theoretical or prescriptive accounts of mental illness
and case studies that describe actual mental illness in detail.54 In both, Dols draws attention to the
fact that the figure of “disturbed men and women” in medieval Arabic sources are “rare, scattered,
and difficult to interpret accurately.”55 At the same time, he points out that despite a lack of more
scientifically qualitative (or quantitative) sources, and despite a lack of first-person accounts of
mental illness in which a disturbed person might have had the chance to speak for themselves, the
character of mad men and women is a frequent one in medieval Arabic literature, and in saying
this he singles out the Nights for particular attention:
The most popular and best known piece of Islamic literature in the West, The
Thousand and One Nights, portrays the madman in many of the guises that are
familiar to us from the strictly historical sources. Indeed, the tale of Shahriyar and
Shahrazad, which furnishes the framework for the other tales, is a story of madness:
Shahriyar goes mad after witnessing the debauchery of his wife, and Shahrazad
cures him by relating a series of tales every night for about three years, which often
deal with the sensitive issue of madness.56
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In pursuing the madman across many different kinds of sources, Dols also pioneered the study of
how mental illness was treated in the medieval Islamic hospital known as the bīmāristān.57 This
bears particular relevance to my argument about the Nights for two reasons. First of all, according
to Dols, it was largely the same Nestorian Christians who were the leading translators of Galen
that successfully advocated for the hospital as a new professional medical instution grounded in a
curriculum of Galen’s writings.58
Second, the social and institutional meaning of the bīmāristān connects to THE FRAME
TALE of the Nights in three ways: first, through the theme of madness; second, through the

connected themes of isolation and confinement; and third, through the theme of royalty, for the
bīmāristān were often connected to royal compounds and symbols of royal prestige.59 For these
reasons, understanding the context of treatment for the mentally ill in the medieval Islamic hospital
can help us go further than simply seeing Shahriyar as the figure of a madman in a generic sense
and seeing Shahrazad as his doctor in equally general terms. Additionally, we can come to see that
their situation of confinement reflects popular representations (what Ahmed Ragab calls “medical
lore”) of the wings for the mentally ill in the bimāristān.60 In short, their bedroom is not only the
heart of Shahriyar’s palace. It is also the center of a hospital. As Dols, Ragab, and more recently
Pauline Koetschet have highlighted, the wings for the mentally ill in the bīmāristān were separate
from the rest of the hospital, in part because mental diseases were considered to be different and
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in part because these wings also served as places of confinement for the violently insane.61 In
Ragab’s analysis of al-Bīmāristān al-Manṣūrī in Mamluk Egypt (13th century) he points out that
the ward for the mad was so separated from the rest of the hospital that it seemed almost like a
bīmāristān of its own.62
In this hospital, patients were given treatment for melancholy, black bile excesses,
“melancholic obsessions” (al-waswās al-sawdāwī), illusions, bad dreams, and “bestial” or
“predatory” mania (al-junūn al-sabʿī). Some of the patients were confined for strictly medical
reasons. Some appear to have been too violent and difficult to be treated at home, and others were
confined following orders from the court.63 These orders could be punitive but in other cases they
appear to represent a form of the “insanity defense” in which the sentence to confinement in a
mental ward replaced a death sentence. In this sense, there were two quite different ways that the
bīmāristān could be used as part of an instutitonal response to mental illness, but in practice both
of these likely involved great hardship, including chaining and restricted movement. False
prophets, for example, could be sent to bīmāristān based on a doctor’s testimony, and their
admission to the hospital on these terms could absolve them of more serious punishment, but such
a person would still face the hardship of living for an indeterminate amount of time in confinement
with a group of other confined patients, some of whom may have been violent.64 There are no
records of kings being incarcerated in these wards, but the combined themes of violent madness,
melancholy, and confinement all offer a way of connecting the nights Shahrazad spends with
Shahriyar to these wings for the mentally ill in the instution of the bīmāristān. By the tenth-century
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such wards were being frequently established in the Middle East,65 and their image became a kind
of legendary story in its own right, which was spread far and wide by the families and friends who
visited their loved in these places.66
In this light, we can observe something very interesting about the way THE FRAME TALE
works narratologically. Without emphasizing that they are doing so the storytellers of the Nights
keep king Shahriyar’s body––unlike his brother Shahzaman’s––almost entirely out of view. When
king Shahriyar’s brother Shahzaman arrives from Samarkand in distress about his wife’s betrayal,
the storytellers of the Nights show us the deterioration in Shahzaman’s bodily health directly. He
frets with anxiety, grows depressed, stops eating, turns pale, and wastes away. What is more, they
show us that Shahriyar himself reads the signs of this distress in Shahzaman’s body like a doctor:

وﻟﻤﺎ راى اﻟﻤﻠﻚ ﺷﺎھﺮﯾﺎر اﻟﻰ أﺧﯿﮫ وﻛﻠﻤﺎ ﻣﺮ ﻋﻠﯿﮫ ﯾﻮم ﯾﻨﻘﺺ ﻓﻲ ﻋﯿﻨﮫ وﯾﺮق وﯾﻤﺘﺤﻞ
67
.وﻗﺪ اﺻﻔﺮ ﻟﻮﻧﮫ وﺗﻐﺒﺮ ﻛﻮﻧﮫ ﻓﻈﻦ اﻧﮫ ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮاق ﻣﻠﻜﮫ واھﻠﮫ وﺗﻐﺮﯾﺒﮫ ﻋﻨﺪه
When king Shahriyar looked at his brother and saw how day after day he lost weight
and grew thin, pale, ashen, and sickly, he thought that this was because of his
expatriation and homesickness for his country.
Here, too, Shahriyar makes the essential connection between a deterioration in bodily state and
emotional distress. He himself reads his brother’s sickness as arising from a painful separation. He
is wrong, of course, about the details, but right in principle.
By contrast, the storytellers of the Nights gives us almost no information about the state of
Shahriyar’s body and the short description we get is less physiological and also has a more
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formulaic character. According to the storytellers of the Nights, when king Shahriyar sees his wife
and his concubines betraying him he simply loses his mind (kharaja min ʿaqlihi).68 This is the only
explicit description of Shahriyar’s state that we get in THE FRAME TALE, and it is not enough to
put together a diagnosis. Where else might we look for clues? I think one way of answering this
question is to say that the concealment of Shahriyar’s body represents a hiding of the madman,
though such a reading needs to be qualified by the fact that Shahriyar is only “hidden” from us at
night, and during the day we see the effect of his violence on the kingdom very clearly. Still, the
hiding of the king’s body at night, as a feature of THE FRAME TALE’s narrative architecture,
parallels the separateness of the wings of the bīmāristān for the violently insane. On this reading,
the storytellers of the Nights show us Shahzaman’s body because his violence, though disturbing,
is not put forward as a true picture of insanity, but only a momentary lapse. By contrast, Shahriyar’s
body lies hidden in the night and creates a sense of dread that flows into each morning as he
emerges from his bedroom at dawn.
This artful concealment on the part of the storytellers of the Nights also forces us to
encounter the situation from the perspective of Shahrazad––we see Shahriyar through her eyes, as
a terrifying unknown. In this sense, Shahrazad’s marriage to king Shahriyar also represents her
first clinical visit, and the question then becomes, how do the storytellers of the Nights signal to
us what Shahrazad has discovered about the king’s state of body and mind? As the readers of the
Nights, the only information that both we and Shahrazad know is that the king has been acting
with extreme violence towards women. Since this is the only piece of information that is shared
between Shahrazad and the audience of the Nights, it forms the clearest basis for understanding
how Shahrazad makes her diagnosis. In this regard, if we are to speak in Galenic terms, the king’s
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violence points to the psychological (or psychophysiological) problem that Galen discussed more
than any other––“anger” (Greek: thumos; Arabic: ghaḍab) or even “rage” (Greek: orgē; Arabic:
ghayṭ ).69 Galen was no optimist about the curability of anger and rage. As Heinrich von Staden
points out, Galen often talks about heart-wrenching experiences of watching angry people act
violently on those who were not in a position to defend themselves, and Galen does not ultimately
conclude that all anger is “curable,” but he does acknowledge that given the right conditions, a
medical intervention into rage and anger was theoretically possible.70
In Shahrazad’s first stories, there are a number of angry characters––an angry jinn in THE
STORY OF THE FISHERMAN AND THE JINN, king Yūnān in THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE
SAGE DŪBĀN and the Half-Stone Prince from THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING. What I would

like to suggest is that these are the characters that Shahrazad presents to Shahriyar as a reflection
of himself, and because of this, her descriptions of these characters can also indicate to us what
she is seeing in him. In short, they are reflections of the king that allow us to more deeply enter
into Shahrazad’s perspective. These three characters are quite different, as my readings in part
three will demonstrate, but they share something medically important––a strong association with
melancholy. As a result, an initial attempt at diagnosing Shahriyar involves both “rage” and
“melancholy.” How might these two be seen to come together? In order to explore this question, I
need to briefly introduce more details about the humoral theory in which these ideas sit.
Within the Galenic tradition of medicine that circulated in the medieval Islamicate
bīmāristān the overall framework for the diagnosis and treatment of melancholy depended upon
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two things: 1) the humoral theory and 2) a governing principle of reciprocity that held that the state
of the body and the state of the mind were deeply interconnected.71 These two principles were
themselves deeply related and together pointed to therapies that followed a principle of restoring
the humoral balance by raising the levels of the opposing humors, through a variety of means, both
imaginative and pharmacological.72 According to humoral theory (oversimplifying a bit) the
human body is composed of four subtle fluids called humors (Greek, chumoi, Arabic ikhlāṭ alinsān), which are created within the human body from food through a variety of metabolic and
digestive processes.73 There is some variation in how these humors are named, but in their most
general form, the four are “black bile” (Greek: melainē cholē; Arabic: mirra al-sawdāwī), yellow
bile (Greek: xanthē cholē; Arabic: mirra ṣafrāʾ), “phlegm” (Greek: phlegma; Arabic: balgham),
and most importantly of all “blood” (Greek: haima; Arabic: dam).74 These humors themselves
represent dyadic combinations of the more elemental qualities of “warm,” “cool,” “moist,” and
“dry,” so that black bile, for example, is understood to arise under “cool” and “dry” conditions,
yellow bile under “warm” and “dry” conditions, phlegm under “cool” and “wet” conditions, and
blood under “warm” and “wet” conditions. Technically, each part of the body has a different submixture of these humors, and based on these mixtures the body’s different parts have different
“capacities” (dunameis) and “activities” (energeia). As these humors mix throughout the body
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they create one of the major diagnostic (and prognostic) concepts in Galenic medicine––the
“temperament,” (Greek: krasis; Arabic: mizāj). As a general principle, illness arises when the
balance of these humors is disturbed, and according to the Galenic tradition this can happen as a
result of wounds, diseases, and psychological events like strong emotions.75
Second, the principle of reciprocity held that states of the mind were affected by the states
of the body and vice versa. This principle is not only useful as a medical principle, but it is also
closely connected to the social, philosophical, ethical, and in some cases religious question about
the origins of evil in the human world. The single most famous articulation of this principle is
Galen’s text That the Capacities of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body,76 from which we can
look at an example of the principle in action. Towards the very end of this text, Galen is
differentiating his views from those of the Stoics Chrysippus (d. 286 BCE) and Posidonius (d. 51
BCE). In short, Galen rejects an idea that he sees both Chrysippus and Posidonus advancing in
their writing––namely, that human “badness” or “evil” (kakia) enters us from the outside (exothen)
only. To the contrary, Galen asserts that both the good and bad aspects of the mind arises from our
bodily states of mixture, and these themselves arise out of a combination of our physical
predispositions at birth, our habits, and our experience of the passions, like anger:
… ταῖς κράσεσι δ’ ἕπεται κατὰ μὲν τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀγχίνοιά τε καὶ μωρία κατὰ τὸ
μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον· αἱ κράσεις δ’ ἀυταὶ τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει καὶ ταῖς εὐχύμοις
διαίταις ἀκολουθοῦσι, καὶ συναυξάνει ἄλληλα ταῦτα. διὰ γοῦν τὴν θερμὴν κρᾶσιν
⟨οἱ⟩ ὀξύθυμοι γινόμενοι ταύταις πάλιν ταῖς ὀξυθυμίας ἐκπυροῦσι τὴν ἔμφυτον
θερμασίαν· ἔμπαλιν δ’ οἱ σύμμετροι ταῖς κράσεσι συμμέτρους τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς
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κινήσεις ἔχοντες εἰς εὐχυμίαν ὠφελοῦνται. ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος λόγος ὁμολογεῖ
τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις…77
Both quickness of mind and folly depend upon these mixtures for better or worse.
These mixtures themselves arise as a result of both an original formation and wellbalanced routines, and the two amplify each other. So people who are quick-toanger (oxuthumoi) because of their hot mixture fire up their mixture further through
their states of anger, and the minds of those who are well-balanced (summetroi) in
their temperaments move according to a pattern that supports health. In this way,
the argument I have made [in this book] visibly accords with reality…
On such a principle, two important ideas emerge: first, there is a case that can be made that
Shahriyar’s evil should be understood in a wider context than simply his witnessing of his wife’s
betrayal. If our body-based mental predispositions begin from birth, this suggests that to
understand a person’s actions (good or evil) we need to look at their whole life. Second, by virtue
of this same principle, one can theoretically lay out a mind-based therapy, not only for relieving
mental illness, but also for reforming evil action as well, for as a body comes back into humoral
balance behaviors can also change, and these behaviors in turn foster a better balance that leads to
better behavior.
It all depends, to return to the tripartite Hippocratic scheme of the Epidemics which I
discussed in chapter one, on the specific person, the specific doctor, and the specific illness.78
Given his violent actions, his long period of despondency, and his implicit association through
Shahrazad’s character, it makes sense to think of Shahriyar as a violent melancholic, and it likewise
makes sense to understand Shahrazad’s cure as a form of imaginative humoral therapy, which
seeks through the impact of its stories on Shahriyar’s imagination, to restore humoral balance to
his body, ultimately, leading to a change in behavior and the return of a faculty of moral judgement.

77
78
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Before turning to the stories Shahrazad tells to do this, however, it is worth just briefly establishing
a few points of reference in the medieval Arabic medical tradition of reflecting on melancholy.
What we find in this tradition is a language well-suited for describing king Shahriyar,
though the first point that should be made is that there was no one kind of melancholic. As Pauline
Koetschet has recently pointed out, there wasn’t even a fully agreed upon definition.79 Thus in
casting king Shahriyar as a violent melancholic I do not intend to cast him against the letter of a
limited diagnosis, but rather against the backdrop of a broad conversation in medieval Arabic
medical literature about how to think about mental disturbances and violent actions like
Shahriyar’s. Galen himself already recognized a large variety in how melancholics present. In a
famous passage from On the Affected Parts, he writes (and I include Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq’s translation
for the Arabic terminology):
διαφέρονται δὲ ἀλλήλων οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ, τὸ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι καὶ δυσθυμεῖν καὶ
μέμφεσθαι τῇ ζωῇ καὶ μισεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντες ἔχοντες, ἀποθανεῖν δ’
ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ πάντες, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐνίοις αὐτῶν αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο κεφάλαιον τῆς
μελαγχολίας, τὸ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου δέος· ἔνιοι δὲ ἀλλόκοτοί σοι δόξουσιν, ἅμα τε
καὶ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον καὶ θανατᾶν. ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔοικεν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης εἰς δύο
ταῦτα ἀναγαγεῖν τὰ συμπτώματα αὐτῶν πάντα, φόβον καὶ δυσθυμίαν· ἐπί γέ τοι τῇ
τοιαύτῃ δυσθυμίᾳ μισοῦσιν πάντας, οὓς ἂν βλέπωσιν, καὶ σκυθρωποὶ διὰ παντός
εἰσι, δειμαίνοντες, ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ βαθεῖ τά τε παιδία φοβεῖται καὶ τῶν τελείων οἱ
ἀπαίδευτοι. καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν σκότος εἰς φόβον ἄγει σχεδὸν ἅπαντας
ἀνθρώπους, πλὴν τῶν ἤτοι πάνυ φύσει τολμηρῶν, ἢ πεπαιδευμένων, οὕτως καὶ τῆς
μελαίνης χολῆς τὸ χρῶμα παραπλησίως σκότῳ τὸν φρονοῦντα τόπον ἐπισκιάζον
ἐργάζεται τοὺς φόβους.80

ﺗﺨﺎﻟﻒ ﺑﻌﻀﮭﺎ ﺑﻌﻀﺎ إﻻ أن ﺗﻔﺰﻋﮭﻢ وﻛﺂﺑﺘﮭﻢ وﺣﺰﻧﮭﻢ وﻣﺬﻣﺘﮭﻢ ﻟﻠﺤﯿﻮة وﺑﻌﻀﮭﻢ ﻟﻠﻨﺎس
أﻣﺮ ﯾﻌﻢ ﺟﻤﯿﻌﮭﻢ ﻓﺄﻣﺎ اﻟﺸﮭﻮة ﻟﻠﻤﻮت ﻓﻠﯿﺲ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻤﯿﻌﮭﻢ ﺑﻞ ﺑﻌﻀﮭﻢ ﯾﻜﻮن ﺟﻨﻮﻧﮫ اﻟﻔﺰع
ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻮت وﺑﻌﻀﮭﻢ ﯾﻜﻮن أﻣﺮه أﻣﺮا ﻋﺠﯿﺒﺎ ﺑﺪﯾﻌﺎ ﺣﺘﻰ ﯾﻈﻦ ﺑﮫ أﻧﮫ ﯾﻔﺰع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻮت
وﯾﺸﺘﺎق إﻟﯿﮫ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻓﺄﺑﻘﺮاط ﻗﺪ أﺻﺎب ﻓﻲ ﺣﺼﺮه ﺟﻤﯿﻊ أﻋﺮاﺿﮭﻢ وأﺻﻨﺎﻓﮭﺎ إﻟﻰ ھﺬﯾﻦ
ﺐ ﯾﺒﻐﻀﻮن ﺟﻤﯿﻊ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺮوﻧﮫ
ٍ اﻷﻣﺮﯾﻦ أﻋﻨﻲ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻔﺰع وإﻟﻰ ﺧﺒﺚ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ وذﻟﻚ أﻧﮭﻢ ﺑﺴﺒ
وﯾﻜﻮﻧﻮن داﺋﻤﺎ ﻣﻜﺘﯿﺒﯿﻦ ﯾﻔﺰﻋﻮن ﻛﻤﺎ ﯾﻔﺰع اﻟﺼﺒﯿﺎن وﻣﻦ ﻻ أدب ﻟﮫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻜﻤﻠﯿﻦ
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ﻓﻲ اﻟﻈﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﺪﻣﺴﺎء وﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻟﻈﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺎرج ﺗﻜﺎد أن ﺗﺠﻠﺐ ﻟﻠﻨﺎس ﻛﻠﮭﻢ اﻟﻔﺰع
ﺧﻼ ﻣﻦ ھﻮ ﻓﻲ طﺒﻌﮫ ﻛﺜﯿﺮ اﻟﺸﺠﺎﻋﺔ واﻟﻨﺠﺪة أو ﻣﻦ ھﻮ أدﯾﺐ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﻮن اﻟﻤﺮة اﻟﺴﻮداء
81
.إذا ﻏﺸﻰ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺜﺎل اﻟﻈﻠﻤﺔ وﻏﻤﺮه أﺣﺪث اﻟﻔﺰع
Melancholics differ from each other: while all have fear, are despondent, and find
fault with life and hate people, not all of them want to die. For some of them the
main characteristic of melancholy by which they are affected is the fear of death.
Others will appear very bizarre to you, as they both fear death and long to die.
Hippocrates was therefore correct when he reduced all these symptoms to these
two, fear and despondency. In the case of such despondency, they hate all people
they see. They are shy and afraid, just as children and uneducated adults are afraid
in the dark. For just as darkness outside causes fear in all people, except in those
who are unusually without fear or have learned to cope with it, likewise the color
of black bile very similarly casts a shadow over the place where thinking is located,
and produces fears.82
Here, Galen lays out the basics of his view of melancholics. Beyond the useful emotional
terminology, and the relevant emphasis on hate (which Shahriyar clearly feels), Galen introduces
an analogy that corresponds nicely with THE FRAME TALE of the Nights, and which persists through
the reception of thinking on melancholy in the medieval Arabic world. He says the melancholic is
in a position like a child in the dark. On the very first page of the Nights, when Shahzaman
experiences his wife’s betrayal, the storytellers of the Nights vividly bring together this theme of
darkness and the physiology of melancholy by telling us, “fa lamā ra’ā hādhā al-amar iswaddat
al-dunyā fī wajhihi, “When he saw this situation, the world turned dark for him.”83 The stories in
the Nights are also told at night, of course, and they are also named by the word “night.” Galen’s
characterization of melancholics as being in a position like children in the dark thus resonates in a
powerful way from the very first pages of the Nights, and allows us to see Shahrazad’s storytelling

81

Galen, On the Affected Parts, 284, Pormann and van der Eijk [iii.9-10] (Kühn 190-191).
Translation slightly modified from Pormann and van der Eijk,, 285.
83
See Lyons, 1 (MacNaghten, ٢, vol 1). See also Haddawy, 6 (Mahdi, ١٧), where the language is almost identical.
82

111

as an entrance, not only into a dark bedroom, but also into the darkness of Shahriyar’s melancholy,
as well as into the midst of his vulnerability, an idea captured by the connection to childhood.
As a second of example of melancholy’s treatment in medieval Arabic medicine, we can
look briefly at Hippocrates Aphorisms 6.23, a single line of text that, through Galen’s commentary
on it, came to play a significant role in the tradition of thinking about melancholy for almost six
centuries in the medieval Islamicate world.84 The aphorism reads, “Ēn phobos kai dusthumiē polun
chronon diateleei, melancholikon to toiouton” (If fear and despondency last for a long time, then
this is something melancholic).85 This aphorism establishes two things about melancholy that
dominate the traditions after Hippocrates. First, it stakes a claim that the two core affective
elements are thumos (fear) and dusthumia (despondency). Second, it identifies the duration of these
states as a major diagnostic criteria for differentiating melancholy from other mental illnesses. This
provides a different way of understanding the length of the Nights. The night-after-night element
is not only a reflection of Shahrazad’s endless storytelling powers, but also a diagnostic indicator
of king Shahriyar’s condition.
Galen expands upon these two core ideas in his commentary on the aphorism, and in
Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq’s translation of this text, once can begin to see how these core ideas will be
changed and reinterpreted through their reception by many thinkers in the medieval Islamicate
world:
Ἐὰν μὴ διά τινας φανερὰς αἰτίας φοβεῖταί τις ἢ δυσθυμῇ, φανερῶς ἐστι
μελαγχολικὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπτώματα, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰ τύχῃ κεχρονικότα. διὰ
μέντοι φανερὰν αἰτίαν ἀρξάμενα, κἄπειτα χρονίζοντα, μὴ λανθανέτω σε
μελαγχολίαν ἐνδεικνύμενα. καὶ γὰρ καὶ μανία πολλοῖς ἤδη φαίνεται γεγενημένη,
διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ὀργὴν ἢ λύπην ἀρξαμένη, αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος δηλονότι πρὸς τὸ παθεῖν
τὰ παθήματα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντος.86
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If someone is afraid or despondent without any apparent reason, then these are
clearly melancholic symptoms, especially when they happen to have lasted a long
time. If they begin owing to an apparent cause, and then last a long time, then it
should not escape you that they indicate melancholy. And in particular in many [of
these latter] cases it is clear that madness (mania) has already occurred, having
begun because of anger (thumon), rage (orgēn) or grief (lupēn), since the body itself
is obviously predisposed to suffer these affections at that time.87

 ﻓﺎﻷﻣﺮ، ﻣﺘﻰ ﻋﺮض ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﺗﻔﺰع وﺧﺒﺚ ﻧﻔﺲ ﻣﻦ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺳﺒﺐ ظﺎھﺮ:ﻓﻘﺎل ﺟﺎﻟﯿﻨﺲ
 وإن ﻟﻢ ﺗﻜﻦ،ﻓﯿﮫ ﺑﯿّﻦ أن ﻣﺎ ﻋﺮض ﻟﮫ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ إﻧﻤﺎ ھﻮ ﻣﻦ طﺮﯾﻖ اﻟﻮﺳﻮاس اﻟﺴﻮداوي
، وﻣﺘﻰ ﻛﺎن اﺑﺘﺪاء ھﺬه اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻣﻦ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺑﯿّﻦ ظﺎھﺮ.ﺗﻠﻚ اﻷﻋﺮاض طﺎﻟﺖ وداﻣﺖ ﺑﮫ
 ﻓﺈﻧﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻧﺮاه ﯾﻌﺮض. ﻓﻼ ﯾﺬھﺒّﻦ ﻋﻠﯿﻚ أﻧﮭﺎ ﺗﺪل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻮﺳﻮاس،ﺛﻢ داﻣﺖ وطﺎل ﻟﺒﺜﮭﺎ
ﻟﻜﺜﯿﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎس اﻟﺠﻨﻮن ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻮﺳﻮاس ﻣﻦ ﻏﻀﺐ أو ﻏﯿﻆ أو ﺣﺰن أو ﻏﻢ
 وﺑﯿﻦ أﻧﮫ إﻧﻤﺎ ﯾﻜﻮن ذﻟﻚ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﺒﺪن ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ. ﻓﯿﻜﻮن ذﻟﻚ اﺑﺘﺪاء ﺟﻨﻮﻧﮫ،ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﮫ
88
.اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻣﺘﮭﯿﺌﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪا ﻟﻘﺒﻮل ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ
Galen said: “When one suffers from fear (tafazzuʿ) and despondency (khubth alnafs) without any apparent reason, then the matter is clear: these [symptoms] that
have affected him represent a form of melancholy (min ṭarīq al-waswāsi alsawdāwīyi), even if these symptoms have not lasted long and continued in him.
When the beginning of these symptoms is due to a clear and apparent cause, and
they then continue and remain long, it should not pass you by that they indicate
melancholy (al-waswās). For we may observe that madness (al-junūn) rather than
melancholy (al-waswās) befalls many people because of anger (ghaḍab), ire
(ghayṭ), sadness (ḥuzn), or sorrow (ghamm) that befalls them. This therefore is the
beginning of their madness. It is evident that this occurs only when the body is
prepared and disposed at that time to accept these diseases (tilka al-ʿilal).89
Galen begins by reiterating the core principles in the Hippocratic definition, but he adds more
depth and differentiation. In particular, he adds two things, both of which pertain to our
understanding of Shahriyar as a melancholic. First of all, he offers two ways that someone can fall
into melancholy. In one way, there is no apparent cause, but the condition can be recognized by
its long duration. In the second way, there is an apparent cause, and when the cause is apparent,
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there is also often a series of emotional states that the body goes through before entering into
melancholy. Galen lists anger (thumos), rage (orgē), and grief (lupē), all three of which Shahriyar
goes through in his journey to the Box Woman before returning to Sassan.
In comparing the passage to Ḥunayn’s translation, Peter Singer and Peter Joose point out
that Ḥunayn places less emphasis on duration as a criterion of melancholy by reframing Galen’s
“especially when” (kai mallon ei) with “even if” (wa in lam tekun). A second importance difference
seems to me to lie in the fact that Ḥunayn separates out melancholy from madness (junūn) here,
or at least he does not connect the other emotional states that Galen draws up in a clear line to the
evolution of melancholy. The comparison hinges on Ḥunayn’s faḍlan ʿalā (“instead of”) against
Galen’s dia (“because of”). As Singer and Joose point out, there may be corruptions in the Greek
original or Syriac intermediary text that Ḥunayn is translating from here,90 but the difference also
highlights something important that Pauline Koetschet has pointed out about the semantic field of
majnūn in medieval Arabic medical texts––namely, that “madness” (junūn) sometimes translates
Greek mania but can also serve as a more general term for any disease that causes delirium, and
as a result, the question of whether “all mental patients should be considered as madmen,” was
open to debate in medieval Arabic medicine. 91 Koetschet cites many examples that could (and are)
interpreted differently by different practitioners, but one seems to me to be of particular relevance
for assessing Shahriyar. In the Comprehensive Book on Medicine Abū Bakr al-Rāzī writes about a
man who he viewed as melancholic, but not mad (majnūn). What is more, according to al-Rāzī,
this man’s melancholy did not arise as a result of a bad bodily mixture, but instead as the result of
an idea:
Melancholy can occur when the mixing of the humours is good. In this case, it does
not require drugs at all. It occurs because (the melancholic) has some peculiar idea.
90
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To cure this type (of melancholy), we have to make this idea disappear. There was
a man who came to complain to me, and asked me to cure him from a (kind of) bile
that he claimed to be melancholic. I asked him what were his symptoms and he
said: “I think about God: were does He come from? How did He create the world?”.
I told him that this was a widely spread idea amongst many clever people, and he
was immediately cured. He incriminated his intellect so much that he was almost
unable to take care of his interests any further. I cured many people by making their
idea disappear.92
This case history from al-Rāzī is useful for the way that it exemplifies the fact that the Galenic
medical tradition was not simply received by medieval Arabic doctors, but actively debated and
transformed. In the passage above, where Galen and Ḥunayn’s rendering of the relationship
between madness and melancholy differ, there may be a textual issue, but the way that Ḥunayn
subtly disaggregates Galen’s mania (madness) from melancholia (melancholy) reflects an
important debate that doctors had about the connections between melancholy, the body, and
cognitive disfunction. In the passage above, al-Rāzī rejects the idea that this man’s confusion and
suffering have to do with his temperament at all, and instead he locates the problem in a diseased
idea that he then surgically removes in a gesture reminiscent of Stoic therapeutic arguments. Is
there such an idea that Shahriyar could be said to have? There is––the idea that he can’t trust
anyone, especially women.
These reflections leave us, finally, less with a definite diagnosis of Shahriyar, than with a
rich set of terms, a diverse tradition, and a unified humoral framework through which to explore
the stories of the Nights. As a last passage to prepare the way, I cite the moment in Galen’s On the
Affected Parts, where he refers to what seems to me the overall most plausible diagnosis of king
Shahriyar––“bestial, melancholic delirium”:
καὶ τις ἄλλη θηριώδης τε καὶ μελαγχολικὴ παραφροσύνη γίνεται, κατοπτηθείσης
τῆς ξανθῆς χολῆς. ὅσαι δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀκμαῖς τῶν πυρετῶν γίγνονται παραφροσύναι,
κατὰ συμπάθειαν αὗται πάσχοντα τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, οὐ κατ’ ἰδιοπάθεισαν ἔχουσιν·
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παραπαῖσαι μὲν καὶ παραφρονῆσαι καὶ παρακόψαι τούτους οὐ μόνον
οἱ ἰατροὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιῶται…93

وﻧﻮع آﺧﺮ ﻣﻨﮫ ﯾﻜﻮن اﻻﺧﺘﻼط ﻓﯿﮫ اﺧﺘﻼطﺎ ﺳﺒﻌﯿﺎ ﺳﻮداوﯾﺎ وذﻟﻚ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺤﺘﺮق اﻟﻤﺮة
اﻟﺤﻤﺮة ﻓﺄﻣﺎ اﻻﺧﺘﻼط اﻟﺬي ﯾﻜﻮن ﻋﻨﺪ ﻣﻨﺘﮭﻰ اﻟﺤﻤﯿﺎت ﻓﺤﺪوﺛﮭﺎ إﻧﻤﺎ ھﻮ ﻣﻦ طﺮﯾﻖ
ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺔ اﻟﺪﻣﺎغ ﻟﻐﯿﺮه ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻻ ﻣﻦ طﺮﯾﻖ أن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺗﺨﺼﮫ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﮫ وﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﺠﺪ
ھﺆﻻء ﯾﻘﺎل ﻟﮭﻢ ﻗﺪ اﺧﺘﻠﻄﻮا وإﻧﮭﻢ ﯾﮭﺬون وﻻ ﯾﺪرون ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﻤﻠﻮن وﻟﯿﺲ ﯾﻘﻮل ﻓﯿﮭﻢ ذﻟﻚ
94
.اﻷطﺒﺎء ﻓﻘﻂ ﻟﻜﻨﮫ ﯾﻘﻮﻟﮫ ﻓﯿﮭﻢ أﯾﻀﺎ ﻋﻮام اﻟﻨﺎس
There is yet another kind of delirium (paraphronsunē), both bestial (thēriōdēs) and
melancholic (melancholikē), which arises from the burning of yellow bile. In cases
of delirium (paraphronsunē) that arise at peak moments of fever the brain is also
suffering through co-affection (sumpatheia), not proper affection (idiopatheia).
This also explains why these people [who suffer from this disease] lose their wits,
are delirious and besides themselves, as is affirmed not just by doctors but also by
lay people.95
In response to a patient like this, an imaginative humoral cure would have to address both the
cognitive-emotional problem with trust and at the same time use the impact of the imagination on
the body to restore humoral balance. Indeed, according to the principle of reciprocity, the two go
hand in hand. All of this points to a very interesting question: How does Shahrazad do it? I explore
this in the readings that follow.
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3. Shahrazad’s Listening Cure in Three Readings
Reading 1 – Dūbān’s Cure
(THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN)

Shahrazad’s first task is to find a way to delay the king’s violence long enough for a
humoral cure to work. Readers since Ibn al-Nadīm have pointed to the literary technique of the
cliff-hanger as Shahrazad’s main strategy in this regard. There are good reasons to see things this
way. Dunyazad rouses the king’s interest with her ruse, and Shahrazad captures his imagination.
However, I would add to this that there may also be a more specific reason that king Shahriyar
remains interested in Shahrazad’s stories night after night.96 Namely, I think that Shahrazad
provokes the king’s sustained interest by beginning with a story that brings forward exactly the
problem of trust that he is battling. Then, she tells a series of stories that gradually incorporate
more complex dimensions of trust, culminating in a story in which she paints a dangerous and
tragic picture of the failure of trust––THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN. In this
story, however, she also introduces the role of medicine, including a humoral therapy, and thus
provides a basis for hope as well as fear. Through this series of stories she paints a realistic portrait
of the vulnerability involved in trusting people, and it is the realistic quality of this portrait that
ultimately wins enough of Shahriyar’s trust for her to carry out her imaginative humoral cure.
The first story Shahrazad tells is called THE STORY OF THE MERCHANT AND THE JINN and
it goes like this.97 There was once a merchant who was travelling. Along the road, he tosses the
pit of a fruit to the ground and accidentally kills a jinn’s son. The jinn is enraged and demands a
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blood debt be paid by the merchant’s life. The merchant begs for time to go home and say goodbye
to his wife. After making sure that the man is committed to returning, the jinn agrees to allow the
man to return home to put his things in order before dying, but he insists the man must return next
year. A year later, the man returns, prepared for death, but while he is waiting for the jinn to come
and kill him, three other merchants come along one by one. They ask him why he is waiting here
(in the middle of nowhere), and he explains to them his situation. The three merchants are moved
by his plight and come up with an idea to help. They decide to wait with the original merchant for
the jinn to arrive, and then to make the jinn a counteroffer. Instead of the original merchant’s blood,
the three merchants offer to each tell the jinn a story. If he likes the story, the merchants can each
claim one third of the blood debt owed to the jinn for the death of his son. Each of the merchants
tells a story, and the jinn enjoys them all. After their stories are complete, they each claim one third
of the original merchant’s blood debt. The jinn leaves satisfied, and all the merchants live.98
This story introduces the theme of trust in an optimistic way. The Jinn trusts the merchant
to come back after a year. The original merchant fulfills his obligation with no intention to deceive.
The collective of storytellers also establish trust with the Jinn, once again without any intention to
deceive. Instead, they win his trust through delivering on their promise of an entertaining story.
One tells a story about a woman who becomes a sorceress while her husband is away. Another
tells a story of three brothers who spend an inheritance differently. The third tells a story about
how his wife was turned into a mule.99 Collectively, these stories present an important motif––the
punishment of tricksters, sorcerers, and those who deceive. This theme reenforces the bond the of
trust between the jinn and the merchants, and its implications also resonate at the level of THE
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FRAME TALE. There, Shahriyar, too, is hearing stories in which those who act with deception are

justly punished, a theme that seems intended to soothe his fear of being deceived. In the end,
Shahrazad’s first story wraps up neatly. All parties come through on their part of the bargain. It is
a happy ending and a useful introduction to the best-case scenario of the problem of trust––a just
world in which deceivers are punished and conflict is resolved through non-violent exchange.
In presenting this optimistic view, however, this first story avoids many of the complicating
factors in the situation Shahriyar found himself in with his wife. In this situation, Shahriyar faces
a more complex problem that includes not only a personal wound, but also an instutitonal upheaval.
In this sense, his wife has not only betrayed him, she has also led a rebellion, and his grief and
rage are thus compounded by a political crisis that threatens to undo his governing power. In THE
FRAME TALE there is also no fortuitous group of storytelling merchants who come along to help

Shahriyar think through his situation. Instead, the king appears on his own, a state which he puts
into words like this: “No one is safe in this world. Such doings are going on in my kingdom, and
in my very palace. Perish the world and perish life. This is a great calamity indeed!”100 It is true
that he has his brother Shahzaman next to him when he says this, but unlike the collective of
storytellers who work creatively together to invent a solution, the two brother seek to flee their
situation. In this sense, whereas the merchant in Shahrazad’s first story is willing to meet his
obligation even to the jinn who is going to kill him, Shahriyar and Shahzaman’s flight to the Box
Woman represents their refusal to meet their obligations as rulers to their people.
After the first story Shahrazad begins a longer, more layered series of stories that are all
contained within THE STORY OF THE FISHERMAN AND JINN.101 In the main part of this story a poor
fisherman is out fishing by the sea and accidentally brings up a bottle. He uncorks it and out comes
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another angry jinn, like the one in the first story but bigger! This jinn tells the story of how he
ended up inside the bottle, and as he does so he gradually grows to an enormous size. When he
finishes he declares that he will now kill the fisherman (for no good reason), but the innocent
fisherman comes up with a trick. He pretends like he doesn’t believe such an impressively large
jinn could really fit back into such a small bottle. Offended that his powers are being doubted, the
jinn returns to the bottle and the fisherman corks it back up. In this story, Shahrazad introduces the
idea of a trick––the fisherman’s trick––and thus an element of deception, but this trick is in the
hands of someone who has been unjustly attacked. Unlike in THE MERCHANT AND THE JINN the
fisherman has done nothing at all to harm this jinn. To the contrary, he has freed the jinn from the
bottle, and the jinn has responded by threatening to kill him. This is what connects THE FISHERMAN
AND THE JINN to the story the fisherman then tells the jinn––THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE
SAGE DŪBĀN––and it is in this story, finally, that the problem of trust is decisively connected to

the problem of medicine itself.
The story goes like this.102 There once was a king named Yūnān, who ruled the land of
Zuman in Fars. We know almost nothing about this king except that he is sick with baraṣ, a term
that can be translated as leprosy, but may point to a number of different chronic skin conditions.103
For an unknown period of time king Yūnān’s wisest doctors have been trying to cure him, but in
vain. The king remains sick. Then, one day a stranger arrives from an unknown place. This stranger
is a ḥakīm, a doctor and a wise man, who is said to have studied a number of contemporary
traditions of medicine and philosophy––Greek, Persian, Turkish, Arab, Syriac, Byzantine, and
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Hebrew.104 This stranger’s name is Dūbān and he appears to enter as a representative of the fruits
of the ʿAbbāsid translation movement that figures like Ibn Māsawayh and Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq led.
Like these two figures, Dūbān has studied a variety of variety of medical and philosophical
traditions. Like these two, he also represents a cultural outsider, coming from a foreign land, and
like them he is a ḥakīm, a wise man and a doctor. Like them, too, he is destined to become a courtly
figure, but his fate will turn out quite differently from theirs.105
After a few days in the city Dūbān hears of king Yūnān’s illness. He does not examine the
king in person but instead simply goes to the palace and requests an audience to present his
diagnosis. In his audience with Yūnān, Dūbān promises to cure the king without touching him at
all (min al-ẓāhir) and also without having him drink any medications, a detail Shahrazad skillfully
uses to avoid arousing any suspicion of poisoning. King Yūnān is incredulous that such a noninvasive cure could be efficacious. After years of suffering, however, he is open to anything, and
he encourages Dūbān to proceed. Dūbān then does the following: He goes home and crafts a
hollow a stick. Into the hollow part of this stick he pours a fluid that he concocts himself in a
makeshift laboratory at his home. Afterwards, he tells the king to take this stick, as well as a ball
that Dūbān has also crafted himself, and use them to play a game (perhaps polo) in the fields the
following day. Afterwards, the king is to go home, take a hot bath, and sleep. Dūbān claims that
after this the king will be cured.
This first part of Shahrazad’s story thus presents a series of objects representing Dūbān’s
medical knowledge––the mixture, the hollow stick, and the ball––and Dūbān’s only instruction
with them is to play. The king is to play with these tools of knowledge. This playfulness with the
objects of medicine is a way for Shahrazad to indicate to Shahriyar that she means him no harm
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with the objects of her knowledge––her stories. King Yūnān follows all of Dūbān’s instructions to
the letter. He goes out and plays a game with the hollow stick in hand. Then something interesting,
though possibly dangerous happens. He begins to sweat, and his body is said to “drink up” the
medicine through the stick. Dūbān notices this, but Yūnān does not. Then, he goes home, takes a
hot bath, and sleeps. He wakes up in the morning, and lo and behold he is cured. Understandably
overjoyed and even overcome with gratitude, the King invites Dūbān into his most intimate courtly
circles. Like Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq and Ibn Māsawayh, Dūbān becomes a nadīm, an official member
of King Yūnān’s courtly retinue. However, there is a problem––or there is soon to be one––and
the roots of this problem lie in the fact that Dūbān has employed an unfamiliar kind of cure. King
Yūnān is certainly happy to have been cured, but he does not understand how the cure worked.
Initially, he doesn’t seem to mind this, but later in the story this will play a key role.
For a while after he is cured king Yūnān and Dūbān become inseparable. They dine
together, laugh together, and share stories together. Their relationship is described as one that is
loving and filled with respect.106 They enjoy their time together and there is peace. Seeing this,
however, King Yūnān’s wazir grows envious of Dūbān’s new position, and he is concerned that
Dūbān has replaced him. Sowing the seeds of discord, one day the Wazir suggests to King Yūnān
that Dūbān is a spy from the Byzantine empire, who has come to overthrow his kingdom. King
Yūnān is incredulous, and immediately says that he thinks the Wazir has said this out of envy:
Damn you! Is Dūbān my enemy? To me he is the most faithful, the dearest, and the
most favored of people, for this ḥakīm has treated me simply by making me hold
something in my hand and has cured me from the disease that had defied the
physicians and the sages and rendered them helpless. In all the world, east and west,
near and far, there is no one like him, yet you accuse him of such a thing. From this
day onward, I will give him every month a thousand dinars, in addition to his rations
and regular salary. Even if I were to share my wealth and my kingdom with him, it
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would be less than he deserves. I think that you have said what you said because
you envy him.107
This is a very important point. The king initially responds to his vizier’s conspiracy theory lucidly–
–not only by supporting his trustworthy friend but by recognizing and naming what the vizier
suggests as an insidious fantasy. This shows that initially the king has his wits about him enough
to see through a trick. This is encouraging for Shahriyar because in order to tolerate listening to
more nights of stories from Shahrazad, he, too, must feel that he can see through any dangerous
tricks she might have. If Shahrazad had stopped this story here, it would be a story about a king
successfully avoiding deception and its moral would be simple––pay attention and trust your
friends. Good advice, but impossible to follow for someone in Shahriyar’s current state. The fact
that Shahrazad does not stop the story here likewise suggests that her purpose lies in a deeper
exploration of the nature of deception itself.
Despite the initial failure of his trick, the vizier does not relent. He is patient. He says
nothing in response to king Yūnān’s accusation of envy, but simply continues insinuating dark
ideas about Dūbān, the climax of which arrives one day in the form of a story that he himself tells
to Yūnān. In this story, THE TALE OF THE KING’S SON AND THE SHE-GHOUL, there is a vizier who
is accompanying a young prince in the forest. The prince becomes excited about a wild animal and
pursues it. The vizier urges him to enjoy the chase, assuring him implicitly that the forest is safe.
The boy runs into a young girl, who invites him to her house. The young boy follows. It turns out
that the girl is she-ghoul and the boy narrowly escapes through efficacious prayer. When he
returns, his father has the vizier executed for giving bad advice. As he tells this story, king Yūnān’s
vizier says that if he is wrong about Dūbān the king should execute him like the vizier in this story.
All of his advice culminates in a single idea––Dūbān is too dangerous to be allowed to live. For a
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while king Yūnān resists, but then one day, without further explanation from the storytellers of the
Nights (though perhaps influenced by THE TALE OF THE KING’S SON AND THE SHE-GHOUL) Yūnān
decides that the risk posed by Dūbān is too great. He says to his vizier: “What you say is right,
vizier, my sound advisor…for this man has come as a spy to destroy me and if he could cure me
with something I held, it may be that he can kill me with something that I smell.108 He calls his
friend Dūbān into the royal chamber and announces that Dūbān––not the scheming vizier but the
man who cured him––must now be executed. Dūbān protests like the fisherman before the giant
jinn, and asks for a reason, but in a remarkable about-face king Yūnān answers with the very
conspiracy theory of his vizier that he initially rejected. In response, Dūbān makes only one further
request. In a move reminiscent of the original merchant in Shahrazad’s first story, Dūbān asks to
go home to say goodbye to his family, and also to retrieve a book which he wants to give the king
as a parting gift. Like the angry jinn in the first story, king Yūnān agrees to let Dūbān go, but this
time, unlike in THE STORY OF THE MERCHANT AND THE JINN there will be deception and also
death. Dūbān goes home and says goodbye to his family.
He comes back the next day with a jar of powder and a book that he claims contains secret
knowledge, which he wants the king to have it after he is gone. This knowledge is said to be able
to make Dūbān’s head speak after death, and Dūbān says that after death he will be able to answer
any question the king may ask.109 All the king has to do is press the book into the power after
Dūbān is dead, and then the sage’s head will reanimate. This book and the jar of powder are thus
the forth object of knowledge in this story, after the ball, the hollow stick, and the fluid. The first
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three objects were safe and connected to the idea of medicine and play. This object is presented as
a gift filled with a promising secret, but it will turn out to be something else. King Yūnān accepts
the book and jar without suspicion, and immediately afterwards he executes his friend Dūbān in
the same way that King Shahriyar has been executing his wives––he has him beheaded. As
promised, however, Dūbān’s head does not immediately die. Instead, it opens its eyes and begins
to speak. It tells the king to “open the book.” Yūnān does so and turns the pages with excitement,
but they stick together. Yūnān licks his fingers to separate them. He turns seven pages, but finds
nothing at all in the book. He says, “There is nothing written in this book.” Dūbān tells him to turn
more pages. As Yūnān does so, he begins to heave, sway, and twitch, as the poisoned powder
gradually works its way through his system. Right before he dies, the severed head of Dūbān, in a
macabre parody of courtly poetry, recites these line to Yūnān about unjust kings:
For long they ruled us arbitrarily,
But suddenly vanished their powerful rule.
Had they been just, they would have happily
Lived, but they oppressed, and punishing fate
Afflicted them with ruin deservedly,
And on the morrow the world taunted them,
“Tis tit for tat. Blame not just destiny.”110
As soon as the severed head of Dūbān finishes reciting the poem, king Yūnān dies from the poison,
and the head succumbs to death as well.
As Shahrazad proceeds through THE STORY OF THE MERCHANT AND THE JINN, THE STORY
OF THE FISHERMAN AND THE JINN and THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN the

question of trust grows in complexity until, by the deaths of king Yūnān and his friend the doctor
Dūbān it has reached tragic proportions. Some might say that in presenting the real possibility of
betrayal in such stark terms Shahrazad has taken a great risk. Perhaps king Shahriyar will distrust
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her as a result and have her executed like Dūbān. The flip side of this, however, is that Shahrazad
has presented Shahriyar with something like the truth––trust does leave us vulnerable to being
betrayed, and she does so in a nuanced way where Shahriyar has a chance to see a few different
kinds of deception in play from a few different kinds of characters. He has the chance to make
sense of this for himself in a realistic way. There is, for example, little question that Dūbān is the
one who poisoned the book, and to the degree that king Shahriyar is aware that the Dūbān figure
reflects Shahrazad herself, he is faced with the possibility that Shahrazad may try to poison him if
he allows her to live. However, it is also clear that Dūbān was driven to this act by the accusation
and violence of king Yūnān himself. There is nothing in the story to substantiate the vizier’s
suggestion that Dūbān was a spy from the Byzantine empire. What is more Dūbān really did cure
Yūnān of a debilitating illness.
The vizier’s conspiracy theory, however, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy through
repetition and Yūnān’s ignorance. Yūnān initially recognizes it as deception and the result of envy,
but one of the stories lesson’s is that such knowledge is not set in stone. To the contrary, simply
repeating the idea over a period of time appears to wear down King Yūnān’s confidence in his own
perspective. This may suggest that one of the points Shahrazad is making has to do with how the
mind can be changed––for better or worse––over time. Here comparison is useful. King Yūnān,
unlike Shahriyar, experiences a change gradually over time towards a state of confusion and
paranoia that leads him to betray and kill his friend Dūbān. What about Shahriyar’s wife? Did she
perhaps experience her turn towards betrayal gradually over time as well? Or was it sudden? Here,
too, the very short time between King Yūnān’s angry threat and his execution of Dūbān is also
important, for it finds its point of comparison in Shahrazad’s first story, where the jinn had a year
to process his anger and grief. If the three merchant-storytellers had shown up and offered their
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storytelling-bargain while the jinn was still in the first wave of his rage after losing his son, would
he really have accepted their bargain? Perhaps he would have killed them all! With a year,
however, all parties have the time to find a solution. In THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE
DŪBĀN the time period is dramatically shorter. Instead of giving Dūbān a year to put his things

together before dying, Dūbān, like Shahrazad, is given only a single night, and in that short interval
he is not able to generate a story that can be exchanged for his own death.
Finally, a last element of great importance in this story is that the vizier’s deception is only
made possible by the fact that king Yūnān fundamentally does not understand how Dūbān cured
him. Had he understood the mechanism of the cure, he would have been in a much stronger
position to resist the conspiracy theory and deceptive story of the vizier. In this regard, it seems
important that Dūbān’s cure is strongly Galenic. In On the Natural Faculties, as well as in On the
Affected Parts, Galen defines leprosy as the result of an excess of black bile, the humor associated
with “cool” and “dry” conditions (as well as melancholy).111 If this is what king Yūnān is suffering
from, and if we adopt the humoral framework I outlined in part two of this chapter, then Dūbān’s
prescription for play makes perfect sense. What a humoral doctor would seek to do, in principle,
would be to add more of the two opposing elements, the “warm” and the “moist,” and this is
exactly what Dūbān does. By having the king exercise, he makes him sweat and warm up, and this
humoral change carries through into the warm bath afterwards. Likewise, the element of play itself,
with its emphasis on a fun and joyful state would help to relieve the “despondency” (Greek:
dusthumia; Arabic: khubth al-nafs) associated with melancholic conditions like leprosy. King
Yūnān, however, tragically understands none of this framework for understanding his doctor’s
cure, and as a result, he ends up in a vulnerable position where he fantasizes that the doctor who
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cured him without touching him must also be the one who will poison him with a smell. In fact,
Shahrazad makes sure that something like that fantasy comes true. Dūbān does poison king Yūnān,
but not with a smell, and not out of conspiratorial malice. He does so out of revenge. THE STORY
OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN thus fuses the problem of medicine to the problem of trust,

and in it, through the example of Dūbān’s humoral cure of Yūnān, Shahrazad also introduces the
idea that she is working on a humoral cure of Shahriyar. The story may in part serve to prepare
him to understand this as well, a point which I will return to in my analysis of the final story in
Shahrazad’s first cycle––THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING.

Reading 2 – Nuzhat’s Commentary
(THE STORY OF KING ʿUMAR IBN AL-NUʿAMĀN)

In this first series of stories that Shahrazad tells all of the main character in them are men.
What does this have to do with the problems of trust and medicine? The meaning of this seems to
lie in Shahrazad’s understanding that Shahriyar’s sense of betrayal and hatred is directed towards
women. Thus, starting with men provides a bit of distance from Shahriyar’s real fear––being
deceived by a woman––and this allows for Shahrazad to engage the problem of trust in a realistic
way from the beginning without hitting the nerve that might trigger the executioner’s axe.
However, after these initial stories, Shahrazad does go on to tell many stories about a variety of
leading female figures. One particularly important group of these are three female characters who,
like Dūbān, personify knowledge––Tawaddud, Nuzhat al-Zamān, and Dhāt al-Dawāhī. Like
Dūbān all of these women are also said to possess considerable medical knowledge in particular.
In presenting them, Shahrazad follows the same principle that she follows with the male characters
(The Storytelling Merchants, the Fisherman, Dūbān)––namely, she avoids painting the problem of
trust in simplistic terms.
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To the contrary, this group of female characters proves to be a diverse group in terms of
their moral make up. Each also comes from a different social background. Tawaddud is a jāriya,
a young enslaved woman, who through a demonstration of her knowledge becomes a qayna, a
learned courtesan. Nuzhat al-Zamān is the daugher of a king who is reduced to the social status of
a jāriya by a Bedouin who kidnaps and enslaves her, but she, like Tawaddud, subsequently
becomes a qayna by presenting her knowledge in a courtly setting, and is eventually manumitted
and returned to her original station. Dhāt al-Dawāhī is the mother of a Byzantine prince. Her son’s
wife was murdered by Nuzhāt al-Zamān’s father, king ʿUmar ibn al-Nuʿmān, and Dhāt al-Dawāhī
is out for revenge. Like the Storytelling Merchants, The Fisherman, and Dūbān, Tawaddud and
Nuzhat al-Zamān demonstrate the possibility of using knowledge for good, and like king Yūnān
and his vizier Dhāt al-Dawāhī shows how knowledge can be used to cause harm, and even to kill.
The different social station of these characters also parallels the differences in social standing
between the merchants, the poor fisherman, and the sage Dūbān, and this provides a way for
Shahrazad to explore the relationships between knowledge, social class, and gender through the
events that happen in these stories.
Shahrazad’s portrayal of these characters also gives us a point from which to reflect on
Shahrazad’s own character, for she, too, is an embodiment of knowledge.112 The first and only
description we receive of Shahrazad establishes this as one of the basic aspects of her character.
She, like Dūbān, Tawaddud, and Nuzhat al-Zamān has read widely and knows many things. In
fact, the only other thing that we are told about Shahrazad is that she is the daughter of king
Shahriyar’s vizier and the sister to Dunyazad. In short, she is introduced like this:
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.وﻛﺎن اﻟﻮزﯾﺮ اﻟﺪى ﯾﻘﺘﻞ اﻟﺒﻨﺎت ﻟﮫ ﺑﻨﺖ ﻛﺒﯿﺮه اﺳﻤﮭﺎ ﺷﮭﺮازاد واﻟﺼﻐﯿﺮه دﯾﻨﺎرزاد
وﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻜﺒﯿﺮه ﺷﮭﺮازاد ﻗﺪ ﻗﺮات اﻟﻜﺘﺐ واﻟﻤﺼﻨﻔﺎت واﻟﺤﻜﻤﮫ وﻛﺘﺐ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﺎت
،وﺣﻔﻈﺖ اﻻﺷﻌﺎر وطﺎﻟﻌﺖ اﻻﺧﺒﺎر وﻋﻠﻤﺖ اﻗﻮال اﻟﻨﺎس وﻛﻼم اﻟﺤﻜﻤﺎ واﻟﻤﻠﻮك
113
ﻋﺎرﻓﮫ ﻟﺒﯿﺒﮫ ﺣﻜﯿﻤﮫ ادﯾﺒﮫ ﻗﺪ ﻗﺮت ودرت
The vizier who led the women to their deaths had two daughters. The older was
named Shahrazad and the younger Dunyazad. Shahrazad had read books,
collections, and wisdom literature, as well as books of medicine. She had
memorized poetry and studied historical reports. She knew the sayings of the people
and the words of the wise men and kings. She was intelligent, knowledgeable, wise,
and cultured. She had read and learned.114
Shahrazad’s elevated social position and this description of her learning together suggest that she
represents a figure of high intellectual and cultural standing, and that her stories are meant to reflect
her knowledge.115 Indeed, from a description like this Shahrazad’s knowledge can be appreciated
for the way it spans many of the categories used in medieval Arabic classifications of knowledge,
which themselves embody what Paul Heck describes as “socio-epistemological diversity.”116 Her
wide of reading of books connects her to the udabāʾ (the “litterateurs”), and wisdom literature
could connect her to falsafa (philosophy), as well as to the eclectic sayings of the wise
(gnomologia).117 Her knowledge of historical reports connects her to ḥadīth, and also possibly to
the sīra, the stories of the life of the prophet Muḥammad. Her knowledge of poetry connects her
not only to literature but also to grammar and linguistics (naḥw). Her knowledge of kings connects
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her to biography and cultural history.118 The fact that she is adība, “cultured” suggests a connection
to bayān (stylistics) and also perhaps to courtly administration, too.119
In terms of her knowledge of the natural sciences, medicine alone is identified,120 but as I
have argued from the beginning of this chapter, this knowledge is one of the keys to understanding
how Shahrazad thinks about her stories. Indeed, Shahrazad’s medical knowledge is reflected not
only in this description, but also in the many stories she tells that have medical material in them or
in which medicine as a branch of knowledge, craft, or profession plays an important role in the
plot. Often this takes the form of something simple, like the mention of a specific disease, such as
occurs with smallpox (judarī) in the beginning of THE HUNCHBACK’S TALE, or a hygienic regimen,
such as the character ʿAzīz follows in THE TALE OF ʿAZĪZ AND ʿAZĪZA.121 Medical material may
also take the form of a trope such as the lovesickness in QAMAR AL-ZAMĀN AND BUDŪR and THE
LOVERS OF BANŪ ʿUDHRA. Medicine often emerges as a part of the presentation of knowledge, as

in THE STORY OF TAWADDUD and THE STORY OF KING ʿUMAR IBN AL-NUʿMĀN AND HIS SONS.
Other times medicine appears through the figure of a doctor such as in THE TALE OF THE JEWISH
DOCTOR and, as I just analyzed above, in THE STORY OF KING YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN.

Medicine may also appear in the figure of a midwife as in and THE STORY OF SOLOMON AND THE
QUEEN OF SHEBA.122 Still other times, it emerges as part of a ruse, such as the doctorly disguise

donned by Qamar al-Aqmār in THE STORY OF THE EBONY HORSE, a category into which the
smallpox ruse of THE HUNCHBACK’S TALE also fits. 123
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It is important to note, however, that king Shahriyar doesn’t have access to this description
of Shahrazad’s character. Just as the storytellers of the Nights hide his body from us, they also hide
Shahrazad’s vast and capacious mind from him. Shahriyar has no idea that Shahrazad is an
embodiment of knowledge. How does he find out? The main way that Shahrazad’s knowledge
emerges for king Shahriyar is through the portraits of learned figures that she presents in her
stories. Dūbān is one of these figures, and as I demonstrated above, through that story king
Shahriyar could glean the basics of Shahrazad’s medical knowledge as well as her humoral cure.
From that same story he could also get a sense of what she knows about historical reports and the
lives of kings. Compared to the stories of Tawaddud and Nuzhat al-Zamān, however, the Dubān
story is barely an introduction to Shahrazad’s knowledge. The bulk of what she knows comes
through most strikingly in the story of these two characters, both of whom (at least temporarily)
are representatives of a special class of enslaved women who served as learned courtesans in the
courts of the ʿAbbāsids. These women were known as qiyān (i.e. the plural of qayna). A brief
introduction to the qiyān can provide a useful backdrop for interpreting Shahrazad’s use of qayna
characters like Tawaddud and Nuzhat al-Zamān in her stories.
The institution of the qayna has roots that stretch back to the period before Islam, and there
was never only one kind of qayna.124 Originally, there was likely a type that served as a skilled
performer in the house of an owner, and another that served in tavern settings. By the time of the
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early ʿAbbāsid caliphate, however, one type of qayna had become the symbol for the rest––the
highly educated courtesan and court performer––the most famous examples of which are figures
like ʿArīb, Maḥbūba, and Faḍl “the poet.”125 According to Charles Pellat, women like these
received a thorough education, which could span not only the memorization of poetry and
historical accounts, but also an education in the religious and natural sciences. Some qiyān also
received a high level of training in medicine.126 In this regard, the range of their knowledge roughly
spans the same breadth as the one the storytellers of the Nights attribute to Shahrazad. Other
scholars, such as Nadia El-Cheikh, however, have disputed the “thoroughness” of the qayna’s
education and instead described it as “eclectic and non-specialized,” and more importantly, in
contradistinction to the education of elite women, according to El-Cheikh, the qayna’s education
was “never intended for her own self-improvement.”127 Regardless of the intention of the
education, however, El-Cheikh, Pellat, Matthew Gordon, Pernilla Myrne, Kathryn Hain and others
agree that many qiyān did achieve a level of education that was roughly equal to and sometimes
even surpassed their freeborn peers.128
It lies beyond the scope of this chapter to present more than a single historical example of
the qiyān, but even one adds depth to our understanding of Shahrazad’s use of the qayna character,
for in painting memorable portraits of qiyān Shahrazad herself is partaking in a literary trope,
which is exemplified in Ibn al-Ṣāʿī’s collection of such portraits––Nisāʾ al-Khulafāʾ (Consorts of
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the Caliphs)––as well as in al-Iṣbahānī’s Kitāb al-Aghānī (the Great Book of Songs).129 In Kitāb
al-Aghānī, al-Iṣbahānī records the lives of many of the qiyān. One of the most famous is Faḍl “the
poet.” Unlike Shahrazad, Faḍl was thought to have been born into the instution of slavery and thus
in a low social position, but Faḍl herself disputes this.130 The way she is described is also
reminiscent of the how the storytellers of the Nights describe Shahrazad, though in Faḍl’s case the
emphasis on poetry is greater. Here is the first part of Faḍl’s story according to al-Iṣbahānī:
Faḍl was an enslaved woman (jāriya), born of mixed parentage from Basra [i.e. her
mother was enslaved and her father was freeborn]. Her mother was of mixed
parentage too from Yamama in the Najd region. Faḍl was born to this mother and
raised in the house of a man from the tribe of Abd al-Qays. This man sold her after
he had educated and trained her (addabahā wa kharrajahā). She was sold and then
given to the caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-861).
Faḍl maintained that the one who had sold her was in fact her brother, and that her
father had slept with her mother and her mother had given birth to her as her father’s
child. Additionally she maintained that her father had educated and trained her and
recognized her as his legitimate daughter (muʿtarifan bihā). She claimed that it was
her father’s other sons from a different mother who had colluded (tawāṭaʾū) with
her father to both sell and disavow her.
Faḍl was known, even after her manumission, as “Faḍl the Slave.” She had a very
beautiful face and build, she was cultured (adība) and eloquent in Arabic, quick
with a comeback, steeped in the language of poetry, and there was no woman in her
time who surpassed her as a poet.131
This is a skillful and artistic retelling of Faḍl’s story. Matthew Gordon describes it as sympathetic
as well.132 The language is straightforward, but al-Iṣbahānī works this simple language to bring
out the core of Faḍl’s narrative––her protest against wrongful enslavement. In particular, he draws
attention to Faḍl’s ambivalent status as a child of mixed parents (father freeborn, mother enslaved)
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by coordinating the two verbs that most determine this status through a shared Arabic root (w-ṭ-ʾ).
To describe Faḍl’s father’s act of sleeping with Faḍl’s mother, which creates the possibility of
freeborn status, he uses waṭiʾ (to sleep with). For Faḍl’s brother’s act of colluding with Faḍl’s
father to enslave and sell Faḍl, he uses tawāṭʾ (to collude with), and thus a very small difference
in a single word appears to determines Faḍl’s fate, but an equal part will be determined by Faḍl’s
own use of language as a poet in the ʿAbbāsid court, a feature of the story that connects her through
this use of language to Shahrazad.
Such portraits of qiyān appear to have been popular, and thus in Shahrazad’s portraits of
these figures, it is useful to keep the story of people like Faḍl the Poet in mind.133 Shahrazad’s
most well-known story about a qayna is the story of Tawaddud. 134 Tawaddud is initially described
by Shahrazad as a jāriya, a young enslaved woman.135 In the ʿAbbasid age a jāriya was not
precisely the same thing as a qayna, for a qayna underwent an extensive education and served in
courtly setting. However, the term describes Tawaddud as we meet her, not as she turns out. The
storytellers of the Nights tell us that, like Faḍl the Poet, Tawaddud has received an extensive
education. Also like Faḍl, when we meet her, Tawaddud is enslaved by a wealthy merchant of
Baghdad. The story goes that this merchant, nearing the end of his life, lacked an heir, so he prayed
to God for a son. Eventually, God answered his prayers. The merchant laid with one of his
concubines, and she conceived that very night. When his son was born, the merchant named him
Abū al-Ḥusn, and the boy received the upbringing and education of an emir––instruction in the
Qurʾān, Islamic precepts, the tenants of religion, calligraphy, poetry, arithmetic, and archery. Their
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life together was happy. Then one day Abū al-Ḥusn’s father goes to his son and tells him that he
(the father) is not long for this world. He assures his son that his inheritance will be sufficient, not
only for him, but for his own children. Then his father dies. Abū al-Ḥusn falls into deep mourning.
However, he is quickly roused from his grief to prodigal spending by a group of friends who tell
him that “mourning is only suitable for girls and women kept in seclusion.”136 A short time later,
having spent through his entire inheritance, he realizes he has only one possession left, Tawaddud.
Seeing Abū al-Ḥusn’s destitution, Tawaddud proposes a solution that resembles elements
of the solutions that Shahrazad’s proposes to her own father. In short, Tawaddud goes to Abū alḤusn and says “take me to the caliph”:
Take me to Harun al-Rashid and ask him to pay you ten thousand dinars for me. If
he thinks that this is too much, tell him: “Commander of the Faithful, the girl is
worth more than that, and if you test her, her value will soar in your eyes, for she
has no equal and she is only fit for one like you.137
This daring proposal reveals that though we have been unaware of it, Tawaddud herself knows of
her courtly value. As Jocelyn Sharlet has recently studied, the qiyān played an important role in
ʿAbbāsid gift exchange.138 Such exchanges often involved an exam in which the qayna had a
chance to formally present her knowledge and training, the greatest symbol of her value. The
young Abū al-Ḥusn, perhaps still lost in grief, doesn’t seem to fully understand what Tawaddud is
suggesting, but he agrees and the two find their way to the court of the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd.
When they arrive we are told of Tawaddud’s beauty, but the caliph’s focus in this story is
on her learning. In this regard, she claims a truly impressive range of intellectual trainings
including Qur’ānic interpretation, philology, music, the precepts of Islam, ancient legends,
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recitation, religious practice, ḥadīth and isnad, arithmetic, geometry, the curriculum of Aristotelian
philosophy, psychology, logic, rhetoric, astronomy, exposition, anatomy, Ibn Sīnā, and medicine.
Indeed, Tawaddud spends five whole nights summarizing her knowledge of medicine alone! After
a detailed description of the body according to Galenic anatomy, a careful summary of how to
interpret the body’s humoral condition through touching and sensing “firmness, heat, dryness,
coldness, and dampness,” she summarizes the practice of making inferences about internal states
from external signs (i.e. prognōsis). Here there is an important departure from the Galenic
tradition. In tallying the best way to assess a change in internal state, Tawaddud lists six things,
five of which Galen discusses in various places, one of which she adds herself. To identify diseases
by internal signs, she claims, one must also look at “actions.”139 This is not a specific Galenic
recommendation as far as I know, and it is definitely not the first place a Galenic doctor is supposed
to look. In the Commentary on Hippocrates Prognosis, Galen says the first place to look is the
face.140 Tawaddud’s “action” thus represents a subtle “action” taken by Shahrazad through
Tawaddud that departs from the Galenic tradition and reflects her own diagnosis of Shahriyar. As
I highlighted in my brief analysis of al-Rāzī’s departure from Galen’s theory of melancholy, when
attending to Galenic medicine, we have to attend not only to the ways it appears, but also to the
way it actively changed in the text. What is the meaning of this substitute in Tawaddud’s Galenic
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knowledge? One possibility is that “actions” are, in fact, what Shahrazad herself had to make her
diagnosis on at first. After all, all she knew was that king Shahriyar was executing women.
Naturally, when Tawaddud claims such an array of technical knowledge, the Caliph is
incredulous, but the young woman calmly instructs him to summon the leading scholars of each
field (from Basra, no less, 500 kilometers away) so that they can examine her, and the fact that
Hārūn al-Rashīd does so reveals that he believes Tawaddud’s claim is at least plausible.141 Once
the scholars are summoned, in one of the longer stories in the Nights, Tawaddud systematically
demonstrates her mastery of each subject. Indeed, she proves herself to be superior to the leading
figures in each field––including the courtly doctor, who is forced to conclude, “Commander of the
Faithful [i.e. the caliph], I testify that this girl knows more than I do about medicine and other
subjects. There is nothing I can do to surpass her.”142 Tawaddud’s level of mastery is then
represented in a ritual of disrobing. At the end of each subject test, she is given the chance to ask
a question of her examiner, and if they cannot answer her she orders the scholars to disrobe. At the
end of the story, all the men except the Caliph have been disrobed and Tawaddud, clothed in the
raiment of her intellectual achievement, not only wins for Abū al-Ḥusn a decisive financial
recovery, the Caliph is so impressed by Tawaddud’s learning, that he grants the young woman a
wish. She wishes to be returned to Abu al-Ḥusn. Moved by her loyalty and affection, Hārūn alRashīd grants Tawaddud’s wish, and in addition admits Abu al-Ḥusn to an elite class of the
ʿAbbāsid court. He makes the young man a nadīm, like Dūbān, an official companion of the ruler’s
court.
Tawaddud’s story thus presents an optimistic picture of how knowledge can be used to
achieve a happy ending. Like figures like Faḍl the Poet, Tawaddud is able to use her knowledge
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and presentational ability to climb a social ladder and help Abū al-Ḥusn recover from the loss of
his father.143 In terms of medicine, however, one of the things that stands out about Tawaddud’s
medical knowledge, is that, unlike Dūbān, she does not actually use it for medical purposes. It is
used only for display. For this reasons, Tawaddud’s medical knowledge also doesn’t yet pose the
kind of threat that applied medical knowledge such as Dūbān’s can have. The same holds true in
a second example of a Shahrazadian qayna––Nuzhat al-Zamān. Nuzhat al-Zamān’s story forms a
part of a long and complex romance and popular epic called THE TALE OF KING ʿUMAR IBN ALNUʿMĀN. Unlike Tawaddud’s story that takes place in the court of Hārūn al-Rashīd in Baghdad at

the height of the ʿAbbāsid translation movement, the THE TALE OF KING ʿUMAR IBN AL-NUʿMĀN
presents a dynastic story set against the complex backdrop of wars between Byzantines, Muslims,
and Crusaders.144 In it Nuzhat al-Zamān and Dawʾ al-Makān are twins born to Sophia, one of King
ʿUmar’s ibn al-Nuʿmān’s concubines. However, Sophia hides Dawʾ al-Makān from King ʿUmar
so as not to endanger the inheritance rights of the king’s other son, the hero Sharrkān. In the long
plot that subsequently unfolds these twins separated at birth are eventually reunited as part of a
caravan to holy sites like Mecca and Jerusalem. While on this caravan, Dawʾ al-Makān becomes
very sick, and his twin sister Nuzhat al-Zamān must try and find work to take care of them both.
She leaves the place where they are staying in order to look for work. While out, instead of finding
work she is captured by a Bedouin, who pretends to be looking for a companion for his daughter.
He asks Nuzhat al-Zamān whether she is a slave or freeborn. She responds truthfully that where
she comes from she is of high birth, but that she and her brother are strangers here. The Bedouin
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says he is looking for a companion for his young daughter. This trick works and Nuzhat al-Zamān
follows him to the desert. On the way she realizes she’s been tricked. The Bedouin highway robber
then enslaves her, threatens her, abuses her with insults, and beats her. In this sense, though we
do not yet know that Nuzhat al-Zamān possesses extraordinary knowledge, she provides an
important example for Shahriyar of a woman who has been tricked. All of Shahrazad’s early stories
focus on men being tricked, but Nuzhat al-Zamān’s tale provides a point of gender balance in this
respect.145
Nuzhat al-Zamān is able to fend off some of the Bedouin’s violence through her moving
performances of poetry, but he tires of her weeping and stops in Damascus to sell her to the highest
bidder. When describing her, he too uses language of the kind used to describe Faḍl the Poet and
Shahrazad. He tells the merchant who deals in enslaved young women, praising her as bikr bilugha
(unmatched in linguistic skill) and possessingʿaql (intelligence), adab (cultured learning) and ḥusn
(beauty) “She is intelligent, cultured, clever, and beautiful.”146 The Damascene merchant
immediately recognizes her value, and he also recognizes that the Bedouin does not know her true
value. He tries to buy her for two hundred dinars, but the Bedouin gets angry and refuses. The
merchant’s goal, however, is not to be averted. He wants to purchase Nuzhat al-Zamān in order to
offer her to Sharrkan (her half-brother), who has in the meantime become the governor, in
exchange for letters of introduction to Sharrkan’s father King ʿUmar Ibn al-Nuʿmān. Of course,
the merchant has no idea that Nuzhat al-Zamān is actually King ʿUmar Ibn al-Nuʿmān’s daughter.
Nor, for that matter, does Sharrkan himself when he eventually purchases her from the merchant.
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For a scheme like this, the merchant is willing to pay the Bedouin a lot, and eventually he offers a
hundred thousand dinars for Nuzhat al-Zamān, and the deal is done.
After purchasing Nuzhat al-Zamān, the merchant wishes to test her further to see how much
knowledge she really has. Nuzhat al-Zamān obliges, relieved to be free from the abuse of the
highway robber, and after affirming that she knows the Qurʾān by heart, she describes the rest of
her knowledge like this:
I have a knowledge of philosophy, medicine, the Preface to Science and Galen’s
commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, on which I have commented myself.
I have read the Tadhkira, commented on the Burhan, studied the Mufradat of Ibn
al-Baitar, and can discuss the Meccan Canon of Avicenna [i.e. the Qānūn of Ibn
Sīnā]. I can solve riddles and set problems; I can talk about geometry and am
proficient in anatomy. I have studied the books of the Shafʾites, as well as the
traditions of the Prophet, together with grammar. I have held debates with men of
learning and have discussed all branches of knowledge. I am familiar with logic,
rhetoric, arithmetic and astronomy. I know occult lore and how to establish the
times of prayer. All these sciences I have mastered.147
Like both Shahrazad and Tawaddud––and also like Dūbān––Nuzhat demonstrates an impressive
range of knowledge, highlighting key Greek medical texts in particular, which offers Shahriyar
another chance to begin to understand the kind of cure that Shahrazad is putting together for him.
Indeed, as I highlighted in section two of this chapter, the Aphorisms which Nuzhat claims to have
not only read but also to have commented on herself, were one of three key texts for thinking about
melancholics like Shahriyar in the medieval Arabic medical tradition.148 Impressed by her
knowledge the merchant’s plan to sell Nuzhat al-Zamān to the governor seems to be on course.
The big sale goes through, and Sharrkān purchases her. He does not yet know that she is actually
his half-sister, so after purchasing her, he manumits her in order to marry her. As his wife, she has
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two more chances later on in the story to display her knowledge like Tawaddud in the courts of
the world.
The examples of both Tawaddud and Nuzhat al-Zāman present essentially optimistic
portraits about the saving power of women’s knowledge in a crisis. However, Shahrazad is also
aware of the potential for danger, and this is what she clearly explores in the second part of THE
TALE OF KING ʿUMAR IBN AL-NUʿMĀN through the figure of the Byzantine woman––Dhāt al-

Dawāhī. As Sharrkān and Nuzhat al-Zamān return to Baghdad, they meet up with Dawʾ al-Makān
along the way. Once in Baghdad, they receive terrible news––their father King ʿUmar Ibn alNuʿmān was assassinated by Dhāt al-Dawāhī, the mother of the Byzantine king. King ʿUmar’s
death leads to a complicated set of court intrigues and at first we do not even know how he died.
Eventually, however, things calm down and Sharrkān asks to hear the story from someone in the
palace. What happened was this: Dhāt al-Dawāhī penetrated King ʿUmar Ibn al-Nuʿmān security
forces by disguising herself as an ascetic accompanied by five learned, enslaved women. She
pretends to have brought these women as a tribute to the king, and following the model of
Tawaddud and Nuzhat al-Zamān, she encourages king ʿUmar to examine the women himself for
their knowledge. The king agrees, and one by one the women present their knowledge to him,
ranging from Qurʾānic material, to historical reports and the sciences. The king is very impressed
and wishes to purchase the women. Dhāt al-Dawāhī responds by saying she will only give the
women to the king in exchange for a month of fasting. The king agrees. Over the next month he
fasts. Dhāt al-Dawāhī also prescribes specific foods for him to eat and drink to break his fast,
preparing these herself. Through the first part of this month, she builds trust with the king and
piques his anticipation. At the end of the month, he drinks one last thing that Dhāt al-Dawāhī has
prepared for him. It turns out to be poisoned and he dies.
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The stories of Tawaddud, Nuzhat al-Zamān and Dhāt al-Dawāhī thus explore a variety of
possible associations that the figure of a qiyān could evoke, but on this theme as we have see
Shahrazad does not restrict herself to portraits of the dangers posed by women’s knowledge alone,
for she also includes learned men like Dūbān and also ignorant ones like king Yūnān. The question
for Shahriyar is––which one is Shahrazad? We may feel that we know, but how could Shahriyar?
Yet I argue that Shahrazad is aware of this and rather than try to circumvent the complexities of
building real trust by painting an idealistic picture of women, doctors, or knowledge, through the
portraits of Dūbān, Tawaddud, Nuzhat al-Zamān, and Dhat al-Dawāhī, she paints a realistic picture
of the risks involved in trusting someone––as well as the risks involved in refusing to trust one’s
friends. Through this honesty she wins Shahiryar’s trust, and a chance for her humoral cure to take
effect. In sum, Tawaddud, Nuzhat al-Zamān, Dhāt al-Dawāhī, and Dūbān embody a range of
problems that can come up when medical knowledge is in play. Sometimes problems are solved
by knowledge. In other cases, knowledge is used as a weapon. In still other case, medical
knowledge is not used as a weapon, but the idea of medical knowledge as a weapon is itself
weaponized against a doctor like Dūbān.

Reading 3 – The Half-Stone Prince
(THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING)

In a narratological study that to my mind has yet to be surpassed, Mia Gerhart rejects the
idea that there is a meaningful connection to be drawn between THE FRAME TALE and the stories
Shahrazad tells. To the contrary, she claims that to try and draw such a connection is to doom
Shahrazad to looking like a fool:
Such a relation between the framed stories and the frame is lacking in the 1001
Nights. To be sure, it would have been difficult to keep up in so vast a collection,
and necessarily would have limited its scope. Yet, especially in the beginning it is
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somewhat surprising when Shahrazad’s stories seem so ill-adapted to the dangerous
situation she had put herself in. The first one, THE MERCHANT AND THE JINN,
already presents two wicked wives, and in the second one, THE FISHERMAN AND
THE JINN, the last part seems a particularly tactless choice under the circumstances:
the queen’s morbid infatuation with the negro slave can scarcely have been a
pleasant topic to king Shahriyar… All in all, in the first few stories, if we try to
connect them with the frame, Shahrazad appears to be rubbing in the king’s
conjugal misfortune, rather than helping him to get over it…149
Against this view, I have been arguing that the key to understanding the connection between THE
FRAME TALE and the stories Shahrazad tells is to look at things medically, and to understand that

these stories represents an imaginative humoral cure. The culmination of this cure in the first cycle
of Shahrazad’s stories occurs in THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING, and it centers on the figure
who more than any other of Shahrazad’s character’s gives us a portrait of Shahriyar as a
melancholic in need of help from someone like Shahrazad.
THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING goes like this.150 After hearing THE STORY OF KING
YŪNĀN AND THE SAGE DŪBĀN, the big and angry jinn from THE STORY OF THE FISHERMAN AND
THE JINN offers to make the Fisherman rich by leading him to a secret lake that contains some

special fish. The Fisherman agrees and goes to lake. He catches these fish, which are of four
different colors, and he brings them (on the jinn’s advice) to the local king. As it turns out, these
fish have a number of magical properties, which become manifest during only the cooking process.
When the king learns of this, he demands that the Fisherman show him the secret lake where the
fish come from. The Fisherman obliges. He leads the king and a large escort to a lake surrounded
by four mountains. The king is deeply interested in this lake, and decides to go explore it for
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himself. On the second day of this journey he makes his way to a black-stone palace, hoping to
find someone who can tell him about the mysterious lake. His wish is granted when he meets a
prince who is reclined in a room within the palace. Unfortunately, the prince cannot get up because
the lower half of his body has been turned to stone. The king asks the half-stone prince what
happened to him, as well as what happened to the fish in the lake to make them magical, and the
half-stone prince tells him his story.
This story is the closest reflection of what actually happened to Shahriyar, and the fact that
Shahrazad chooses to tell it at this early stage, I argue, supports my idea that the way that she is
generating Shahriyar’s interest in her stories, is by presenting him, not with fantasy, but with
reality. As the young man tells it, he gradually learned of his wife’s deceit from his other
concubines. Once his suspicion had reached a sufficient pitch, he spied on his wife himself and
discovered her adultery. In his rage, he immediately tried to kill the enslaved black man with whom
she was having sex, but the prince only managed to wound the man. The prince then flees the
scene before being discovered, and for a while his wife doesn’t know that he is the one who nearly
killed her beloved. Eventually, however, the truth comes out, and the wife turns out to be a
sorceress. To punish the prince for wounding her beloved, she turns the lower half of his body to
stone, and she transforms the four communities of his kingdom (Christian, Jews, Muslims, and
Magians) into the four differently colored fish. After hearing the tale, the king devises a plan to
trick the sorceress into returning the prince’s body to a healthy state. The plan succeeds, and the
two become lifelong friends.
In terms of the larger therapeutic arc, THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING advances
things in two ways. First, it introduces the first two sympathetic royal figures––the king who goes
exploring the lake, and the half-stone prince he meets. In so doing, the story invites Shahriyar to
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make contact with a different kind of warmth, not the heat of anger, but the steady flame of
affection and a desire to do good, which both of these figures possess throughout their story.
Second, on a deeper level, it is the first story to present Shahriyar with a situation very much like
the one he experienced. The purpose of this is not principally to help Shahriyar feels less alone in
his suffering (he has already seen Box Woman’s jinn and his brother Shahzaman’s suffering as
well), but rather, to give him a chance, to reprocess what happened to him, as his temperament
gradually improves day to day. This story may also serve to alert Shahriyar to the deeper reality
that, though he feels himself to be in power as king, he, like the half-stone prince, is in a position
of vulnerability and dependence.
In this sense, the king who finds the half-stone prince in the black-stone palace is actually
a figure of Shahrazad. Once again like the figure of Dūbān, she casts herself in a less threatening,
masculine guise. Likewise, this king’s rescue of the half-stone prince from his terrible condition
raises the possibility for Shahriyar that Shahrazad might actually be able to help bring him out of
his own inner plight. In short, THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING is a story designed to represent the painful episode of adultery and contextualize it within the possibility of genuine
recovery. In it the half-stone prince is painted as a melancholic figure, and the elemental
associations of the black stone of the lower half of his body (its coldness and dryness) also point
to black bile and melancholy. Fittingly, as a part of introducing this recovery from melancholy,
the story also begins to raise the idea of the broader social impact of the king’s illness. Though the
four peoples were turned into fish by the half-stone prince’s wife, once they have been turned back
into people, the prince himself becomes responsible for seeing to their rehabilitation, giving
Shahriyar a faint image––important nonetheless––of himself as a king who could be a servant,
rather than a scourge, to his people. This is the end of THE STORY OF THE FISHERMAN AND THE

146

JINN. In the end, the fisherman becomes part of the story himself, as the intermediary between the

lake’s fish and the king who saves the half-stone prince.
Naturally, the material in THE STORY OF THE ENCHANTED KING is raw and its impact on
Shahriyar’s still delicate state will need to be assessed for many nights afterwards by Shahrazad.
Thus, it makes sense that she would follow this deep story with something lighter and more
comical. The next story after this one––THE PORTER’S TALE––brings us back to the first level of
enframement, and is one of the bawdiest and most fun in the whole Nights, though it, too, mixes
in seriousness even while jesting. In it, Hārūn al-Rashīd makes his first, striking appearance, and
the political structure of the institution of the qiyān, so entrenched at the heart of the Nights,
undergoes a first, brilliant, inversion. A group of men are tied up and forced to entertain a group
of dangerous women. This inversion marks a crucial stage in the long journey from Shahriyar’s
violent melancholy towards something like individual balance, and something also like a
restoration of a healthy political order, both of which seem to be the aims of Shahrazad’s
storytelling cure.
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3

Rousseau’s Remedy
The constitution Cure
In chapter one of this dissertation I looked at Galen’s cure of his teacher Eudemus. This
was a storytelling cure by an individual of an individual. In chapter two I looked at Shahrazad’s
cure of king Shahriyar. This was also a storytelling cure by an individual of an individual, but since
Shahriyar was the king of Sassan, Shahrazad’s cure had a greater social impact than Galen’s cure
of Eudemus. Once Shahriyar was cured, his kingdom as a whole could also begin to heal. In this
last chapter, I would like to take the storytelling cure one step further and look at an example of a
cure that addresses itself, not to an individual, but to a society as a whole. The Second Discourse
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau has often been fruitfully interpreted against the backdrop of
seventeenth-century thought experiments carried out by figures like Thomas Hobbes that focused
on imagining human beings in a hypothetical “state of nature.” It has also been read as a brilliant
turning-on-its head of Bernard Mandeville’s theory of doux commerce in the service of a Genevan
and Calvinist ideal of republicanism.1 It has been productively interpreted as a naturalistic version
of the fall of humankind from a state of grace, too,2 and more recently, Rousseau’s sustained focus
on the problems (and promise) of the passion known as amour propre (excessive self-love) has
been read as a kind of theodicy.3 A fifth kind of reading, which complements these, but which has
not yet been attempted lies in focusing on the role of the physical body in The Second Discourse,
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and analyzing the way Rousseau makes use of the physical body not only in his account of
humanity’s ills, but also as a potential source of a remedy.
Most scholars look to later works like The Social Contract and Emile for Rousseau’s
remedies to the problems of human society. Tantalizingly, however, at the end of The Second
Discourse Rousseau tells us that “C’est dans cette lente succession des choses qu’il verra la
solution d’une infinite de problems de morale et de Politique que les Philosophes ne peuvent
résoudre” (It is in this slow succession of things that he [i.e. the reader] will see the solution to an
infinite number of problems of morals and politics which the philosophers cannot resolve).4 This
stakes an important claim, for “cette lente succession des choses” refers here to none other than
the main story told by the Second Discourse itself, and thus it suggests that somehow a careful
reading and reflection on this text is already enough to begin to see a solution to the problems of
human inequality that Rousseau famously paints in such dark tones. But if so, what is the remedy
offered by Rousseau in The Second Discourse? I believe the key to understanding it lies in paying
close attention to exactly what Rousseau tells readers to focus on––“cette lente succession des
choses,” and for reasons that I make clear in this chapter, I believe this refers most directly to
Rousseau’s artful and complex use of a single, multilayered word––constitution.5 In short, the
story of The Second Discourse is also, as I will demonstrate, in a certain light, the story of this one
word.
In The Second Discourse, Rousseau addresses himself to a question asked by the Academy
of Dijon––What is the origin of human inequality? In answering this question he begins by
distinguishing between two types of inequality––inégalité physique, which encompasses
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differences in age (âges), health (santé), the strengths of the body (des forces du Corps), and the
qualities of the mind and soul (des qualités de l’Esprit, ou de l’Ame), and inégalité morale, which
he equates with political inequality and human hierarchies established by convention.6 In light of
this distinction, Rousseau’s answer to the Academy is that inégalité physique is the product of
nature, but inégalité morale is not, nor does it reflect a divine plan or an ineluctable natural order.
Instead, for Rousseau, it represents the accumulated result of gradual changes that begin in bodily
passions, pass into states of mind, and gradually affect human action.
Many of these changes have not been intentional, but their effects have nevertheless been
devastating. This is true not only in relation to human society as whole, but also to human beings
as individuals, because these changes in our bodies have affected our ability to exercise the
fundamental capacity needed, according to Rousseau, to extricate ourselves from the ills of
society––self-reflection. This is why for Rousseau, in order to answer the Academy’s question
about the origins of human inequality, he feels the need to look not only at the nature of the human
being, but also at his own nature, for it is only through a particular kind of self-reflection that,
according to Rousseau, humankind “…viendra-t-il à bout de se voir tel que l’a formé la Nature, à
travers tous les changemens que la succession des tems et des choses a dû produire dans sa
constitution originelle…” (…will succeed in seeing himself as nature formed him, through all of
the changes that the succession of time and things must have produced in his original
constitution…).7 This is certainly a complex answer to the Academy’s question, but it is not
impossible to say in just a few pages. Why does Rousseau go on at such length? In other words,
why does he choose, not just to state his answer, but to slow things down and tell us a story? I
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believe the answer is that Rousseau doesn’t only want us to know his answer. He also wants his
readers to be impacted by the story he tells.
When speaking about the negative effect of the passions (pathē), Galen also liked to refer
to a story––one of Aesop’s.8 In this story, a person is walking around with a kind of saddlebag
slung over their shoulder. One part of the bag hangs down the person’s back. The other part hangs
down the front. According to Galen, everyone suffers from passions like fear, greed, anger, and
insatiability (aplestia), but we tend to keep these in the bag that hangs from the back, so that when
we go to reflect on ourselves as moral, physical, and emotional beings, we generally do not see the
negative effect of these passions in our lives, though it is easy enough to see the bags hanging from
the backs of others. In his reflection on this story, Galen identifies a specific passion that is most
responsible for our blindness to ourselves. Like Rousseau, he cites excessive self-love (hikanōs
philei hēmas). For Galen, this self-love is not the product of reason (logos) or even the intellectual
part of the soul (logistikon).9 Instead, it is largely a matter of the physical body, beginning with
our predispositions at birth as determined by our individual temperaments (krasis), continuing
through the routines we follow (diaita), and molded by our experience, especially our experience
of the other passions. In this sense, for Galen the makeup of our physical bodies determines not
only the “capacities” (dunameis) of the soul in a general sense, but also, specifically, our power to
constructively self-reflect––to see the bag that hangs from our backs.
For Rousseau, at least on the account he gives in The Second Discourse, the bodies of
individuals living in civil society have been so impacted by the onslaught of generations of
passions that they likely cannot be persuaded through intellect alone to turn around and see the
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bags hanging from their backs. In this light, the question I would like to put to The Second
Discourse in the context of this dissertation’s focus on storytelling cures is this: What is the story
that Rousseau tells about our constitutions in this text, and how does he seem to think that telling
such a story might bring about, if not a full constitution cure, at least the rudiments of a remedy? I
believe the idea is actually quite simple, but to understand it one has to be willing to follow
Rousseau into a deeply physicalist account of the human being––much further than his
contemporaries like Buffon were comfortable going. In the context of this physicalist account, in
which the word constitution is the star, it seems to me that Rousseau believes the right kind of
story can nourish our appetites for liberté, “freedom,” and through this nourishing bring about a
private experience of inner illumination.
In making this case I proceed in three steps. First, I analyze the Galenic dimension of the
meaning of the word constitution in eighteenth-century French, focusing on its usage in Buffon’s
Histoire Naturelle, and I demonstrate that the primary meaning of this term in Rousseau’s day was
not political, but physical, and in particular, through its connection to the idea of “temperament,”
medical. In connecting Rousseau to Buffon, however, I emphasize that Rousseau not only drew
constructively on the Histoire Naturelle but was willing to take the implications of Galenic
humoralism further than Buffon himself. Second, I present a close reading of the word constitution
as Rousseau uses it in The Second Discourse. In particular, I argue that the word’s meaning steadily
evolves through the text as the story of humanity deteriorates. At the beginning it means “physical
body,” or “temperament,” later it refers to a “political body,” and finally, after the arrival of
despotism, the word disappears entirely. Third, I connect the physicalist account that I trace in the
evolution of the word constitution to Rousseau’s ideas about the power of storytelling––both its
dangers and its promise––and I argue that the remedy of The Second Discourse lies in Rousseau’
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hope that we will read it in a state of contemplative solitude in which its bitter pill can have a
healthful effect on our constitutions.

1. The Galenic Element in “constitution” in Eighteenth-Century French
The word constitution occurs at least twenty-two times in The Second Discourse, four times
in the dedication, four times in the preface, four times in part one, five times in part two, and five
times in the notes. Additionally, there are at least nine occurrences of the closely related verbal
forms constitué and constitues, and one instance of constitutives. Rousseau’s even distribution of
constitution and its cognates throughout the Discourse suggests a self-conscious, programmatic
interest in the term.10 In short, the word constitution is a leading character in the story of The
Second Discourse, and the personification of one of Rousseau’s basic principles of social and
political analysis––namely, that humanity’s political institutions reflect our make-up as beings.
This is why, from the very beginning of the preface, Rousseau frames the question about the origins
of human inequality as question of self-knowledge and begins with an allusion to the inscription
on the temple at Delphi––gnōthi seauton, “know thyself.”11 To understand the connections
Rousseau seeks to make between the concept of constitution and self-knowledge, we need to
recognize that the meaning of this word has changed since Rousseau’s day. Today, the word’s
meaning in both English and French (according to the Oxford English Dictionary and the
Dictionnaire de L’Académie française) is primarily political, but this was not the case in the
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France.12 To see this we can analyze and compare the
meanings listed between the first complete edition of Le Dictionnaire (published in 1694) and the
fifth edition (published in 1798), a semantic window that roughly spans the century of Rousseau’s
contribution and has as its middle point the completion of The Second Discourse in 1754.13 Here,
contrary to the contemporary political resonance of the word constitution in both French and
English the principle meaning of constitution in this period has to do with “corps naturel,” the
“natural body,” and within these physical meanings lies one that is particularly important for
understanding the story of constitution in The Second Discourse––a Galenic meaning, where
constitution translates Galen’s idea of krasis, our bodily “mixture” or “temperament.” This is the
meaning, as I will demonstrate in what follows, that allows Rousseau to give an evolutionary
account of our physical bodies and our political institutions at one and the same time.
To understand this it is useful to briefly survey the word constitution’s other meanings, as
Rousseau employs multiple of these. The first meaning listed in the 1694 edition of the
Dictionnaire reads as follows: “La forme et la maniere14 entrent en la constitution du corps
naturel,” and the entries from the fourth edition (1762), and the fifth edition (1798) are identical.
This meaning has to do with the physical make-up of natural bodies. Indeed, a “constitution” in
this first sense is a body. This first usage of constitution occurs frequently in the first two volumes
of Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle, the most important book on natural history to emerge from
eighteenth-century France, and a key resource for Rousseau in the writing of The Second
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Discourse.15 In these first two volumes Buffon set himself the ambitious task of refuting the
mechanistic view of matter that had come to dominate the study of the natural world in the wake
of figures like Newton and Descartes, laying out a new foundation for natural philosophy on the
basis of a different definition of matter, and using this definition to offer a new description of the
make up the Earth.16 In pursuing these goals Buffon adopted the view that an organic body was a
constitution or “a conjunction of symbiotically related parts” and “a set of relations or rapports
existing between mutually interdependent parts” in which “the rapports between the parts
constituted the whole, creating a unique organism.”17 This is clear from the first paragraph of
Buffon’s description of the universe:
Il n’est ici question ni de la figure de la Terre, ni de son mouvement, ni des rapports
qu’elle peut avoir à l’extérieur avec les autres parties de l’Univers; c’est sa
constitution intérieure, sa forme & sa matière que nous nous proposons
d’examiner.18
It is not a question of the shape of the Earth, nor of its movements, nor of its
relations to the parts of the universe that lie outside of it. The question I propose to
look at regards its inner constitution, its form and its materiality.
Here, we can see that Buffon’s adoption of the idea of constitution reflects his Vitalist interest in
the inner forces of living bodies. “Organic interconnection,” writes Peter Hans Reill, “constituted
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a basic pillar supporting Enlightenment Vitalism.” 19 At the same time, the idea of constitution also
gives Buffon a place from which to reject the mathematical and external relations that guided the
Newtonian framework.
After this first physical meaning of constitution the next two meanings in the Dictionnaire
are both legal, but limited in scope and not yet political in the modern sense of the term. The second
meaning refers to a specific kind of financial agreement, one with a long life: “Il signifie aussi,
Establissement, creation d’une rente, d’une pension” (The word also means the establishment or
creation of an annuity, a pension). The third meaning refers to individual legal acts, orders, rules:
“Il signifie aussi, Ordonnance, Loy, Reglement” (The word also means an ordinance, law, or
regulation). Here, a constitution is not a document that provides an entire legal framework, but
refers, more like the modern meaning of “statute,” to individual rules that collectively aggregate
to create a legal order. It does not yet carry the additional unifying, political sense of a modern
constitution. Chronologically speaking this is not surprising, for as David Bates has recently put
it, the Enlightenment was “when the problem of the interrelation of autonomous political power
and foundational legal norms first appeared.”20 Thus, the question of how the legal and the political
relate to one another and the authority under which they do so is not yet answered by the word
constitution in the eighteenth century, but waits for what Quentin Skinner has called “the master
noun of political discourse”––état, the “state.”21
The fourth meaning of constitution is the key one that I would like to focus on. Like
meaning one it is also physical, but more importantly it is specifically medical and Galenic, and it
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is this meaning that Rousseau uses to greatest effect in The Second Discourse. This meaning in the
Dictionnaire is given as follows: “Il signifie aussi, Le temperament & la complexion du corps
humain” (It also means the “temperament” and the defining mixture of the human body). In France
at this time, the source of the concepts of “temperament” and “complexion” was Galen. By the
eighteenth century, Galen’s standing as a medical scientist had been powerfully challenged by the
Swiss physician Paracelsus (d. 1541) and the English doctor William Harvey (d. 1657),22 and some
of Galen’s ideas had been knocked from their high position in the same blow that Newtonian
mechanism struck against the Aristotelian account of matter (i.e. hylomorphism).23 However, as
Oswei Temkin emphasizes in his account of the decline of Galenism, “the fall of the Galenic
science of medicine was not the same as the fall of the Galenic practice of medicine.”24 To the
contrary, even as chemically oriented physicians like Franciscus Sylvius (d. 1672) and pioneering
microbiologist Herman Boerhaave (d. 1738) rose to positions of leadership in the medical
department of the University of Leiden, in France Galenic medicine still exerted great cultural
influence as a paradigmatic example of ancient thought. For example, in a passage on the emerging
medical discoveries in Querelles des ancienes et des modernes (Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns) Charles Perrault has one of the representatives of the “ancients” satirize the uselessness
of “modern” medicine’s discoveries. “These discoveries,” retorts the ancient, “are certainly very
remarkable, but at the same time quite useless for the cure of diseases.”25 In this respect, though
doctors increasingly tried to incorporate accounts of illness that centered new concepts like
“sensibility,” Galen’s formulation of the theory of the humors, and the theory of human “mixtures”

22

See Temkin, Oswei, Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1973), 134-92.
23
Ibid., 156; 161; 166; 171.
24
Ibid., 165.
25
As quoted in Temkin, Galenism, 176.
157

(krasis) that accompanies it, continued to be a cornerstone of patient care in Rousseau’s day.26 As
Temkin puts it, “The strength of Galenism reposed in no small measure in its having provided
medical categories, like the temperaments, for relating the individual to health and disease. Their
scientific reinterpretation might be desirable, but their abandonment was not.”27
Likewise, Maria Pia Donato records 21 new editions (not including reprints) of Galen’s
texts between 1700-1820.28 One of the most influential of these was Galen’s late text, The Art of
Medicine. When Temkin speaks of Galen having provided medical categories, these emerged in
part through readings of this text.29 As a result, The Art of Medicine can provide a paradigmatic
Galenic articulation of the fundamental framework for thinking about health and disease that this
fourth meaning of the word constitution points to. As I demonstrated in chapter two, this
framework revolves around the idea of krasis, “bodily mixture.” Here it is in yet another form:
Ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς σῶμα τὸ ἐκ γενετῆς εὔκρατον μὲν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ἁπλοῖς καὶ
πρώτοις μορίοις· σύμμετρον δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένοις ὀργάνοις…νοσῶδες
δε ἐστιν ἁπλῶς σῶμα, τὸ ἐκ γενετῆς ἤτοι δύσκρατον τοῖς ὁμοιομερέσιν, ἢ
ἀσύμμετρον τοῖς ὀργανικοῖς, ἢ ἀμφότερα.30
A body is healthy in the absolute sense when it is eukratic in the simple and primary
parts from birth, and balanced in the organs compounded from these parts…A body
that is diseased in the absolute sense is either duskratic in its structural parts from
birth, or unbalanced in the organic parts, or both.31
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I believe this fourth usage of constitution as krasis is Rousseau’s meaning early in The Second
Discourse, when he speaks in the preface of changes in humankind’s “constitutions originelle.”32
My reasoning is that in this same passage, Rousseau has a footnote to a telling passage in
Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle that describes the history and nature of the human being. What is
more, in this passage Buffon is concerned with precisely the idea that motivates Rousseau’s
methodology in The Second Discourse––self-knowledge––and the passage is preceded by a
lengthy discussion of conception and reproduction in which Galen’s name is mentioned twice and
the humoral theory permeates the argument:
Quelqu’intérest que nous ayions à nous connoître nous-mêmes, je ne sais si nous
ne connoissons pas mieux tout ce qui n’est pas nous…trop occupez à multiplier les
fonctions de nos sens, & à augmenter l’étendue extérieure de notre être, raremont
saisons-nous usage de ce sens intérieur qui nous réduit à nos vraies
dimensions…c’est cependant de ce sens dont il faut nous servir, si nous voulons
nous connoître, c’est le seul par lequel nous puissions nous juger; mais comment
donner à ce sens son activité & toute son étendue? comment dégager notre ame
dans laquelle il réside, de toutes les illusions de notre esprit? Nous avons perdu
l’habitude de l’employer, elle est demeurée sans exercice au milieu du tumulte de
nos sensations corporelles, elle s’est desséchée par le feu de nos passions; le cœur,
l’esprit, les sens, tout a travaillé contr’elle.33
Whatever interest we may have to know ourselves, I am not sure whether we do
not know better everything that is not ourselves … Too busy multiplying the
functions of our senses and augmenting the external range of our being, we rarely
use that internal sense which reduces us to our true dimensions … However, this is
the sense we must use if we wish to know ourselves; it is the only one by which we
can judge ourselves. But how can this sense be made active and given its full range?
How can we rid our soul, in which it resides, of all the illusions of our mind? We
have lost the habit of using it, it has remained without exercise in the midst of the
tumult of our bodily sensations, it has been dried out by the fire of our passions;
heart, mind, senses, everything has worked against it.34
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In this passage, Buffon connects the human capacity of “looking within”35 to the state of the
physical body, and he describes the deterioration of this capacity in humoral terms––“elle s’est
desséchée par le feu de nos passions” (It has been dried by the fire of our passions). Rousseau, as
I will demonstrate below, will go even further, for though Buffon plays with a connection between
self-knowledge and the body, he quickly backtracks in the next paragraphs, where he calls the
mind “inaltérable dans sa substance, impassible par son essence, elle est toûjours la même”
(unalterable in its substance, imperturbable in its essence, the human mind is always the same).36
This fourth meaning is the key to understanding how Rousseau weaves together the
physical body, self-knowledge, and the origins of human inequality.37 In short, in order to
understand the origins of inequality, one must understand the human being, and in order to
understand the human being, one must understand the human beings physical makeup, for this
exerts a large impact on all other aspects of human life. To develop this line of argument further,
in the next section of this chapter I will analyze how the story of our constitutions plays out in The
Second Discourse, but to make the point in briefly here, we can look at a single passage, the most
famous of Rousseau’s footnotes:
Les hommes sont méchans; une triste et continuelle experience dispense de la
preuve; cependant l’homme est naturellement bon, je crois l’avoir demontré;
qu’est-ce donc qui peut l’avoir dépravé à ce point sinon les changemens survenus
dans sa constitution…38
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Men are wicked; sad and continual experience spares the need for proof. However,
man is naturally good; I believe I have demonstrated it. What then can have
depraved him to this extent, if not the changes that have befallen his
constitution…39
In this passage Rousseau makes his famous assertion that although people appear to be wicked,
they are, in fact, “naturally good.” As a result, in order to understand their wicked actions, one
must look to the story of their constitutions.

2. The Story of Our constitutions in The Second Discourse
Rousseau opens The Second Discourse with an image that embodies the beginning, middle
and end of his intellectual project, tracing a full circle of human development from the state of
nature to the catastrophic entrance into civil society and the despotism which for Rousseau is its
eventual result––the statue of Glaucon:
…semblable à la statue de Glaucus que le tems, la mer et les orages avoient
tellement défigurée, qu’elle ressembloit moins à un Dieu qu’à une Bête féroce,
l’âme humaine altérée au sein de la société par mille causes sans cesse renaissantes,
par l’acquisition d’une multitude de connoissances et d’erreurs, par les changemens
arrivés à la constitution des Corps, et par le choc continuel des passions, a, pour
ainsi dire, changé d’apparence au point d’être presque méconnoissable; et l’on n’y
retrouve plus, au lieu d’un être agissant toûjours par des Principes certains et
invariables, au lieu de cette Celeste et majestueuse simplicité dont son Auteur
l’avoit empreinte, que le difforme contraste de la passion qui croit raisonner et de
l’entendement en délire.40
Like the statue of Glaucus, which time, sea and storms had so disfigured that it
looked less like a god than a wild beast, the human soul, altered in the midst of
society by a thousand continually recurring causes, by the acquisition of a mass of
knowledge and errors, by changes that have taken place in the constitution of
bodies, and by the continual impact of the passions, has, so to speak, changed in
appearance to the point of being almost unrecognizable; and, instead of acting
always according to certain and invariable principles, instead of that celestial and
majestic simplicity with which its author had endowed it, one no longer finds
39
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anything except the ugly contrast of passion which presumes to reason and
understanding in a state of delirium.41
In Rousseau’s description of this statue, we can see just how far he departs from Buffon’s usage
of the humoral theory. As I demonstrated above, Buffon at first appears to acknowledge that the
mind and soul can be “dried out” by the fires of the passions, but in fact, he retracts this statement
and asserts that they are “unalterable.” By contrast, when Rousseau speaks here of the
consequences of the changes in our bodily constitutions on “l’âme humaine,” he says the effects
are radical, to the point of leaving the human soul “méconnoissable” (unrecognizable). How did
this happen? Can it be repaired? I believe the answers lie in observing the physical human body as
it moves through Rousseau’s ring composition from the state of nature, to civil society, and “back”
to a corrupted form of nature after despotism. Here, I make my case through a ten-point analysis
of the word constitution in The Second Discourse, for which I provide a visual aid below.
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In order to understand how Rousseau intervenes through the word constitution in The
Second Discourse we first need to briefly compare it to a standard view in Rousseau's day about
the nature of political bodies. One place to look for such a view is the Encyclopédie. Louis de
Jacourt was one of the most prolific contributors to the Encyclopédie and in his 1756 definition of
L’état (the state) he focuses on how the état is distinguished from a mere “multitude” in virtue of
a concours des volontés (a confluence of wills) animated by une seule ame qui en dirige tous les
mouvemens d’une maniere constant, relativement à l’utilité commune (a single soul which steadily
directs all [the state’s] movements according to the principle of common utility).42 In The Second
Discourse, Rousseau rejects the prevailing concept of l’utilité commune arguing that it bases itself
on hypothetical accounts of human nature rather than realistic ones.43 How can you speak of the
“common good,” he challenges, before you know what is truly “good” for individual people?
In other words, for Rousseau, one of the fundamental things that determines whether an
account of human nature is realistic or not is whether or not it takes the physical nature of the
human body substantively into account. Jacourt’s definition (“il en est du corps politique comme
du corps humain,” “the state is a political body like the body of a human”) appears to engage the
body, but upon closer inspection this bodily dimension is relatively superficial. In this respect,
Jacourt echoes earlier seventeenth-century figures like Pufendorf and Hobbes who saw the état as
“a distinct moral person of which the sovereign is the head and all individuals are its members.”44
On the surface, the language suggests that this notion of the state is closely tied to observations
about the physical body, but as with Buffon and Jacourt, the implications of such a connection are
not actually explored by these writers, for they do not concern themselves with how the human

42

Jacourt, La Encyclopédie, 1756, 19.
OC, III.125; 185-186, Starobinski.
44
See Skinner, Visions, 409.
43

163

constitution really works. One of Rousseau’s insights in The Second Discourse is that, as a result
of this vagueness about the nature of the human body, a door opens “de composer des definitions,
et d’expliquer la nature des choses par des convenances presque arbitraires” (for composing
definitions and of explaining the nature of things by almost arbitrary expedience).45 If like Louis
de Jacourt you claim the état is like a human body, but you do not investigate what a human body
is really like, then you are free claim almost anything you want about the nature of states and
natural laws, without having to reflect on whether such states meet the true needs of human beings.
Put another way, as Rousseau himself will later put it in The Social Contract, before
answering the question of what an état is you have to explain how a group of individuals becomes
a collective people, and doing this depends on being able to give a rigorous account of what a
person is.46 Indeed, in the first draft (Geneva manuscript) of The Social Contract he begins the
treatise focused on the fundamental importance of understanding the human constitution:
Tant d’Auteurs célébres ont traitté des maximes du Gouvernement et des régles du
droit civil, qu’il n’y a rien d’utile à dire sur ce sujet qui n’ait été déja dit. Mais peut
être seroit-on mieux d’accord, peut-être les meilleurs rapports du corps social
auroient-ils été plus clairement établis, si l’on eut commencé par mieux déterminer
sa nature. C’est ce que j’ai tenté faire dans cet écrit. Il n’est donc point ici question
de l’administration de ce corps mais de sa constitution. Je le fais vivre et non pas
agir. Je décris ses ressorts et ses piéces, je les arrange à leur place. Je mets la
machine en état d’aller; D’autres plus sages en régleront les mouvemens.47
So many famous authors have dealt with the maxims of government and the rules
of civil rights that there is nothing useful to say on this subject that has not already
been said. But perhaps there would be greater agreement, perhaps the best
relationships of the social body would have been more clearly established if its
nature had been better determined at the outset. This is what I have tried to do in
this work. It is, therefore, not a question here of the administration of this body, but
of its constitution. I make it live, not act. I describe its mechanisms and its parts,
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and set them in place. I put the machine in running order. Wiser men will regulate
its movements.48
In this paragraph Rousseau emphasizes that a constitution is in reality a living thing, and that thus
his task as a writer is to bring this constitution to life for the reader.
Similarly, in The Second Discourse, Rousseau claims in multiple places that his project––
les histoire hypotétique des gouvernements (the hypothetical history of governments) 49––half
empiricism, half imaginative storytelling is designed to counteract what he saw as the unfounded
claims that his contemporaries were making about human nature.50 For this reason, the word
constitution is pivotal in The Second Discourse, not only because it has a rich semantic field, but
because it allows Rousseau to intervene in these debates about the connection between the état and
the individual, through presenting a more robust portrait of human nature that brings our biological
natures (both meanings one and four from Le Dictionnaire) together with our political ones. What
is more, Rousseau doesn’t proceed through conceptual analysis alone, but brings the word itself
through an imaginative development that mirrors the evolution of human beings. In short, the
word’s meaning begins as “temperament,” becomes “political body,” and then after despotism it
disappears entirely from the text when we return, according to Rousseau, to a corrupted state of
nature. This is a sad end, but the ring composition also carries within it a faint, but palpable sense
of hope that though we have fallen from our natural state, we may yet find our way back to
recovery. To make this case I will now look at ten instances of constitution, summarized in the
table below.
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Form of the Word

Summary of Usage

Page

1. constitution

Constitution as the physical
medium of humanity’s gradual
change through time

OC, III.122 (R, 36)

2. constitution

Transmissibility of constitution
from parents to children

OC, III.135 (R, 46)

3. constitution

Connection between constitution
and perfectibilité

OC, III.202 (R, 103)51

4. constitution

The role of habit and education
in shaping the constitution

OC, III.160 (R, 67)

5. constitution52

Comparison between constitution OC, III.162 (R, 68)
in the state of nature and in
c.f. OC, III.202 (R, 46)53
society

6. constitution

The effect of amour propre
(excessive self-regard) on the
constitution

7. Constitution
(capitalized) and
constitution54

(The bridge passage): Nascent
OC, III.180 (R, 83)
governments had vices (les vices)
in their Constitution because
their constitution was weak
(foible)

8. Constitution
(capitalized)

The limit of a magistrate’s power
defined as “tout ce qui peut main
tenir la Constitution”

OC, III.185a (R, 88)

9. constitué

La Loi (the law) is what
constitutes the essence of the état
(the state)

OC, III.185b (R, 88)

10. constitué

The constitution of the state can
be bien ou mal constitué (healthy
or unhealthy)

OC, III.189 (R, 91)

51
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This is note nine, which refers to the key paragraph on perfectibilité at OC, III.142 (Translation Rosenblatt, 52).
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We begin in the state of nature. In the preface to The Second Discourse, right before the
statue of Glaucus, Rousseau uses the word constitution to refer to the physical makeup of the
human body. This is the first key use of the word I would like to trace:
et comment l’homme viendra-t-il à bout de se voir tel que l’a formé la Nature, à
travers tous les changemens que la succession des tems et des choses a dû produire
dans sa constitution originelle…55
And how will man succeed in seeing himself as nature formed him, through all the
changes that the succession of time and things must have produced on his original
constitution…56
Here, Rousseau argues that our constitutions are initially given by nature (i.e. nature formed them).
Since he goes on to connect this physical makeup to the passions in his description of the Glaucus
statue (“par les changemens arrivés à la constitution des Corps, et par le choc continuel des
passions”), the meaning of constitution fits meaning four from Le Dictionnaire, the Galenic
“temperament.” A short while later Rousseau adds two important things to the basic meaning of
constitution that he begins with. First, he adds that our constitutions are also shaped by experience
and training, and second that they are transmittable through reproduction (and thus given not only
by nature but also by our parents). Both are captured in the second key use of constitution:
Accoutumés des l’enfance aux intempéries de l’air, et à la rigueur des saisons,
exercés à la fatigue, et forcés de défendre nuds et sans armes leur vie et leur Proye
contre les autres Bêtes féroces, ou de leur échapper à la course, les Hommes se
forment un temperament robuste et presque inaltérable; Les Enfans, apportant au
monde l’excellente constitution de leurs Peres, et la fortifiant par les mêmes
exercices qui l’ont produite, acquiérent ainsi toute la vigueur dont l’espèce humaine
est capable. 57
Accustomed since childhood to the inclemencies of the weather and the rigor of the
seasons, hardened to fatigue, and forced, naked and unarmed, to defend their lives
and their prey against other ferocious beasts, or to escape them by running, men
develop a robust and almost unalterable temperament. Children, bringing into the
world the excellent constitution of their fathers, and fortifying it with the same
55
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training that produced it, thus acquire all the vigor of which the human species is
capable.58
This transmissibility is crucial in Rousseau’s account because from this initial analysis of our
constitutions in the state of nature he wants to give an account of how they’ve changed through
time, and this account will emphasize the gradualness of this change, such that no individual
human life sees a dramatic transformation in their constitution, but instead dramatic change
accumulates almost imperceptibly through the generations. How does this happen?
According to Rousseau’s account in The Second Discourse, in the state of nature, human
beings lived independently and relatively far apart. However, through a mixture of intention and
accident, they came to realize that there were sometimes advantages to living together––such as
collaborating on a hunt or keeping watch for danger. At first, though, all such collaborations were
temporary and without obligation, and as a result, according to Rousseau, their effect on our
constitutions was minimal. Step by step, however, humans begin to collaborate and depend upon
each other more, and eventually they reach a stage in which they establish temporary communal
dwellings. In this “hut stage” a crucial series of changes take place in the constitution. People begin
to have new experiences, such as eating regularly together, dancing together, and dwelling
intimately together. Through these experiences, a seed in the human mind begins to develop.
According to Rousseau, in the state of nature, human beings were defined, not by the possession
of reason, but by two core elements of our constitutions––amour de soi-même (a wholesome selfinterest) and pitié (compassion for the suffering of other beings). In the state of nature, these two
elements were in balance, so that a person was usually able to negotiate situations where selfinterest and compassion appeared at odds. With the coming of the hut stage, however, these
elements underwent a gradual, but eventually dramatic change. The reason, for Rousseau, is
58
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simple––comparison. As humans began to live together and experience things together, we started
to compare ourselves with others, and this gradually transformed amour de soi-même and pitié into
something Rousseau calls amour propre, an excessive and destructive form of self-regard.
The emergence of amour propre represents a watershed moment in the evolution of the
human constitution because according to Rousseau amour propre is the true source of virtually all
other human passions as we have come to know them in civil society––greed, fear, and especially
our desire to see ourselves as superior to all those around us. Rosenblatt characterizes amour
propre as a “deflection” of the healthy self-love in amour de soi-même.59 Starobinski describes it
as a “perversion” of healthy self-regard, in which “what is mine is ever more sharply distinguished
from what is yours.”60 Jerrold Seigel paints a slightly different picture in which amour de soimême and amour propre lie on a closer continuum,61 but he concurs that the result is a new form
of “self-regard that finds satisfaction in distinction from others, and that quickly turns into the
desire to dominate them.”62 At the other end of the interpretive spectrum, Frederick Neuhouser
argues for a “strict demarcation” of amour propre from amour de soi-même, and he draws sharps
contrasts based on qualities like amour propre’s “relative” and “artificial” nature, as compared to
from amour de soi-même’s “absolute” and “natural” nature.63
What I would like to draw attention to has less to do with the difference between amour de
soi-même and amour propre than with the relationship between amour propre, the physical body,
and the concept that Rousseau introduces after amour propre––perfectibilité. If amour propre
represents an aspect of our constitutions that emerges as a destructive force, for Rousseau

59

Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, 167.
Starobinski, Transparency and Obstruction, 27.
61
Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 223-24.
62
Ibid., 218.
63
Neuhouser, Frederick, Theodicy, 13; 29; 32; 37.
60

169

perfectibilité is a more ambivalent quality, which gave rise to both our greatest achievements and
our most catastrophic failures. In short, it is Rousseau’s word for our changeableness. On the one
hand, it is an “unlimited” capacity (presque illimitée)64 for change, which in theory has allowed us
to adapt and overcome physical hardships, but on the other hand, it has also led to much destructive
change. This is what he explains in the note to the passage on perfectibilité, in which the third key
usage of constitution occurs:
Les hommes sont méchans; une triste et continuelle experience dispense de la
preuve; cependant l’homme est naturellement bon, je crois l’avoir demontré;
qu’est-ce donc qui peut l’avoir dépravé à ce point sinon les changemens survenus
dans sa constitution…65
Men are wicked; sad and continual experience spares the need for proof. However,
man is naturally good; I believe I have demonstrated it. What then can have
depraved him to this extent, if not the changes that have befallen his
constitution…”66
Here, constitution still refers to our physical makeup as human beings, but as Rousseau has begun
to speak of wickedness and goodness, this use of constitution marks a beginning of the term’s
meaning moving beyond the state of nature, for in the state of nature, for Rousseau, there was no
wickedness, per se. He does, to the contrary, assert that human beings are naturally good, but this
“goodness” is also not emphasized in his characterizations of the state of nature. Instead, in the
state of nature we are simply solitary and relative peaceful beings,67 “good” perhaps in an absolute
sense in so far as we express a God-given nature, but not “good” yet in relation to a social standard
of goodness.
Subsequently, as the word constitution continues to accompany humanity beyond the state
of nature, Rousseau begins to explore its relationship to society in greater detail. The first way he

64

OC, III.142, Starobinski.
Ibid., 202. Note: the word “tempérament” is sometimes accented in Starobinski’s text. Others times it is not.
66
Translation, Rosenblatt, 103.
67
Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, 166-67.
65

170

does this is introduce a comparison between our constitutions as they were originally given to us
in the state of nature and as they are then molded by the changing ways of life in more complex
societies. Here is the fourth key usage:
En effet, il est aisé de voir qu’entre les différences qui distinguent les hommes,
plusieurs passent pour naturelles qui sont uniquement l’ouvrage de l’habitude et
des divers genres de vie que les hommes adoptent dans la Société. Ainsi un
tempérament robuste ou délicat, la force ou la foiblesse qui en dépendent, viennent
souvent plus de la maniére dure ou efféminée dont on a été élevé que de la
constitution primitive des corps.68
In fact it is easy to see that, among the differences that distinguish men, some pass
for natural that are uniquely the work of habit and the various types of life men
adopt in society. Thus a robust or delicate temperament, and the strength or
weakness that depend on it, often come more from the harsh or effeminate way in
which one has been raised than from the primitive constitution of bodies69
In exploring the new connection between our constitutions and a changing society, Rousseau
emphasizes something surprising, but important––the role of accidents. According to Rousseau, if
it were not for a number of decisive accidents––such as lightning striking a tree and showing us
how to make fire––our perfectibilité (and possibly our amour propre) would never have been
awakened and humanity would have remained, as he puts it in a fifth key use of the term,
“eternellement dans sa constitution primitive” (forever in its original constitution). 70 By this point
in the text, the word’s meaning is beginning to take account of these impactful accidental
experience. Additionally, this fourth usage is also important because it occurs in a passage that
Rousseau revised when he went to publish The Second Discourse in a new edition in 1782.
Originally, he had written “sa condition primitive” in the passage above, but thirty years later, he
decided that, in fact, constitution was the more precise term for his meaning here. This not only
clarifies the meaning of this particular passage, it also demonstrate how precisely Rousseau is
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delineating the use of the word. The difference between constitution and condition was enough,
thirty years later, to lead to a revision. The two words are obviously connected, but I believe the
difference is one of externals versus internals, where constitution refers to our inner makeup, and
condition refers to the outside world. Thus, what Rousseau is highlighting in this passage is that
the unusual conditions (e.g. accidents) that befell our kind from the outside, also awakened a
change inside of us, in our constitutions.
Since by definition unusual accidents happen sporadically, one could fairly ask of
Rousseau how such sporadic occurrences led to such a dramatic change in our constitutions. His
answer is that once a few of these accidents happened, the changes they brought about in us set in
motion a cascade of further changes, both internal and external, culminating in our earliest forms
of social life, and it is in these early forms of social life that what had before occurred as a sporadic
accident became a “new normal.” It is in this context that the sixth key occurrence of constitution
can be found:
Mais il faut remarquer que la Société commencée et les relations déjà établies entre
les hommes, éxigeoient en eux des qualités différentes de celles qu’ils tenoient de
leur constitution primitive; que la moralité commençant à s’introduire dans les
Actions humaines, et chacun avant les Loix étant seul juge et vengeur des offenses
qu’il avoit reçues, la bonté convenable au pur état de Nature n’étoit plus celle qui
convenoit à la Société naissante…71
It must be noted that society in its beginning stages and the relations already
established among men required in them qualities different from those they derived
from their primitive constitution; that, since morality was beginning to be
introduced into human actions, and since, before there were laws, everyone was
sole judge and avenger of the offenses he had received, the goodness suited to the
pure state of nature was no longer that which suited nascent society72
Here, the social practices that, on Rousseau’s account, human beings had initially created as a way
of providing convenient mutual aid have begun to open the door to the destructive forces of civil
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society. The key developments are twofold: First, already in these early societies, as humans
became more mutually dependent, different qualities were required of them. Some things got
easier. They no longer needed so much physical endurance. Somethings became more complex.
They had to be more careful of accidentally harming one another, for since they had come to live
in close quarters, according to Rousseau, people felt a greater need to punish the people who
harmed them, since there were not yet any laws to deter future bad actors.73 Second, as a result of
developments such as this one, “morality” begins to exert an influence on human society. In this
context, morality doesn’t refer to “goodness” in the same way as Rousseau describes the person in
the state of nature as “good.” Instead, it is at this stage that a social “morality” (social norms,
decorum, group judgments) begins to emerge along with an increasingly inflamed form of amour
propre.74 This new morality has two dimensions. First, it partly overshadows the older, instinctive
compassion captured in the idea of pitié, which moved us to help others when we saw them
suffering. Second, it also entails new ways of seeing others as morally good or evil, in a social
sense that gives them (in society’s eyes) a superior or inferior status. Thus, with “morality” in this
sense emerges moral vanity.
It is at this stage that the social fabric humans have created reaches a level of complexity
that leads to everything (and everyone) “à changer de face,” to change its face or appearance.75 At
first, the changes are only a matter of valuing objects differently, spending more time with people
outside of the family, and experiencing “les plus doux sentimens qui soient connus des hommes,
l’amour conjugal, et l’amour Paternel” (the sweetest sentiments known to men––conjugal love and
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paternal love).76 However, according to Rousseau jealousy “s’éveille avec l’amour,”77 awakens
along with love, and “la plus douce des passions” (the gentlest of passions) is destined to lead to
“des sacrifices de sang humain” (sacrifices of human blood).78 The way this works in detail is
complex, but in its general arc it is simple and similar to what we have already seen. The positive
experience of love in early human societies brings with it an even more intensified amour propre,
such that as one became accustomed to the pleasure of being loved, one also learned of the pain of
rejection, humiliation, and degradation. According to Rousseau, these new passions were so strong
and so frequent that they transformed our constitutions and led us to begin to look not only at one
another but also at the objects we had formerly used in common differently. Eventually, through
the sustained experiences of mutual dependence, collaboration, family life, and longer-lasing love,
a further division of labor is introduced based on the idea, as Rousseau puts it, that a single person
could be understood to do work enough to provide “provisions for two.”79 As soon as this happens,
according to Rousseau, the concept of propritété (property) emerges and as soon as this happens,
a new kind of society must also emerge that claims to protect it.
In the tumultuous stages that followed this first introduction of property, a complex thing
happens that has to do with our constitutions in two senses. First, the idea of property altered the
significance of what Rousseau calls inegalité physique, “physical inequality.” As I mentioned
briefly above, these are differences like physical strength, sharpness of eyesight, intelligence.
According to Rousseau, as humans gradually developed agriculture and metallurgy, the people
who were naturally stronger and in particular those who had greater foresight were able to take
greater advantage of the new system of private property, and use it, not only to secure their actual
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needs, but also to try and satisfy an insatiable economic vanity––a particular pernicious form of
amour propre.80 As this situation developed, our constitutions developed more and more of an
appetite for seeing ourselves as the ones with property, and this led to changes in behavior that
began to tear apart the very social fabric that early humans built. The most terrible of these is what
Rousseau calls “a base inclination to harm each other, a secret jealousy.”81 As soon as this new
passion takes root in our constitutions, it is accompanied by a pandemic of fear and suspicion, in
which everyone who has any possessions fears that their possessions (and perhaps even life) will
be taken by force. According to Rousseau, it is this new fear alone that explains how human beings,
who were originally endowed by nature with a full and rich freedom, were lead to exchange this
most precious quality for their protection. As Rousseau puts it, “All ran to meet their chains
believing they secured their freedom, for although they had enough reason to feel the advantages
of a political establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its dangers.”82
It is this confusion, ultimately, that underpins the first true governments that Rousseau
gives an account of in The Second Discourse, and it is in this context that the word constitution
itself undergoes a marked change––Rousseau begins to capitalize it, Constitution. His account of
these early political bodies spans three phases of increasing sophistication (and dysfunction): first,
the simple law of property and its protection; second, the invention of magistrates; and finally, the
arrival of arbitrary power. It is as Rousseau sets his mind to analyzing this series of disastrous
institutions, that he begins to employ the word Constitution rather than constitution. The choice to
use the same word but capitalize it draws attention to the continuity between the two ideas. In
particular, in his account of these early political bodies, Rousseau emphasizes that like our
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constitutions these Constitutions were underwent constant, gradual change, in response to both
intentional steps taken (for example, by magistrates) and accidents. However, unlike with the
constitution of our bodies (given by nature), Rousseau explains the instability of these political
Constitutions by saying that they were constantly changing because their foundations were rotten.
Or, to put it more medically as Rousseau himself does, for some uncountable number of
generations, human beings tried to cure these early Constitutions of their defects, but failed to find
a “remedy.” This is the seventh key usage:
Malgré tous les travaux des plus sages Législateurs, l’Etat Politique demeura
toûjours imparfait, parcequ’il étoit presque l’ouvrage du hazard, et que mal
commencé, le tems en découverant les défauts, et suggérant des remédes, ne put
jamais réparer les vices de la Constitution.83
Despite all the labors of the wisest legislators, the political state remained forever
imperfect because it was almost the work of chance, and because, as having begun
badly, time revealed its defects and suggested remedies but could never repair the
vices of the Constitution.84
Interestingly, “vice” is not a word Rousseau ever applied to constitution in the older, lower-case
sense, when it referred to our physical makeup. I believe there are two reasons for this. First of all,
constitution in the sense of a physical makeup given by nature was, on Rousseau’s account, largely
a “premoral” reality, so it would not make sense to speak of its vices. Second of all, before the
arrival of the inflamed forms of amour propre, humanity, on Rousseau’ account, didn’t really have
recurring vices at all. It had passions, but these remained within an acceptable range. Thus, the
vices of the first “Constitution” in The Second Discourse (capital “C” now) refers to the
consequences of amour propre itself––hate, the desire for revenge, avarice, the excessive
accumulation of property, and also a falsely inflated sense of one’s own goodness.
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Likewise, it is also interesting to note that, although Rousseau clearly marks amour propre
as a destructive force in relation to our constitutions, he does not describe it as a foiblesse
“weakness” until he begins to use Constitution with a capital “C.” I interpret this as follows: when
amour propre emerges in the early part of the hut stage, it is dangerous, corrosive, and painful, but
it is also connected with human beings exerting effort and even strength in pursuit of recognition.
The goal of amour propre might be vain, and it may represent a corruption of amour de soi-même,
but it is anything but “weak.” This changes once humanity reaches the stage of early political
bodies, for in the same paragraph where he first uses Constitution with a capital “C,” (i.e. key
usage seven above) Rousseau adds a gloss with the lower case forming saying, “Il fallut que
l’expérience montrât combien une pareille constitution étoit foible” (It was left to experience to
show how weak such a constitution was).85 The constitution referred to here with the lower case
“c” is the political Constitution, so what Rousseau must be saying is that the constitution (i.e. the
old sense of the physical makeup) of the Constitution (the emerging political body) was foible,
“weak.” This points to a subtle paradox, for Rousseau has explicitly stated that these early political
bodies were led, not only by the strongest, but also by the ones with the greatest foresight (the
“strongest” mind). How could the strongest and most intelligent human beings have created the
first thing that Rousseau describes as “weak”? The answer is that the passion that lies behind their
success––amour propre––is a strong passion in the human body, but not a social strength, for its
role in society is to weaken the foundations of independent self-regard that for Rousseau are the
cornerstone of the health of classical republics. His treatment of the Genevan republic in his
dedication to The Second Discourse is filled with flattery and even sarcasm,86 but the ideal of
health that runs through it is real for Rousseau. He says of Geneva, “votre constitution est
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excellent” (your constitution is excellent),87 and this constitution––lower case “c”––is what
supports the “liberté précieuse,” which Rousseau elsewhere identifies as the most precious quality
human beings can have.88 Rousseau famously observes that “the same vices that make social
institutions necessary make their abuse inevitable,”89 but I believe the statement can be flipped in
a positive sense, too––the same virtues that make social institutions unnecessary [i.e. independent
self-regard, liberté] make their abuse, in theory, avoidable.
However, Rousseau’s focus in the main part of The Second Discourse is certainly on the
abuses. These take on a particular form that Rousseau describes in the culminating section of part
two of the Discourse. In this final section, the institution of the magistracies succeeds the simple
structure of the law of property and right, and after this comes “pouvoir arbitraire” arbitrary
political power.90 In its earliest manifestations, the figure of the magistrate for Rousseau is one
who is entrusted with maintaining the Constitution with a capital “C.” Here is the eighth key use
of the term: “Ce pouvoir s’étend à tout ce qui peut main tenir la Constitution, sans aller jusqu’à la
changer” (This power [of the magistrate] extends to everything that can maintain the Constitution,
without going so far as to change it).91 The problem is that the magistrates are not operating as
ideal agents whose constitutions are healthy, but instead they are themselves a corrupted product
of the early political body. We have seen that amour propre corrupted these early bodies by
provoking economic vanity (the desire to see oneself as having more property than others), but in
the magistrate state amour propre leads to yet another new passion that we might call “political
vanity,” an excessive desire to see oneself in charge of others. As Neuhouser observes, “amour-
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propre is capable of assuming highly variable forms because of the extent to which an individual’s
‘opinions’––more precisely, his conception of himself––mediate his pursuit of social
recognition.”92
In the case of the magistrate, his pursuit of social recognition as a wielder of political power
leads him to overextend this power, and the way that he does that, according to Rousseau, is
paradoxically by “creating clients to whom he [himself] is forced to yield some part” of his
power.93 In doing this, the magistrate not only extends his power, but he also extends the
magistracy, as it now comes to include his clients as well. This kind of corrupting exchange reflects
the already corrupted state of these early political bodies and also leads to a further catastrophic
change. As the magistrates and their clients are empowered by the political body to establish norms
of conduct, they also are able to accumulate more and more wealth, which these norms can then
protect, and this is how the inégalité morale (social inequality) that was originally very small in
the state of nature, grows dramatically during the period of early political bodies. This inequality
then leads to increasing unrest and anger among those who suddenly find themselves in the
position of working as subordinates to the magistrates and their clients, and this in turn leads the
magistrates to feel greater fear (of losing their power) and to act with greater violence to defend
their position.94
As they do so, they revoke the terms upon which political power was originally given to
them––namely, as stewards of a collective will. According to Rousseau, if the magistracy had
developed upon the foundation of a sound constitution (like the Genevan ideal), in the event that
individual magistrates abused their power, the ordinary people would have been able to take this
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power back through direct action. In describing this process, Rousseau uses the word constitution
in a participle form constitué, which is key usage nine: “comme ce n’auroit pas été le Magistrat,
mais la Loi qui auroit constitué l’essence de l’Etat, chacun rentreroit de Droit dans sa liberté
Naturelle” (since it would have been the law and not the magistrate that constituted the essence of
the state, everyone would return by right to his natural liberty).95 But unfortunately the essence of
the state was not the laws in these early governments, though magistrates had claimed that they
were. The essence of the state, instead, was its constitution, which above all was made up of the
results of amour propre’s goading towards wealth, nobility, rank, and power. For Rousseau, this
reality brings us to the last usage of constitution in The Second Discourse. Reading the state like a
Galenic doctor might perform a prognosis, he says that the pursuit of these things (wealth, nobility,
rank, etc) are “l’indication la plus sûre d’un Etat bien ou mal constitué (the surest sign of a well or
badly constituted state).96 As a result of this bad constitution of the Constitution, not only do
magistrates refuse to give up their political power when asked, they begin to pass it on to their
children, paralleling the way Rousseau highlighted that our constitutions (lower case “c”) in the
state of nature were passed down to us by our parents.97 Once this happens, it is only a matter of
time, for Rousseau, before a violent uprising from the dispossessed in the society leads to such a
state of chaos and disorder that a despot can enter, take violent control, and bring the members of
the society to a tragic, corrupted form of equality in which, “tous les particuliers redeviennent
égaux parce qu’ils ne sont rien” (all individuals become equals again because they are nothing).98
This nothingness is reflected on a literary level in an interesting fact. The word constitution
does not occur again after the entrance of the despot, a figure which Rousseau calls not le maître,
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the political “master,” but “le Monstre,” a monstrosity of nature.99 In light of the evolution of this
key word as I’ve traced it in The Second Discourse here, this absence seems meaningful.
Despotism, on Rousseau’s account, reflects the ultimate illness that can befall a human
Constitution (political institution). In fact, the effect of despotism’s entrance in The Second
Discourse is to bring about a tragic “return” to the state of nature, but one in which nature is no
longer pure and good, but rather has been ruined by the human political body itself, in which:
…tout se ramene à la seule Loi du plus fort, et par conséquent à un nouvel Etat de
Nature différent de celui par lequel nous avons commencé, en ce que l’un étoit
l’Etat de Nature dans sa pureté, et que ce dernier est le fruit d’un excès de
corruption.100
…everything is brought back to the sole law of the stronger, and consequently to a
new state of nature different from the one with which we began, in that the one was
the state of nature in its purity, and this last one is the fruit of an excess of
corruption.”101
In this light, one can see that eventually the impact of human society extends beyond our
constitutions as individual and reaches back into the constitution of nature, and despotism, in so
far as it reflects humanity’s out-of-control amour propre is not only a disease that afflicts people
and human societies, but also a form of pollution, which may lead to the destruction of nature
itself.
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3. Storytelling and the constitution Cure
The evolution of the word constitution in The Second Discourse seems to me to reflect not
only a specific line of argument that Rousseau is making conceptually, but also a self-conscious
literary feature of the text that is one of many pieces of evidence that suggest we are to read this
text not only as an argument but as a story. Rousseau emphasizes again and again that what he is
doing in The Second Discourse is an imaginative exercise, calling his actions “hypothetical and
conditional reasonings,” that bring us beyond both philosophy and science.102 To me that sounds
very much like another way of saying “story.” What is more, at least since Starobinski, The Second
Discourse has often been compared to the story of the fall of humankind from a prelapsarian state
of grace in the garden of Eden. The Eden story is richly filled with literary details that inform its
“argument” about the dangers of knowledge. Many of the most famous of these details have to do
with physical bodies––the nakedness of Adam and Eve, God’s removal of the serpent’s legs, the
Trees of Good and Evil and Knowledge. Indeed, as Abdelfattah Kilito points out at the beginning
of La langue d’Adam, the realm of the physical body and the world of human language intersect
in the the tasting of the fruit of knowledge through the image of the “langue,” the tongue,
“L'ambiguïté est originelle; nous pouvons la faire remonter à l'arbre situé au milieu du paradis, à
l'arbre de la connaissance (The ambiguity is original. We can trace it to the tree in the middle of
Paradise, the tree of knowledge).103
In this last section of this chapter, I would like to briefly argue this: the literary dimension
of The Second Discourse is not merely an ornamental feature of the text, but reflects Rousseau’s
understanding of how a piece of writing can act as a remedy for the kind of illness he believes
102
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humanity has. Concretely, I understand Rousseau as saying that our constitutions have become so
corrupt in civil society that we no longer even seek to know the truth about the inequality that
surrounds us, much less its origins. Because of this, ordinary philosophical arguments that seek to
persuade through reason alone are not effective at awakening people to change anything. Instead,
what a writer must first do is get the attention of his audience through a compelling story, and this
is what Rousseau does in The Second Discourse––he tells a story about the brutal and unflattering
realities of human society. We are not creatures endowed with perfect reason. We are not morally
upright beings. We are not fair. We are violent and greedy and sick. Rosenblatt and Neuhouser
have both argued that Rousseau makes creative use of amour propre itself to redirect the passionate
elements of our nature towards patriotism or towards a society that recognizes and protects the
freedom of all individuals.104 Focusing on the literary dimensions of The Second Discourse adds
to these historical and philosophical approaches. In short, I argue that it is through the dark story
of our wretched conditions that Rousseau seeks to use the flames of amour propre to bring about
an inner illumination in his readers.
As a literary feature of The Second Discourse, the evolution of the word constitution
embodies the deterioration of the human being which results from our gradual estrangement from
the state of nature. The further away we get from the state of nature, the more the meaning of the
word appears to wear down from its original biological and medical meanings to unstable political
ones, until eventually the word disappears entirely. From another angle, however, this same
evolution also captures the principle by which Rousseau believes governments could be justly
formed––namely, that they must develop out of, in response to, and as a reflection of our original
constitutions as beings, rather than the caricatures of human nature and natural law that he observed
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the powers that be in eighteenth-century France using to justify their exploitation. The portraits of
human nature that figures like Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, and Mandeville offered prior to
Rousseau differed in many ways, but they shared an idea that humankind in the state of nature was
not self-sufficient. For Hobbes, pre-social humanity was a creature of destructive (and selfdestructive) passions. For Pufendorf, humankind in the state of nature had been feeble and weak.
For Locke, we were endowed with reason, but disordered and chaotic. For Mandeville, we were
naturally selfish, but not self-sufficient, for we were vulnerable to being made social (and
dependent) through the manipulation of our innate senses of pride and shame. 105 In this light, one
of Rousseau’s achievements in The Second Discourse lies in the way he identified a point of
intersection between these different views of human nature in their attribution to humankind of a
need for recognition, which required other humans to fulfill.
Against this prevailing emphasis on the need for recognition, Rousseau posited that human
beings in the state of nature, though they could and did collaborate with each other, did not
originally need recognition from others at all, but were as Jerrold Seigel puts it “whole and selfcontained.”106 Instead, our need for recognition arose through the same gradual, barely perceptible
changes in our constitutions that I covered in the last section of this chapter. One way of thinking
about how Rousseau intervened in the debates about human nature of his day is to say that he
staked a subtle claim about the precedence and significance of a quality that would come to be
known in the centuries after him as “authenticity,” though for Rousseau this was not only a moral
quality, but a feature of good, physical health.107 As humanity departed from the state of nature in
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which we felt no need, according to Rousseau, for recognition from others, our constitutions
deteriorated, our desire to be recognized by others grew stronger as we grew weaker, we became
less authentic, until eventually “Il falut pour son avantage se montrer autre que ce qu’on étoit en
effet. Etre et paroître devinrent deux choses tout à fait différentes” (One had to appear to be other
than what one in fact was. To be and to seem became two altogether different things),108 and we
also fell to “demandant toujours aux autres ce que nous sommes et n’osant jamais nous interroger
là-dessus nous mêmes” (always asking others what we are and never daring to question ourselves
on this subject).109 From passages like these that recur in The Second Discourse it becomes clear
that one of the thematic elements in Rousseau’s account of the sorry state of human self-knowledge
is that we do not know that we do not know ourselves and have lost the wish to pursue authentic
self-knowledge at all.
One way of thinking about this familiar theme from The Second Discourse is to say that
Rousseau is telling us that we are living in the dark. We do not see what is really going on, and
thus can do nothing about it. In this regard, though the word lumière occurs regularly in The Second
Discourse, the ability to give light is not attributed to humankind, as such, but to nature, a powerful
repudiation in and of itself of the very idea of lumières, “enlightenment.” The most memorable
images of light in the text are the lightning strike that shows us how to make fire, and the volcanic
eruption that teaches us how to make iron.110 What is more, the lesson of both of these lights is the
same––namely, that even something as lucky as this can be made destructive through human
action, for “Plus l’esprit s'éclairoit, et plus l’industrie se perfectionna” (The more the mind became
enlightened, the more industry was perfected), 111 and industry leads to civil society’s corruption.
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In Emile, in the context of interpreting a children’s fable, Rousseau will later elaborate on what it
means for him to be in the dark. In short, it means to not know what is really going on around you.
Noteworthy in this definition of darkness is the way that it overlaps with ignorance, and for
Rousseau, the fear of the dark has to do less with the darkness itself than with the not knowing. In
this sense, one can understand the darkness of the story Rousseau tells in The Second Discourse
as a way of trying to demonstrate, through a story, how little we know about what is really going
on.
In this sense, Rousseau’s attempt to scare us with a dark story about our society can be
thought of as an attempt at illumination.112 However, to suggest as much is to implicitly observe
Rousseau himself in an act of illumination, and if he considers himself capable of such an act, then
there must be a part of us that is susceptible to giving light. What part of us might this be? One
good candidate is the complex set of qualities that Rousseau captures with liberté, for this is the
quality that Rousseau seems to hold in highest regard, as a divine gift to humanity, and thus it is
makes sense that it could also serve as a kind of illumination. In The Second Discourse the word
liberté is used in at least four senses. First, there is the liberté of the state of nature, captured in
Rousseau’s characterization of human interaction during this period as an association libre, a “free
association,” which entailed no mutual obligation and depended upon immediate, individual
convenience. This meaning of freedom comes close to the idea of “innocence.”113 Second,
Rousseau uses liberté as his word for the most defining and even sacred aspect of the human being,
which not only differentiates us from animals, but also reveals us to be a creation of God. The
clearest instance of this use is when Rousseau rejects Pufendorf’s suggestion that within a social
contract one can legitimately give up one’s liberté in exchange for other goods. I believe one can
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translate this meaning of freedom as “individual sovereignty,” in social and political contexts, and
“free will” in philosophical ones.114 Third, he uses the idea of liberté in a more specialized sense
as a standard by which to judge the fairness and health of human governments. “Il est donc
incontestable, et c’est la maxime fondamentale de tout le Droit Politique, que les Peuples se sont
donné des Chefs pour défendre leur liberté et non pour les asservir” (It is therefore incontestable,
and it is the fundamental maxim of all political right, that peoples have given themselves leaders
to defend their liberty and not to enslave themselves).115 This third meaning approaches something
like the meaning of the word “liberties” in the plural form in many contemporary Western
societies.
Finally, there is a fourth use of liberté introduced in the dedication to Geneva and
developed further in the second part of the Discourse, which I believe has been overlooked. Many
scholars have commented on Rousseau’s interest in liberté in the first three senses of the word.
Rosenblatt has pointed out that “According to Rousseau, to divest oneself of one’s liberty in favor
of someone else was to offend God. Man could not renounce his God-given freedom and remain
a moral or, properly speaking, human being.”116 Similarly, Neuhouser observes that freedom, for
Rousseau, is humankind’s “essence.”117 Seigel finds in Rousseau’s idea of freedom a commitment
to rebellion against materialist determinism,118 and Starobinski, in comparing Rousseau to Buffon,
claims that where humankind’s spirituality was thought to reside by Buffon in our
“understanding,” for Rousseau it lies in our freedom. In this rich scholarly conversation about the
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meaning of liberté in The Second Discourse, yet another meaning is this––liberté as a form of
nourishment that enters the physical body through the constitution:
Car il en est de la liberté comme de ces alimens solides et succulens, ou de ces vins
généreux, propres à nourir et fortifier les temperamens robustes qui en ont
l’habitude, mais qui accablent, ruinent et enyvrent les foibles et délicats qui n’y
sont point faits.119
For freedom is like those solid and rich foods, or those hearty wines, which are
suited to nourish and fortify robust constitutions who are used to them, but which
overwhelmed, ruin and intoxicate the weak and delicate who are unsuited for
them.120
Given Rousseau’s deeply physicalist account of human nature, I do not think that this passage is
only a metaphor. To the contrary, I believe it signals something essential about how Rousseau
hopes his text will work. He claims right after this passage that people whose constitutions (i.e.
temperaments) have weakened in this way cannot be brought to freedom through a purely
intellectual exercise for “Les Peuples une fois accoutumés à des Maîtres, ne sont plus en état de
s’en passer. S’ils tentent de secouer le joug, ils s’éloignent d’autant plus de la liberté” (Once people
grow used to masters they are no longer able to do without them. If they try to shake off the yoke,
they move all the farther away from liberté).121 Likewise, later on in the Discourse Rousseau will
return to this idea in his critique of how other philosophers speak about liberté ineffectually
precisely because they do not realize that “it is as true of liberty as it is of innocence and virtue,
that their value is felt only as long as one enjoys them oneself, and the taste for them is lost as soon
as they are lost.”122
On this view, one can understand why the physical body and the idea of one’s constitution
needs to play the central role that it does in The Second Discourse, and also why Rousseau might
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deploy such a sophisticated literary strategy around the term. The evolution of the term constitution
is not aimed at persuasion in the classical sense, but at the creation of an unforgettable story. This
is my interpretation of Rousseau’s enigmatic statement near the end of The Second Discourse when
he claims this:
En découvrant et suivant ainsi les routes oubliées et perdues qui de l’état Naturel
ont dû mener l’homme à l’état Civil; en rétablissant, avec les positions
intermédiaires que je viens de marquer, celles que le tems qui me presse m’a fait
supprimer, ou que l’imagination ne m’a point suggérées; tout Lecteur attentif ne
pourra qu’être frappé de l’espace immense qui sépare ces deux états. C’est dans
cette lente succession des choses qu’il verra la solution d’une infinité de problêmes
de morale et de Politique que les Philosophes ne peuvent résoudre.123
In discovering and following thus the forgotten and lost routes that must have led
man from the natural state to the civil state; in reestablishing, along with the
intermediary positions I have just noted, those that the pressure of time has made
me suppress or that imagination has not suggested to me, every attentive reader
cannot fail to be struck by the immense space that separates these two states. It is
in this slow succession of things that he [i.e. the reader] will see the solution to an
infinite number of problems of morals and politics which the philosophers cannot
resolve.”124
The “slow succession of things” here must refer to the story that he has told about the fall of
humankind from a state of nature, and in particular, by comparing this sentence to the following
earlier one from the preface, I believe we can say that what Rousseau is specifically referring to
by “cette lente succession” are the changes in our physical constitutions. In the fourth paragraph
of the preface he tells us that “Il est aisé de voir que c’est dans ces changemens successifs de la
constitution humaine qu’il faut chercher la premiére origine des différences qui distinguent les
hommes” (It is easy to see that it is in these successive changes to the human constitution that one
must seek the first origin of the differences that distinguish men…).125 Likewise, he emphasizes
in images like the Glaucus statue “les changemens arrivés à la constitution des Corps.” Evidence
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like this leads me to believe that this key sentence primarily refers to a study of humanity’s
gradually changing constitution. What is more, this sentence is the only time that Rousseau
addresses the reader (Lecteur) with the instruction of paying attention to something specific.126 As
a result, my interpretation is that when Rousseau says “tout Lecteur attentif ne pourra qu’être
frappé de l’espace immense qui sépare ces deux états. C’est dans cette lente succession des choses
qu’il verra la solution d’une infinite de problems,” he is signaling to us that the remedy is to be
found in paying attention to the changes in our constitution––a highly self-conscious literary
gesture that draws attention to the way he has let the word’s meaning gradually develop through
the text.
Interestingly, however, as we turn towards exploring Rousseau’s use of what Anna Akasoy
has called elsewhere “philosophy in the narrative mode,”127 we encounter a possible tension in
Rousseau’s thought between his literary tactic in The Second Discourse and his critique of
literature in The First Discourse, as well in The Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theater. These two
texts differ in their audiences and contexts, but they share the general idea that art, if in some cases
it can serve to enrich us, also has the potential to inculcate the corrosive values of society,
aggravate our amour propre, and leave us, as a result, in a weakened and further alienated
condition. In particular, in The Letter to M. d’Alembert, Rousseau highlights the danger of arts that
are sold directly to a public because, as Rosenblatt highlights, these often present what the public
wants to see rather than what it would be good for them to see.128
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However, in Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling brought attention to the fact that
there are two genres of literature that escape Rousseau’s critique of the narrative arts––oratory and
the novel.129 Trilling points out that in The Letter to M. d’Alembert Rousseau praises the
“contemplative readings” that he associates with the solitary experience of novel-reading among
the English, and Trillings observation rings true to the text:
De ce goût commun pour la solitude, naît aussi celui des lectures contemplatives et
des Romans dont L’Angleterre est inondée. Ainsi tous deux, plus recueillis avec
eux-mêmes, se livrent moins à des imitations frivoles; prennent mieux le goût des
vrais plaisirs de la vie, et songent moins à paraître heureux qu’à L’être.130
From this common taste for solitude arises a taste for the contemplative readings
and the novels with which England is inundated. Thus both [men and women],
withdrawn more into themselves, give themselves less to frivolous imitations, get
more of a taste for the true pleasures of life, and think less of appearing happy
than of being so. 131
The nature of the exception here seems clear and relevant to the story in The Second Discourse in
thre ways: First of all, what Rousseau praises about the reading of certain novels is that it does not
lend itself to “imitations frivoles.” That is, it doesn’t present an artificially pleasant view of the
mimesis of social life in which everyone seeks to appear more impressive than everyone else. In
its decidedly pessimistic view of social life, The Second Discourse avoids all frivolity in this sense.
Second of all, Rousseau approves of novels that aren’t focused on giving the reader a superficial
kind of pleasure, but instead satisfy “le goût des vrais plaisirs de la vie,” a taste for the true
pleasures of life. Third, Rousseau thinks that the experience of arts in solitude have a particular
value that they do not have in public, so he (sometimes) approves of novel-reading because it is a
solitary exercise that affords an opportunity to reflect apart from the corrupting forces of public
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life. The Second Discourse falls into this category, too. Rousseau’s exception for the novel, of
course, does not extend categorically to all novels, but among the ones like Samuel Richardson’s
Clarissa which he embraces, his acceptance lies in the fact that these novels do not aggravate our
vanity. In addition, they also provide a special, solitary opportunity to encounter for oneself what
Rousseau will later call in the Reveries “the sentiment of being,”132 an experience that is the
antithesis of self-alienation and serves as one of the foundations for Rousseau’s concept of
authenticity.133
On the level of its formal structure, The Second Discourse, is, of course, not a novel, but
Rousseau’s qualified embrace of what Trilling calls the novel’s “salubrious” effects can
nevertheless provide a lens through which to understand how Rousseau may have imagined how
The Second Discourse worked. Namely, it is not only a theoretical text or a political tract aimed at
dispelling the myths about human nature through the exercise of reason, but also a kind of
storytelling cure that seeks to heal the human constitution through nourishing our liberté and
bringing about an act of private, inner illumination. In this respect, I think it worth considering
again, from a different angle, how often amour propre and the passions are described as a kind of
fire, for fire is both destructive and illuminating, and Rousseau himself affirms for us that
“Quoiqu’en dissent les Moralistes, l’entendement humain doit beaucoup aux Passions” (Whatever
the moralists say about it, human understanding owes a lot to the passions).134 In his treatment of
the Letter to D’Alembert, Starobinski frames Rousseau’s turn to telling his own story as a form of
psychological “regression” away from a real audience into an increasingly isolated inner world.135
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Even understanding the details of Rousseau’s later personal life and isolation, however, I think we
can still ask whether this turn inwards need to be read regressively? Isn’t “inwards” where both
the problem and the solution lie on Rousseau’s own account? If society really is as sick as
Rousseau has made it out to be, isn’t it a reasonable thing to do to find a way to withdraw and gain
perspective? Here, I think, one finds something truly distinctive about Rousseau’s storytelling cure
in The Second Discourse. Unlike the story Galen tells about his teacher Eudemus, and unlike the
stories of Shahrazad to king Shahriyar, Rousseau’s story appears intended, in part, to cure through
encouraging the individual to seek solitude––to seek an inner light––rather than society.
On this reading, Rousseau was not the butcher of human nature he was taken to be by
contemporaries like Voltaire,136 but its surgeon. He sought through telling us the dark story of our
constitutions in The Second Discourse to open an inner cavity in which we might have a chance to
see something that he felt he had seen with clarity: Namely, that the darkness of the world reflects
a darkness in our own bodies and minds, such that humanity itself has become “opprimée au
dedans par une suite des précautions mêmes qu’elle avoit prises contre ce qui la menaçoit au
dehors” (oppressed from within as a consequence of the very precautions it had taken against that
which menaced it from without).137 It is worth remembering, too, what Rousseau tells us these
precautions were. Above all, it was the precaution against the loss of liberté that drove us blindly
into civil society.138 To find our way back, according to Rousseau, we need to spend time, like the
English novel readers, with stories in solitude, for it is in this individual solitude that the
glimmering roots of the remedy lie.
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Conclusion
An Old Idea with Enormous Wings
How old is the storytelling cure? Taking a path that Rousseau would probably have loved
to explore, in The Prehistory of the Mind Steven Mithen provides a model from contemporary
cognitive archaeology for thinking about the origins of human art, religion, and science. The
storytelling cures I have studied here are a combination of these three elements, so it makes sense
to me to start looking here.1 Mithen calls his model “the cathedral theory.” It works like this.
Prior to the arrival of homo sapiens sapiens around 100,000 years ago, the early human
mind developed not as a single unified processing machine, but as a group of independent
“specialized intelligences.” There was technical intelligence (i.e. tools), natural-history
intelligence (i.e. knowledge of wildlife patterns), social intelligence (i.e. knowledge of
relationships, care for the sick), and linguistic intelligence.2 Originally, each of these intelligences
developed in its own chamber, separated from the others by a kind of cognitive wall, with just a
bit of permeability between social and linguistic intelligence. Then, between 60,000 and 30,000
years ago, something dramatically changed in the human mind. As a result of this change, a
“cultural explosion” occurred from which we get the first bone artifacts in southern Africa, the
first animal parts being placed in human burials in the Near East, and our earliest extant examples
of human art, such as the Hohlenstein-Stadel Lion-Man statue.3 According to the cathedral theory,
all of this started to happen for a simple reason––the walls in our minds came down. As the separate
chambers of the mind got in contact with each other, the inner life of the human being, which had
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been bounded by a collection of specialized containers of knowing, became for the first time a
fluid conversation. On this theory, it was this conversation between different modes of knowing
within each of us that opened up the possibility of art, science, and religion as we know it today.4
If I had to guess when the storytelling cure first emerged as a human practice, I would place it
here, during this cultural explosion in the early part of the Upper Paleolithic.
This is the reason why I have not sought to give a definite historical point of origin for the
storytelling cure, and it is also the reason why I think this topic offers a tremendously rich space
in which to carry out cross-cultural studies. In this dissertation, I have presented a first set of these,
focused on a specific medical tradition––the work of Galen of Pergamum. Thus, in chapter one, I
turned to Galen himself and the case history of his teacher Eudemus. I argued that Galen’s practice
of prognōsis is more than a calculation about the future. It is also a storytelling cure intended to
bring about a salutary change through relieving fear, creating joyful surprise, and celebrating life
as an unfolding experience of discovery. Then, in chapter two, I analyzed a different kind of
storytelling cure in a different kind of text––the cure of king Shahriyar by the storyteller Shahrazad
in the stories known today as 1001 Nights. Here, I argued that Shahrazad follows the principles of
Galenic humoral theory in selecting her stories and also integrates the reception history of the
medieval Arabic tradition of melancholy, as represented by figures like Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. Finally,
in chapter three, I turned to yet another kind of storytelling cure in a third kind of text––Rousseau’s
story of the fall of humankind in The Second Discourse. This text has been read as a powerful
condemnation of the darkness of civil society, but in my reading of it I also identified ways that
Rousseau uses the darkness of the story as the rudiments of a remedy to light up reality.
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There are many differences between these three cures. For one thing, each patient is
suffering from a different illness. Eudemus has malaria. King Shahriyar is mentally ill, and for
Rousseau all of civil society suffers from an excess of amour propre in its most destructive forms.
The qualifications of the doctorly figure in each are also all different. Galen is a Hippocratic
physician in close conversation with Stoicism and the literary cultures of his day. Shahrazad is a
combination of Persian heroine, courtly wife, and qayna. Rousseau is a daring philosopher. The
cultures in which the cures are offered likewise differ. Galen offers his prognōsis in the highly
public world of the Second Sophistic in Antonine Rome. Shahrazad tells her stories in the private
bedchamber of the king of Sassan. Rousseau publishes his story through an essay contest convened
by the Academy of Dijon.
At the same time, these cures share things as well. First of all, each cure depends upon a
psychosomatic principle that holds that the life of the body and the state of the mind are deeply
interdependent. Galen must be able to distinguish emotional disturbances in Eudemus’s sphugmos
(pulse) from those that signal a coming fever. Shahrazad works through the corporeal effects of
Shahriyar’s wahm (imagination) to restore his humoral balance. Rousseau seeks to nourish our
capacity and appetite for liberté in our bodily constitutions. Second of all, each cure requires the
storyteller to build trust with the listener. Eudemus originally thinks highly of Galen, but
principally as a philosopher, not as a physician. As a result, Galen’s first job is to win his teacher’s
trust as a doctor. King Shahriyar was betrayed by his wife, and he has been killing a new wife
every night for three years. At the peril of her own life, Shahrazad, too, must find a way to
reestablish trust. Rousseau’s essay carries a painful message about humanity’s state that no one
would listen to unless they trust its writer. Third, and finally, each storytelling cure is a narrative
of hope offered at a time of darkness. This may be the most unifying of the three similarities.
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Eudemus has malaria during the major mortality event known today as the Antonine pandemic.
Shahriyar himself is a major mortality event, and according to Rousseau, the whole world––
including nature––was about to be destroyed by despotism. In this light, storytelling cures are a
powerful resource, adaptable to many situations, and transmittable across cultures.
I would like to close with one last storytelling cure. This one lies beyond the Galenic
medical tradition that has been my principal focus, but speaks to the themes I have just highlighted.
In “Un señor muy viejo con unas alas enormes” (A Very Old Man with Enormous Wings), Gabriel
García Márquez tells the story of a very old man who arrives one day in a rural village in the
middle of a storm of crabs. The old man has wings. Some say he is an angel. His appearance is
strange to the community whose world he falls into. He lands at the house of a man named Pelayo
and a woman named Elisenda. He doesn’t speak their language, and they don’t speak his either.
At first, they are afraid of this Old Man, but before long they realize that he is a subject of wonder
to many. What is more, people are willing to pay to see him. Pelayo and Elisenda sense an
opportunity for wealth, and they act on it. They advertise that the Old Man is staying with them,
and they charge admission to see him.
A kind of circus emerges, which lasts for a while, but eventually the world grows used to
the old man, and people stop coming to see him. Pelayo and Elisenda are rich. They have a twostory house now, and they, too, stop seeing the Old Man. He lives in their backyard in the chicken
coop. Everyone avoids him except Pelayo and Elisenda’s child. One day, the child goes into the
chicken coop to play and comes down with chicken pox. The Old Man gets sick as well. When the
doctor comes to see the sick child, he can’t resist the chance to listen to the Old Man’s heart. What
he hears is a kind of story in miniature, “tantos soplos en el corazón y tantos ruidos en los riñones,
que no le pareció possible que estuviera vivo” (so much puffing and blowing in his heart and so
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many sounds in his kidney that it didn’t seem possible for him to be alive). 5 Time passes. The
child recovers and begins school. The chicken coop collapses. The Old Man stops eating and
appears to go partially blind. His wings have been stripped bare by his illness. One night he
becomes delirious with fever and sounds like the ones the doctor heard deep in the Old Man’s
heart emerge from his mouth in the form of a Norwegian tongue-twister. Pelayo and Elisenda are
convinced the Old Man is about to die.
But he does not die. Instead, after surviving the worst nights of a cold November, he
appears to improve with the sunny days of December. Fresh feathers begin to grow on his wings.
They are not pretty to look at, but the Old Man appears to understand the meaning of their arrival.
He guards them like a secret. Meanwhile, at night he sings sea shanties to himself under the stars,
and his health continues to improve. This timing suggests to me that there is something in these
stories about the sea that helps the Old Man to heal. Some aliveness in them. Elisenda spends all
day chopping onions and complaining about the Old Man’s erratic presence. She says it feels like
he's everywhere, multiplying himself into numerous new forms. The Old Man ignores her
complaints. Eventually, one day, after a very long period in this strange land, the Old Man takes
flight, ungainly, but unencumbered.
As the old man flies off and becomes a dot on Elisenda’s horizon, I believe he offers one
more example of how the storytelling cure can work. We tend to assume that the story must be
told by someone to someone else, but in Márquez’s story the storyteller, the sick person, and the
listener are one. The doctor does not understand the sounds of the Old Man’s heart, but these puffs
and whistles are his story, just as the tongue-twisters are his story, and the sea shanties are his
story. It is true that we have no idea how these stories cure the Old Man of an illness that seemed
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bent on killing him, but that, too, may be part of the point. Márquez does not leave us within the
limits of Elisenda’s mind, but he also does not bring us into the Old Man’s mind either. Do we
need to be brought in to appreciate the cure? I don’t think so. I’m not sure that storytelling cures
owe their wide circulation in human cultures to being easy to understand. I think, again, of
Winnicott and the boy with the string. There is a basic mystery in the idea. This is part of why it
calls out for humanistic study. The image of the Old Man flying off is a fitting one to close with–
–the angel who survived a sickness on earth and sang himself into the strength of a new story.
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